Bergsrud v. Bank of America NA et al

Filing 21

ORDER Denying 8 Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Remand to State Court and Denying 7 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge James C. Mahan on 01/23/2014. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - AC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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PATRICK BERGSRUD,

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2:13-CV-998 JCM (VCF)

Plaintiff(s),

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v.

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BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,

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Defendant(s).

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ORDER

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Presently before the court is plaintiff Patrick Bergsrud’s motion to remand to state court.

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(Doc. # 8). Defendants Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”) and Bank of America, N.A. filed

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a response (doc. # 17) to which defendant Saxon Mortgage Company joined (doc. # 19). Plaintiff

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filed a reply. (Doc. # 18).

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I.

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Background
Ocwen removed this action from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Ocwen cited

this court’s diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as the basis for removal.

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This case arises out of plaintiff’s claim that defendants wrongfully foreclosed upon his home

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on January 20, 2012. In this case, plaintiff seeks quiet title to the property in question as well as other

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forms of relief.

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Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was originally filed in Clark County District Court on April

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4, 2013. Prior to the filing of plaintiff’s complaint, a separate eviction proceeding had been

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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

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commenced against plaintiff in Las Vegas Justice Court. This proceeding was dismissed on June 17,

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2013.

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II. Discussion

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Plaintiff bases the instant motion entirely upon the “prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine.”

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This doctrine holds that, “when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court

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will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the same res.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co.,

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2013 WL 2364178 (Nev. 2013) (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006)).

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Departing from the ordinary application of this doctrine, plaintiff requests that the court

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remand this case on the basis of the prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine even though the state court

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action regarding the property has been dismissed. In support of his argument, plaintiff refers to cases

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stating, “The unilateral activity of another person cannot satisfy the requirement of contact between

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an out of state defendant and the forum” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,

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298 (1980). Plaintiff states that because defendants are trying to avoid the application of the prior-

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exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine by dismissing their action in state court, that they should be “estopped

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from unilaterally creating jurisdiction.”

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However, plaintiff fails to recognize that the concerns embodied in the “minimum contacts”

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doctrine are very different than those of the prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine. Cases such as

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World-Wide Volkswagen make clear that a plaintiff’s unilateral actions cannot create jurisdiction

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because of the due process concerns inherent in requiring a party to defend himself in a forum with

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which he has made no intentional contact, and in which he cannot “reasonably anticipate being haled

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into court.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.

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In stark contrast, the purpose of the prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine is “the maintenance

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of comity between courts; such harmony is especially compromised by state and federal judicial

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systems attempting to assert concurrent control over the res upon which jurisdiction of each

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depends.” United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1989).

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While unilateral action by a plaintiff to establish a defendant’s minimum contacts

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contravenes due process, unilateral action voluntarily dismissing a state court case raises no similar

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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

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concerns. Furthermore, a party’s dismissal of a state court action involving property that is at the

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heart of an ongoing case in federal court alleviates problems of federalism and possible discord

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between the courts. For this reason, plaintiff’s arguments relating to “unilateral action” are entirely

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misplaced in the context of the prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine.

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Therefore, because the action in Nevada state court involving the property that is at the heart

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of this case has been dismissed, the prior-exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not apply and

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plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

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Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiff’s amended motion

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to remand (doc. # 8) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to remand (doc. # 7) be, and the same
hereby is, DENIED.
DATED January 23, 2014.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

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