Takiguchi et al v. MRI International, Inc. et al
Filing
183
ORDER on 133 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Howard D. McKibben on 9/18/2014. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DKJ)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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SHIGE TAKIGUCHI, FUMI NONAKA,
)
MITSUAKI TAKITA, KAORUKO KOIZUMI, )
TATSURO SAKAI, SHIZUKO ISHIMORI, )
YOKO HATANO, YUKO NAKAMURA,
)
HIDEHITO MIURA, YOSHIKO TAZAKI, )
MASAAKI MORIYA, HATSUNE HATANO, )
SATORU MORIYA, HIDENAO TAKAMA,
)
SHIGERU KURISU, SAKA ONO,
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KAZUHIRO MATSUMOTO, KAYA
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HATANAKA, HIROKA YAMAJIRI,
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KIYOHARU YAMAMOTO, JUNKO
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YAMAMOTO, KOICHI INOUE, AKIKO
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NARUSE, TOSHIMASA NOMURA, and
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RITSU YURIKUSA, Individually and )
on Behalf of All Others Similarly )
Situated,
)
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Plaintiffs,
)
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vs.
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MRI INTERNATIONAL, INC., EDWIN J )
FUJINAGA, JUNZO SUZUKI, PAUL
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MUSASHI SUZUKI, LVT, INC., dba
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STERLING ESCROW, and DOES 1-500, )
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Defendants.
)
_________________________________ )
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2:13-cv-01183-JAD-VCF
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against defendants
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in connection with the alleged operation of a Ponzi scheme.
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Defendant MRI is alleged to be a Nevada corporation headquartered
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in Las Vegas with a branch in Tokyo, Japan, operated by its
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president and CEO, Edwin Fujinaga.
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controlled by Junzo Suzuki.
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Suzuki, Junzo Suzuki marketed and solicited for purchase MRI
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securities in Japan.
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MRI’s Tokyo operations were
Together with his son, Paul Musashi
The Suzukis reside in Tokyo and Hawaii.
On behalf of the proposed class, plaintiffs have moved for a
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preliminary injunction “restraining and enjoining Junzo Suzuki and
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Paul Suzuki, their agents and representatives, from transferring,
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converting, selling, concealing, any of their assets for purposes
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other than normal living expenses.” (Doc. #133).
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ask that the Suzukis be ordered to immediately disclose the nature
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and location of any assets.
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plaintiffs have replied (#139).
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Plaintiffs also
The Suzukis have opposed (#135), and
MRI purports to deal in the purchase and collection of
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“Medical Accounts Receivable” (“MARs”).
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has recruited more than 8,000 Japanese investors paying in more
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than a billion dollars, promising a solid and safe rate of return
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on their investment.
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promised that investor funds would be: (1) maintained in a separate
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“lockbox” managed by an independent escrow company; (2) used only
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to transact in MARs; and (3) guaranteed by state laws.
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argue none of this was true, and that in fact MRI used investor
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funds to pay off earlier investors, conduct its business, and
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finance the lavish lifestyles of its principals, resulting in an
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inability to now repay its investors.
Since the late 1990s, MRI
In promotional materials, the company
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Plaintiffs
1
In 2012, customers began complaining to authorities in Japan
2
that MRI was not paying on matured investments.
Japan’s Financial
3
Services Agency (“FSA”) began an investigation.
On April 26, 2013,
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the FSA (Kanto Local Finance Bureau) revoked MRI’s license.
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FSA adopted the recommendation of the Japanese Securities and
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Exchange Surveillance Commission (“SESC”), which found that MRI had
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failed to separately hold investor monies and since at least 2011
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had commingled those assets with MRI’s own, that investor monies
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had been used to pay dividends to other investors, that MRI had
The
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made false statements to FSA during the investigation, and that MRI
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had planned to continue soliciting new investors in 2013, even
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after it became clear it could no longer repay the ones it already
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had. (Doc. # 133-4 (Igarishi Decl. ¶ 2 & Exs. A-B)).
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MRI has stopped paying on its maturing contracts and already
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owes more than $3,300,000.00, and that number continues to
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increase.
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(Doc. #134 (Taenaka Decl. ¶ 18)).
The third amended complaint (“TAC”) alleges, and plaintiffs
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assert, that the Suzukis were primary actors in consummating MRI’s
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fraud on investors, that they were in charge of virtually all of
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MRI’s solicitations and interactions with the investors, and that
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they repeatedly made many of the misrepresentations alleged.
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particular, plaintiffs allege the Suzukis represented, at seminars
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and other social gatherings, that:
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used only to purchase MARS; (2) U.S. laws protected investors’
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funds; (3) investor funds would be kept in a separate “lockbox” in
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escrow, which account was a specialized bank account used for
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collecting receivables and which required that the face value of
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the receivables purchased exceed the actual amount paid to purchase
3
In
(1) investor funds would be
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them; (4) only companies that passed a rigorous test were eligible
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to open lockbox accounts; (5) the escrow company made it impossible
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for MRI to touch investors’ assets; and (6) the escrow system
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ensured segregation of funds, which protected the funds from
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creditors in the event that MRI became insolvent. (TAC ¶¶ 46, 47,
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51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64; see also Doc. #133-5 (Tobita Decl.
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¶ 4)).
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supported by ample evidence.
9
W, X, Y)).
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That all or most of these statements were not true is
(See Doc. #134 (Taenaka Decl. Exs. V,
Various of the Suzukis’ assets have been provisionally
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attached by the courts in Japan.
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2).
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the Suzukis have taken steps to conceal their interests in some of
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their assets, suggesting, the plaintiffs argue, that the Suzukis
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will continue to dissipate, hide, conceal, or distance themselves
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from these and other assets before judgment is reached in this
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litigation.
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the Suzukis’ assets.
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(Id. Hiroshi Yamaguchi Decl. ¶
However, since MRI’s fraud was uncovered, plaintiffs allege
Accordingly, the plaintiffs move for an order freezing
“An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is an
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extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing
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that the [plaintiffs are] entitled to such relief.”
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Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Earth Island
To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must show: (1)
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they will probably prevail on the merits; (2) they will likely
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suffer irreparable injury if relief is denied; (3) the balance of
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equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the
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public interest.
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U.S. 7, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555
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Alternatively, an injunction may issue under the “sliding
2
scale” approach if there are serious questions going to the merits
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and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiffs’ favor,
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so long as plaintiffs still show a likelihood of irreparable injury
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and that an injunction is in the public interest.
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Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).
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“Serious questions are those which cannot be resolved one way or
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the other at the hearing on the injunction.”
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Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2003).
Alliance for
Bernhardt v. Los
They “need
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not promise a certainty of success, nor even present a probability
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of success, but must involve a ‘fair chance of success on the
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merits.’”
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1362 (9th Cir. 1988).
Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355,
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1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
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Plaintiffs allege, and the Suzukis have not disputed, that the
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Suzukis were virtually the sole face of MRI in Japan.
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Suzukis who marketed MRI securities, solicited plaintiffs to
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invest, and repeatedly represented at seminars, social gatherings,
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and tours that investing in MRI was safe and secure – a promise
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that plaintiffs have already shown was demonstrably false.
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Musashi Suzuki also made these and similar misrepresentations in
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VIMO.
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It was the
The Suzukis also controlled MRI’s Japan operations.
Paul
Junzo
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Suzuki was MRI’s foreign registered representative, which vested
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him with authority to act on the corporation’s behalf, and he was
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in control of MRI’s Tokyo office. (Mot. Prelim. Inj. Yamaguchi
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Decl. ¶¶ 2-3). Paul Musashi Suzuki managed the Tokyo branch. (TAC ¶
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90).
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While the Suzukis argue that they had no knowledge that MRI
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was defrauding its investors until Japanese authorities began their
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investigation1, the record establishes that the Suzukis were
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intimately involved in MRI’s operations and either knew, or
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recklessly disregarded, that MRI was perpetrating a fraud.
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the Suzukis argue that their roles were limited to marketing and
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solicitation and that they had no involvement in, or access to,
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MRI’s financial dealings, they have not disputed that they were,
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along with Fujinaga, the principal individuals controlling and
Though
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coordinating the business of MRI.
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MRI is corroborated by the fact that both Suzukis were present at
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several meetings with Fujinaga in which issues fundamental to MRI’s
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business were discussed, including its affiliate companies and the
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contents of the annual business report.
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filings in S.E.C. case against Fujinaga and MRI that describe audio
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recordings seized from Junzo Suzuki’s residence in Tokyo)).
Their critical positions within
(See TAC ¶ 76 (citing
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Plaintiffs also allege that the Suzukis were involved in
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drafting and submitting the annual reports to Japanese regulators,
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which materially conflicted with materials sent to MRI’s investors.
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That the Suzukis were involved in drafting the annual reports is
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supported by the fact that Junzo Suzuki submitted the reports under
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his seal, (Doc. #140 (Igarishi Decl. ¶ 3), and apparently by the
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audio recordings referenced in the S.E.C. case.
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exists that the figures in these documents were inconsistent in
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material ways, (see Doc. #140 (Igarish Decl. ¶¶ 4-9 & Exs A-H), and
Ample evidence
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The Suzukis believe documents prepared by the Japanese SESC will
corroborate that they had no knowledge of the fraud. However, the court
does not have before it any such documents.
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that demonstrates at least serious questions going to whether the
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Suzukis were on actual or constructive notice of the discrepancies,
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and thus of MRI’s fraud.
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In addition, the Suzukis and their close relatives
received
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commissions in excess of twenty-two million dollars between 2009
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and 2013.
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that virtually all of the control of MRI was exercised by Fujinaga
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and the Suzukis, supports an inference that the Suzukis were aware
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of – or should have been aware of – the fraud.
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These substantial commissions, coupled with the fact
(Taenaka Decl. ¶¶
7-12)).
Finally, faxes sent by Fujinaga to the Suzukis beginning in
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April 2012 essentially informed the Suzukis that MRI was engaged in
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a Ponzi scheme. (Taenaka Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. U).
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faxes could have been interpreted by the Suzukis as revealing only
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that MRI’s funds were not being distributed to investors because of
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an escrow audit, it is not disputed that the Suzukis continued to
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solicit investors and represent MRI as a safe investment when they
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knew, or should have known, that MRI could not repay its maturing
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investments.
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control over the activities when he directed Fujinaga to pay
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investors who might complain to the authorities.
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(Taenaka Decl. Ex. U)).
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that the Suzukis attempted to conceal MRI’s fraud.
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And, even if the
Significantly, Junzo Suzuki exercised considerable
(Doc. #134
Such conduct creates a strong inference
On the same facts presented to this court, the Japanese court
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has attached the Suzukis’ assets in Japan.
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action filed by the S.E.C. against, among others, Fujinaga and MRI,
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Fujinaga and MRI have entered into a stipulated preliminary
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injunction and asset freeze.
Further, in the related
Finally, this court has already
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issued a preliminary injunction against MRI and Fujinaga, as
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officer of MRI, after finding that plaintiffs were likely to
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succeed on their claims of fraud, breach of contract, and
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securities violations against MRI and Fujinaga, as officer of MRI.
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The Suzukis argue that the fact they transferred their own
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funds to MRI and encouraged their family members to invest with MRI
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shows they did not have any knowledge of MRI’s fraud.
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that the Suzukis encouraged family members to invest with MRI is
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not supported by any evidence in the record.
However,
Further, combined
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with the faxes in which they requested that Fujinaga pay certain
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investors, (Doc. #134 (Taenaka Decl. Ex. U)), the fact the Suzukis
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transferred some of their own funds to MRI in 2012 supports an
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inference that they did so to avoid detection by authorities of
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MRI’s massive fraud.
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Fraud requires the plaintiffs to show:
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(1)
a false representation made by the defendant;
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(2)
the defendant’s knowledge or belief that the
representation was false (or an insufficient basis
for making the representation);
(3)
the defendant’s intention to induce the plaintiff to
act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon the
misrepresentation;
(4)
the plaintiff’s justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation; and
(5)
damage to the plaintiff resulting from such
reliance.
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Bulbman, Inc. v. Nev. Bell, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (Nev. 1992).
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Plaintiffs’ allegations and the evidence produced establishes that
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plaintiffs are likely to prove that the Suzukis repeatedly made
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false representations to the plaintiffs in order to sell MRI
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securities.
The evidence is persuasive that the Suzukis were aware
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of, or should have been aware of, the fraud at the time they made
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the representations and at the time they received commissions from
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MRI.
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the Suzukis promised the investments would be subject to strict
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safeguards.
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manner in which plaintiffs’ investments would be handled.
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Plaintiffs make several specific allegations of misstatements by
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each Suzuki, including that: (1) investor funds would only be used
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to purchase MARS (both); (2) U.S. laws protected investors’ funds
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(both)2; (3) investor funds would be kept in a separate “lockbox”
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in escrow, which account was a specialized bank account used for
12
collecting receivables and which required that the face value of
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the receivables purchased exceed the actual amount paid to purchase
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them (both); (4) only companies that passed a rigorous test were
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eligible to open lockbox accounts (both); (5) the escrow company
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made it impossible for MRI to touch investors’ assets (both); and
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(6) the escrow system ensured segregation of funds, which protected
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the funds from creditors in the event that MRI became insolvent
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(Paul Musashi Suzuki).
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they intended for the representations to induce the plaintiffs into
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making investments, the plaintiffs justifiably relied on the
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representations in deciding to enter into contracts with MRI, and
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plaintiffs will suffer the damage of losing most, if not all, of
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the money they invested.
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plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their fraud claim against the
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Suzukis, or at the very least there are serious questions going to
Plaintiffs invested large sums of money with defendants after
The Suzukis made false representations about the
They knew these representations were false,
The court therefore concludes that
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2
The TAC also details several statements made by Paul Musashi Suzuki
in VIMO that relate to this general statement.
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that claim.
2
For the same reasons, plaintiffs are also likely to prevail on
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their claim of constructive trust.
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defined as a remedial device by which the holder of legal title to
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property is held to be a trustee for the benefit of another who in
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good conscience is entitled to it. The requirement that a
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constructive trustee have title (not mere possession) to the
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property involved is critical to the imposition of a constructive
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trust.”
“A constructive trust has been
Danning v. Lum's, Inc., 478 P.2d 166, 167 (Nev. 1970).
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“[I]mposition of a constructive trust requires: ‘(1) [that] a
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confidential relationship exists between the parties; (2) retention
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of legal title by the holder thereof against another would be
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inequitable; and (3) the existence of such a trust is essential to
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the effectuation of justice.’”
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(Nev. 2008). Constructive trust “is not ‘limited to [fraud and]
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misconduct cases; it redresses unjust enrichment, not wrongdoing.’”
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Id.
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provide relief where a balancing of interests in the context of a
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particular case seems to call for it.”
20
Currency, Ltd., 767 F.2d 1573, 1575 (9th Cir. 1985).
21
Waldman v. Maini, 195 P.3d 850, 857
A constructive trust may be “flexibly fashioned . . . to
In re N. Am. Coin &
The Suzukis argue that one who purchases a tainted asset in
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good faith may not be subjected to a constructive trust, and
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plaintiffs cannot show the Suzukis had actual or constructive
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notice of the fraud at the time they received the tainted
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commissions.
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Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 51 (2000).
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concluded, there is a substantial likelihood that plaintiffs will
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prove that the Suzukis knew of the fraud.
See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney,
As the court has previously
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The Suzukis repeatedly
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offered the plaintiffs what they represented was a safe and secure
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investment, and the plaintiffs in turn invested their assets, and
3
in some cases their life savings, with MRI.
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established that there are at least serious questions as to whether
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such actions on the part of the Suzukis created a confidential
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relationship.
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principals in MRI’s fraudulent scheme, and they obtained
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substantial commissions that came directly from plaintiffs’
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investments funds.
Plaintiffs have
The Suzukis, along with Fujinaga, were the
Thus, the court finds plaintiffs are likely to
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succeed on their a constructive trust claim as to those assets of
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the Suzukis that can be traced in whole or in part to the
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commissions they received from MRI.
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serious questions going to the merits of their constructive trust
14
claim.
Plaintiffs have shown at least
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2. Irreparable Harm
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While, in general, harm that can be compensated with monetary
17
damages is insufficient to establish a right to injunctive relief,
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irreparable harm may be demonstrated by showing a likelihood of
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dissipation of the claimed assets, or other inability to recover
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monetary damages, if relief is not granted.
21
572 F.3d 1067, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Conn. Gen. Life Ins.
22
Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 321 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir.
23
2003).
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allegations of past fraud coupled with a present ability to
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dissipate funds may satisfy this standard.
26
1067.
27
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Johnson v. Couturier,
Simple allegations of past fraud are insufficient, but
See Couturier, 572 F.3d
Plaintiffs assert there is a danger that the Suzukis will
improperly dissipate or conceal their assets.
11
Specifically, they
1
point to a rapid series of transactions in May 2013, just after the
2
SESC issued its findings, (see supra p. 3), in which a home in
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Hawaii belonging to “Junzo Suzuki Trust” was ultimately transferred
4
to an entity called Puuikena Investments, LLLP, which was formed by
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Paul Musashi Suzuki and Catherine Suzuki (Junzo Suzuki’s children)
6
the same day the transfers began.
7
3-4 & Ex. B)). Puuikena Investments is not as readily associated
8
with the Suzukis as the Junzo Suzuki Trust.
9
made to another piece of real propert located in Hawaii.
(See Doc. #134 (Taenaka Decl. ¶¶
Similar transfers were
(Taenaka
10
Decl. ¶¶ 5).
11
Sonnette3 – cashed out a life insurance policy on the life of Keiko
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Suzuki before it could be attached by Japanese courts, depositing
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the proceeds into its Tokyo bank account; despite the policy having
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paid out nearly $230,000.00, and despite the record showing more
15
than eight million dollars in MRI commissions having been wired to
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Sonnette between 2009 and 2013, only $4,640 remained in the account
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as of November 2013.
18
Doc. #134 (Taenaka Decl. ¶¶ 7-12)).
19
In addition, an entity controlled by the Suzukis –
(Doc. #133-3 (Hiroshi Yamaguchi Decl. ¶ 4);
The Suzukis argue that the assets which plaintiffs identify as
20
improperly dissipated cannot be tied to any commissions received
21
from MRI because they were purchased in 1987, 2002 and 2004 – well
22
before the Suzukis learned of any fraud and well before the class
23
period.
24
would be subject to a constructive trust, they show that the
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Suzukis began taking immediate steps, as soon as MRI’s fraud was
26
uncovered, to divest themselves from some of their assets.
However, regardless of whether these particular assets
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3
See Mot. Prelim. Inj. Takashi Yamaguchi Decl. ¶ 5.
12
A
1
reasonable inference can be drawn that the Suzukis are likely to
2
dissipate or conceal other assets and property paid for, at least
3
in part, with commissions received from MRI.
4
the Suzukis and their entities obtained more than twenty-two
5
million dollars over a four- to five-year period, it is likely that
6
some or all of the assets were paid for, at least in part, by
7
commissions.
8
Further, given that
The Suzukis also argue that the assets were not dissipated or
9
hidden but were transferred as part of an estate planning process
10
that had begun ten years earlier, and that all transfers are part
11
of the public record.
12
highly suggestive of an attempt to secret assets.
13
However, the timing of the transfers is
The Suzukis argue that the life insurance policy was on the
14
life of Keiko Suzuki and the proceeds were deposited into
15
Sonnette’s bank account; neither Keiko Suzuki nor Sonnette is a
16
party to this case.
17
of the policy are not defendants is irrelevant; both are closely
18
related to – and in the case of Sonnette, controlled by – the
19
Suzukis.
20
balance is not evidence of dissipation because plaintiffs have not
21
shown the money was not spent for normal and ordinary purposes.
22
However, neither have the Suzukis shown the bank account’s funds
23
were depleted for normal and ordinary uses.
24
argue that because the policy was purchased in 2002 it cannot be
25
tied to the MRI commissions, and because Sonnette’s bank account
26
has already been frozen by Japanese courts there is no threat of
27
irreparable harm.
28
life insurance policy at or around the same time MRI’s fraud was
However, the fact that the holder and insured
The Suzukis argue that Sonnette’s low bank account
Finally, the Suzukis
However, the fact that the Suzukis cashed out a
13
1
uncovered suggests an intent to conceal and/or dissipate their
2
assets so that they might not be reached by any judgment in this
3
case, regardless of whether Sonnette’s bank account is now frozen
4
and regardless of whether the policy was purchased with MRI
5
commissions.
6
Finally, the Suzukis argue that the property transfers took
7
place more than five months before the plaintiffs filed their
8
motion, that plaintiffs have twice withdrawn their request against
9
the Suzukis, and that there is no evidence of current asset
10
dissipation, which undercut any alleged urgency or threat of
11
irreparable harm.
12
the Suzukis does not preclude a finding of irreparable harm in this
13
case.
14
Any delay in seeking injunctive relief against
Several named and putative plaintiffs have submitted
15
declarations or statements in this action detailing how they have
16
invested substantial sums of money in MRI – in some cases their
17
life savings.
18
clear that plaintiffs’ recovery from MRI and Sterling Escrow is
19
likely to be minimal.
20
showing that the Suzukis have taken steps to distance themselves
21
from their assets since MRI’s fraud was revealed, the court
22
concludes that there is a danger that, unless restrained, they will
23
continue to do so before final judgment is rendered.
24
substantial commissions earned by the Suzukis, it is likely that a
25
good portion of their assets were paid for with those commissions –
26
commissions that undoubtedly came directly from plaintiffs’
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investments.
28
impossible to provide any effective relief to the thousands of
As discussed in this court’s prior orders, it is
As plaintiffs have proffered evidence
Given the
A dissipation of these assets would make it
14
1
investors in this case.
2
irreparable harm of not being able to recover their investments
3
unless the Suzukis’ assets are frozen.
4
5
Plaintiffs face the immediate and
3. Balance of Equities
As already discussed, the plaintiffs have invested
6
substantial sums of money in MRI, including in some cases their
7
life savings, and they will likely not be able to secure any
8
recovery if the Suzukis are not prevented from further dissipating
9
or hiding their assets.
An asset freeze would allow the Suzukis to
10
continue paying their normal living expenses and legal fees but
11
would prevent them from concealing or dissipating assets without
12
specific leave of court.
13
equities tilts sharply in plaintiffs’ favor.
Accordingly, the balance of these
14
4. Public Interest
15
“The public interest inquiry primarily addresses impact on
16
non-parties rather than parties.”
17
Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir. 2002).
18
be no harm to the public interest should an injunction be issued.
19
The court concludes the public interest favors the issuance of an
20
injunction.
21
Sammartano v. First Judicial
Here, there would
Plaintiffs seek the freezing of the Suzukis’ assets.
The
22
court has inherent equitable power to grant an asset freeze.
23
& Exch. Comm’n v. Int’l Swiss Invs. Corp., 895 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th
24
Cir. 1990).
25
assets where the only relief the plaintiffs seek is legal, monetary
26
damages, Couturier, 572 F.3d at 1083-84, an asset freeze is
27
properly awarded where the plaintiffs have shown they have an
28
equitable interest in the assets sought to be frozen.
Sec.
While the court does not have the authority to freeze
15
Textron Fin.
1
Corp. v. Unique Marine, Inc., 2008 WL 4716965 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (the
2
court “can order an asset freeze as part of preliminary injunctive
3
relief only with respect to assets in which an equitable interest
4
is claimed and established”).
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demonstrated they are likely to have an equitable interest in funds
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currently held by the Suzukis.
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relief freezing the Suzukis’ assets that are traceable to the
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commissions they received from MRI is proper.
As discussed, plaintiffs have
Accordingly, an award of injunctive
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Although the plaintiffs also seek expedited and particularized
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discovery into the Suzukis’ assets, the court, in a separate order,
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has denied the motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ securities causes of
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action.
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into the Suzukis’ assets but will allow such to be conducted in
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accordance with the normal discovery order of this case.
Accordingly, the court will not separately order discovery
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The court therefore concludes as follows.
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1. There is good cause to believe that Junzo Suzuki and Paul
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Musashi Suzuki have engaged in fraudulent conduct such that
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plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their state law
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and securities fraud claims as well as their claim of constructive
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trust;
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2. There is good cause to believe that before this action
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reaches final judgment immediate and irreparable harm will result
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from the Suzukis’ dissipation or concealment of their assets;
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3. Balancing the equities, the potential harm to the
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plaintiffs substantially and sharply outweighs the harm to the
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Suzukis if an injunction is issued; and
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4. Weighing the equities and considering plaintiffs’
likelihood of success on the merits, equitable relief is in the
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public interest.
It is therefore ordered that except as necessary for normal
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living expenses and legal fees, defendants Junzo Suzuki, Paul
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Musashi Suzuki, their agents and representatives, and all persons
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and entities under the control of or acting in concert with either
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of them be restrained and enjoined from:
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A.
Directly or indirectly transferring, converting, selling,
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concealing, disbursing, spending, withdrawing,
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liquidating, encumbering, pledging, assigning, or
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otherwise disposing of any assets, wherever located, that
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are:
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1.
Owned or controlled by Junzo Suzuki or Paul Musashi
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Suzuki, or their affiliates or by any person or
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entity under the control of either of them; or
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2.
In the actual or constructive possession of Junzo
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Suzuki or Paul Musashi Suzuki, or their affiliates
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or by any person or entity under the control of
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either of them; or
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3.
Owned, controlled by, or in the actual or
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constructive possession of any corporation,
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partnership, or other entity directly or indirectly
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owned, managed, or controlled by or under common
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control with Junzo Suzuki or Paul Musashi Suzuki;
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B.
Opening or causing to be opened any safe deposit box
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titled in the name of or for the benefit of Junzo Suzuki
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or Paul Musashi Suzuki, or their companies, affiliates,
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or subsidiaries, or subject to access by any of them;
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C.
Directly or indirectly destroying, secreting, defacing,
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transferring or otherwise altering or destroying any
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documents concerning, evidencing, or relating to the
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business, assets, and financial affairs of Junzo Suzuki
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or Paul Musashi Suzuki, or of any business or entity
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affiliated with either of them or under their control.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any financial institution, broker,
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dealer, or escrow agent having possession, custody, or control of
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any asset titled in the name of or on behalf of Junzo Suzuki or
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Paul Musashi Suzuki or by any person or entity owned or controlled
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by either of them shall:
A.
Hold and retain within its control and prohibit the
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transfer, encumbrance, pledge, hypothecation, assignment,
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removal, withdrawal, dissipation, sale, or other disposal
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of any such asset, other than as authorized by further
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order of the court;
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B.
Deny access by anyone to any safe deposit box titled in
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the
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Musashi Suzuki or of any person or entity under the
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control of either of them or otherwise subject to access
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by either of them.
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name of or for the benefit of Junzo Suzuki or Paul
Defendants may petition the court to modify this order to
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allow the transfer, conversion, sale, disbursement, spending,
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withdrawing, liquidation, encumberance, pledging, assignment, or
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other disposal of a specific asset for good cause shown.
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extent that any nonparty has an interest in an asset reached by
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this order, the court will not preclude that nonparty from
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petitioning the court to modify this order as may be appropriate.
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The bond in the amount of $10,000.00 already filed by
To the
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1
plaintiffs in this action shall serve as security for the
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injunctive relief herein ordered by the court.
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DATED: This 18th day of September, 2014.
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____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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