Edwards v. Clark County et al

Filing 175

ORDER denying ECF Nos. 161 and 163 Motion for Attorney Fees; and denying ECF No. 166 Motion for District Judge to Reconsider Order. Signed by Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey on 6/21/16. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - JC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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Ronnie Edwards,
2:13-cv-01316-JAD-CWH

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Plaintiff
Order Denying Motions for Attorney’s
Fees and Motion for Reconsideration

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v.

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Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, et al.,

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[ECF Nos. 161, 163, 166]

Defendants

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Pro se prisoner Ronnie Edwards sued Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) correctional

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officers and medical staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries he sustained when he slipped and fell

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on a puddle while awaiting trial at the CCDC.1 Because Edwards lacked evidence to show that

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defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety or serious medical needs, I granted their

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motions for summary judgment and closed this case.2 The defendants now separately move for

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attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,3 and Edwards asks me to reconsider my summary-judgment

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order.4 Because the defendants have not shown that Edwards’s suit was frivolous, I deny their

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requests for attorney’s fees. And because I see no valid reason to revisit my summary-judgment

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order, I deny Edwards’s motion for reconsideration.5

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Background

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In June 2013, Edwards slipped on a puddle of water near the showers at the CCDC. Edwards

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made several trips to medical after the slip and was twice transported to the University Medical

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Center for testing. But despite Edwards’s frequent medical kites and extensive testing, all

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ECF No. 7.

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ECF No. 158.

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ECF Nos. 161, 163.

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ECF No. 166.

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I find these motions suitable for disposition without oral argument. L.R. 78-1.

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Page 1 of 5

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tests—save an x-ray taken shortly after the slip that revealed soft tissue swelling in his right hand and

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a muscle spasm in his back—were negative for injury. Edwards was given pain killers and muscle

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relaxers but continued to complain about his symptoms. He filed suit, alleging that the correctional-

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officer defendants were deliberately indifferent to the serious risk to his safety posed by the puddle

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and that both the officer and medical-staff defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious

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medical needs when they failed to adequately treat him for his injuries stemming from the slip.

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The defendants separately moved for summary judgment on all of Edwards’s claims. I found

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that the officer defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Edwards’s deliberate-indifference-

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to-safety claim because the slippery-floor situation that Edwards experienced does not qualify as a

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serious safety risk under Ninth Circuit precedent.6 I also concluded that the officer defendants were

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entitled to summary judgment on Edwards’s deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claims

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because they could reasonably rely on the expertise of the prison’s medical staff, and were not under

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any obligation to provide Edwards further treatment than that provided by medical.7 Finally, I found

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that the medical-staff defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Edwards’s medical-

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needs claims because the record reflects that these defendants were consistently responsive to

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Edwards’s medical needs, all tests consistently returned negative results, and Edwards failed to offer

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any evidence to show that the medical treatment he received was medically unacceptable under the

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circumstances or that it was provided in conscious disregard for his health.8

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Discussion
A.

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Defendants are not entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988(b).
The American Rule recognizes that each party in litigation must bear its own attorney’s fees

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in the absence of a rule, statute, or contract authorizing an award of fees.9 Section 42 U.S.C. §

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1988(b) is a fee-shifting statute. It allows district courts to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing

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ECF No. 158 at 9.

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Id. at 12.

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Id. at 14.

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MRO Commc’n Inc. v. Tel. & Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1999).

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party in § 1983 cases. But attorney’s fees in civil-rights cases should be awarded to a defendant only

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in exceptional circumstances.10 A defendant may recover attorney’s fees only if the plaintiff’s action

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was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”11 An action becomes frivolous when the result

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appears obvious or arguments are wholly without merit, and a defendant can recover if the plaintiff

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violates this standard at any point during the litigation, not just at the inception.12

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The officer defendants request $41,397 in attorney’s fees and the medical-staff defendants

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request $46,442. The defendants argue that Edwards’s claims were groundless because he failed to

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offer evidence to show that his constitutional rights were violated.13 They contend that Ninth Circuit

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law is clear that a puddle of water does not constitute a significantly serious safety risk and that

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Edwards’s medical records show that he received adequate medical treatment.

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I decline to award defendants any attorney’s fees in this action. Defendants have not shown

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that Edwards’s suit was or became frivolous. Edwards represented himself in this action, and he

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made good-faith deliberate-indifference arguments: a concept even licensed attorneys frequently

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struggle with. The law in the Ninth Circuit on what constitutes a sufficiently serious safety risk is

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not crystal clear, and I derived the rule that I applied in this case from a trio of Ninth Circuit cases.

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For these reasons, I decline to award the nearly $90,000 in attorney’s fees that the defendants

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collectively request against this pro se plaintiff (who has also qualified for pauper status, which

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suggests that any fee award would also be a pyrrhic victory at best.

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B.

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Motion to reconsider
A motion to reconsider must set forth “some valid reason why the court should reconsider its

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prior decision” by presenting “facts or law of a strongly convincing nature.”14 Reconsideration is

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appropriate if the court “(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error

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Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Id. (internal citations omitted).

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Christianberg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).

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ECF Nos. 161 at 11, 163 at 5.

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Frasure v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183 (D. Nev. 2003).

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or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling

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law.”15 “A motion for reconsideration is not an avenue to re-litigate the same issues and arguments

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upon which the court already has ruled.”16

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Edwards offers three bases that he claims warrant reconsideration of my order: (1) he asserted

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a FRCP 56(d) argument in response to the defendants’ summary-judgment motions; (2) Edwards is

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legally blind in both eyes, which exacerbated the danger the puddle posed; and (3) the court credited

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the defendants’ side of the story even though they lied on multiple occasions.17

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Edwards’s Rule 56(d) argument fails because he merely referenced Rule 56(d) in a

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declaration he attached to his opposition; he did not comply with the requirements for relief under

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that rule. In his declaration, Edwards conclusorily argued that Rule 56(d) precluded summary

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judgment because he needed to subpoena Naphcare, CCDC, and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police

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Department for “records.”18 But Rule 56(d) requires the movant to show that, “for specified reasons,

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[he] cannot present facts essential to justify” his opposition.19 Extensive discovery was conducted in

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this case, and Edwards has not identified any circumstances that prevented him from presenting the

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necessary facts in his opposition; he does not identify what documents he needs that he did not

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receive in the course of discovery or indicate what additional facts those additional records would

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have revealed. Accordingly, I decline to reconsider my summary-judgment order based on

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Edwards’s thin Rule 56(d) request.

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As to Edwards’s second argument, I found that the slippery-floor situation that Edwards

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encountered was not a sufficiently serious safety risk because Edwards did not “allege[] that another

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condition exacerbated the hazard of the slippery floor or hampered his ability to reduce the risk of

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Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

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Brown v. Kinross Gold, U.S.A., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Nev. 2005).

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ECF No. 166 at 3.

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ECF No. 141 at 48.

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FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d).

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injury should he fall.”20 Edwards now argues—for the first time—that he is legally blind in both

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eyes. Edwards represents that his “deposition transcript, medical records, etc.” show that he is

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blind.21 I decline to comb through the hundreds of pages of records in this case to find evidence

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showing that Edwards is legally blind, and he does not explain how his vision issue contributed to

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the fall. Additionally, Edwards waived this argument—which he clearly should have been aware

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of—by failing to raise it in opposition to defendants’ summary-judgment motions. Edwards’s

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conclusory assertion that his vision impairment exacerbated the risk of the puddle is also belied by

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his deposition testimony that he saw the puddle on the floor for days leading up to the slip22 and that

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he does not wear his glasses consistently.23

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Finally, I decline to reconsider my order based on Edwards’s assertion that I improperly

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credited the defendant-witnesses’ testimony over his own. My order was based solely on the

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undisputed facts in the record in this case and the controlling law; I did not weigh credibility when I

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made my rulings. Because Edwards has given me no valid reason to reconsider my order granting

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defendants’ motions for summary judgment, his motion to reconsider is denied.

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Conclusion

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ motions for attorney’s fees

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[ECF Nos. 161, 163] are DENIED; and Edward’s motion to reconsider [ECF No. 166] is

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DENIED.

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Dated this 21st day of June, 2016.

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_________________________________
_____________________
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__ _________
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Jennifer A. Dorsey
Jennifer A. Dorsey
nn
e
United States District Judge
United States District Jud
ted t
tri t

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ECF No. 158 at 10.

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ECF No. 166 at 2.

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ECF No. 115-4 at 10 (testifying that he did not see the puddle on the day of the slip but that he had
seen it on other occasions).

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Id. at 39. It is also belied by the fact that Edwards has filed hundreds of pages of handwritten
documents in this case, including drawings of the area around the puddle. See ECF No. 115-4 at 3.
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