Mountain Paradise Village, Inc. v. Federal National Mortgage Association

Filing 13

ORDER Denying the 3 Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. Signed by Judge Gloria M. Navarro on 10/15/2013. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD)

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Mountain Paradise Village, Inc., 4 5 6 Appellant, vs. Federal National Mortgage Association, 7 8 9 Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 2:13-cv-01813-GMN ORDER This is a bankruptcy appeal from a final order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for 10 the District of Nevada granting relief from the automatic stay and denying approval of the 11 debtor’s Third Disclosure Statement. Now pending before the Court is the Emergency Motion 12 for Stay Pending Appeal (ECF No. 3) filed by Debtor/Appellant Mountain Paradise Village, 13 Inc. (“Debtor” or “Appellant”) pursuant to Rule 8005 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 14 Procedure. Appellee Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae” or “Appellee”) 15 filed a Response (ECF No. 5) in opposition, and Appellant filed a Reply (ECF No. 9). Having 16 considered the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, the Court hereby denies the motion, for the 17 reasons stated in this order and on the record at the October 15, 2013, hearing. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Appellant’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in the underlying case were initiated in 20 December 2011, and are still ongoing. After the bankruptcy judge denied approval of 21 Appellant’s third proposed plan of reorganization and lifted the stay as to Fannie Mae, a 22 trustee’s sale of the real property of the estate, an apartment complex, was scheduled for 23 October 16, 2013. On October 1, 2013, the bankruptcy judge denied Appellant’s Motion for 24 Stay Pending Appeal, and on October 3, 2013, the instant Emergency Motion for Stay Pending 25 Appeal (ECF No. 3) was filed before this Court. Page 1 of 4 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “A motion for a stay of the judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy judge . . . must 3 ordinarily be presented to the bankruptcy judge in the first instance,” and “may be made to the 4 district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel, but the motion shall show why the relief, 5 modification, or termination was not obtained from the bankruptcy judge.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6 8005. The general purpose of such an order would be to “protect the rights of all parties in 7 interest.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8005. “The district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel may 8 condition the relief it grants under this rule on the filing of a bond or other appropriate security 9 with the bankruptcy court.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8005. The general procedure for requests for 10 expedited action on a motion are provided by Rule 8011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 11 Procedure. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8011. 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 As an initial matter, the Court notes Appellant’s failure to specifically address in its 14 motion “why the relief, modification, or termination was not obtained from the bankruptcy 15 judge,” as required by Rule 8005. 16 Little controlling precedent is available in the bankruptcy context for a motion to stay 17 pursuant to Rule 8005, and such a stay is generally discretionary on the part of the court. 18 However, relevant factors for consideration of such a motion include: (1) whether appellant is 19 likely to prevail on the merits of the appeal; (2) whether appellant will suffer irreparable 20 damage if the stay is not granted; (3) whether irreparable harm to the public or to interested 21 parties will occur if the stay is granted. See Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537, 538 (9th Cir. 22 1965). 23 A. Appellant’s Likelihood of Success on the Merits of the Appeal 24 The operation of an automatic stay in a bankruptcy proceeding is governed by 11 U.S.C. 25 § 362, which also provides for a bankruptcy court’s grant of relief from the automatic stay in Page 2 of 4 1 certain circumstances. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), (d). “The decision to grant or deny relief from the 2 automatic stay is committed to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court,” and is a final 3 decision reviewable on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. In re Conejo Enters., 4 Inc., 96 F.3d 346, 351 (9th Cir. 1996). “Decisions committed to the bankruptcy court’s 5 discretion will be reversed only if ‘based on an erroneous conclusion of law or when the record 6 contains no evidence on which [the bankruptcy court] rationally could have based that 7 decision.’” Id. (quoting In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 841 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988)). 8 In its order, the bankruptcy court granted Appellee’s motion for relief from the 9 automatic stay pursuant to section 362(d)(2) and 362(d)(3). Here, having reviewed the order, 10 as well as the transcript of the bankruptcy court’s August 20, 2013, hearing, the Court finds that 11 Appellant has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its appeal, particularly where 12 the reasoning of the bankruptcy court does not appear to show an abuse of discretion. To the 13 extent that Appellant seeks review of other orders of the bankruptcy court, Appellant is unlikely 14 to succeed where its appeal is untimely or procedurally deficient. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002. 15 B. Irreparable Harm to Appellant, the Public, or Any Other Interested Parties 16 Here, Appellant claims irreparable harm in the form of prejudice to his ability to 17 successfully reorganize, and loss of the rental income from the property. (Mot. to Stay, 7:20-22, 18 ECF No. 3.) Although the Court is not persuaded by this argument, Appellant persuasively 19 argues that the loss of appellate review itself is a form of irreparable injury where any 20 successful outcome to his appeal would likely be rendered moot by the sale of the property. On 21 this basis, the Court finds that irreparable harm could likely result if the stay is not granted. 22 However, the Court also considers the harm to any other interested parties, including 23 Appellee, other creditors, and the public in general. Here, Appellee argues that if a stay is 24 granted, it will continue to lose cash collateral in the form of management fees paid to 25 Appellant’s principal, Mr. Zeer. (Response, 13:1-8, ECF No. 5.) Also, Appellee argues that if a Page 3 of 4 1 stay is granted, it will be “further delayed in its ability to collect and dispose of its collateral in 2 the manner it deems most appropriate.” (Id. at 13:10-12.) Finally, Appellee argues that appeals 3 such as this are an abuse of the system, and contrary to public policy, in that they present no 4 valid appellate issues and represent unjustified delays in the resolution of a creditor’s recovery. 5 (Id. at 13-14.) As discussed at the hearing, the parties also acknowledge that Appellee is the 6 sole secured creditor at this time. 7 Here, the Court finds that the issues presented by Appellant in its appeal are not likely to 8 succeed. Imposition of the harms upon Appellee and the public, discussed above, cannot be 9 justified solely for the sake of preserving the property in the unlikely event of a successful 10 appeal. Accordingly, the Court finds no good cause for granting Appellant’s Motion for Stay 11 Pending Appeal (ECF No. 3) and it will be denied. 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal 14 (ECF No. 3) is DENIED. 15 16 DATED this 15th day of October, 2013. 17 18 19 ___________________________________ Gloria M. Navarro United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 Page 4 of 4

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