Hill v. Longmire et al

Filing 18

ORDER Granting 6 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement is GRANTED. If Hill desires to proceed with this action, he must file an amended complaint that complies with all the rules and procedure s of this Court and the detailed instructions set forth in this order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 8 Motion to Stay, 12 Motion for Trial, and 14 Motion for Hearing are DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey on 4/3/14. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - EDS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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Michael Hill,

Case No.: 2:14-cv-147-JAD-PAL

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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Lauren Longmire and Clark County School
District,

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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss [Doc. 6], Denying as Moot
Defendant’s Motion to Stay [Doc. 8],
Hill’s Motion for Trial [Doc. 12],
and Petition for Hearing [Doc. 14]

Defendants.

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Clark County School District bus driver Michael Hill claims he was subjected to a

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hostile work environment and unequal treatment because he is a white man. See Doc. 1.

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Although his pro se complaint identifies no legal theory as the basis for his claims, Hill prays

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for an order directing the School District to: end workplace discrimination against white male

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employees and students, stop racism by requiring all employees to “speak like they have a

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high school diploma,” require black and female employees to follow the same rules as white

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men, and pay white men extra when they have to correct work performed poorly by others.

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Doc. 1 at 11. He also asks the court to prohibit the School District from outsourcing or

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subcontracting bus-driving work and making bus drivers work for free, and he seeks actual

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and punitive damages in excess of $5 million. Id. at 11-12.

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Defendants move to dismiss Hill’s action under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Hill filed
charges of discrimination with the EEOC but failed to exhaust those administrative remedies,
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precluding this lawsuit as premature. See Doc. 6. They alternatively move for a more

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definite statement under Rule 12(e), contending that the complaint lacks any claim for relief

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or legal theory, making it impossible for them to fairly respond to it. See id.

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Hill has offered nothing to demonstrate that he has exhausted the administrative

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remedies necessary for him to pursue an employment claim, and his failure to articulate the

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grounds for the myriad relief he requests requires the Court to dismiss any remaining claims

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under the federal pleading standards in the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. The Court grants the motion to dismiss

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Hill’s federal employment claims for failure to exhaust the EEOC process before filing this

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suit and also dismisses any other possible claim as insufficiently pled. However, the Court

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also gives Hill leave to file an amended complaint to more adequately allege any claim

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arising from these facts that is not barred by his failure to exhaust the EEOC process.

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Background

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Hill is a bus driver for the Clark County School District. See Doc. 1 at 13. His

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Complaint is not a model of clarity, but it claims the Principal of Decker Elementary School

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failed to abide by school policy and open the gate for bus drivers twenty minutes before class

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started. See id. Hill claims that when he complained about this failure, he was “harassed and

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written up by Lauren Longmire,” a Clark County School District employee. Id. at 14. He

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also claims that Longmire once ordered him out of the bus to “look for the students that

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belonged on that bus,” a task that she did not require black bus drivers to perform. Id. at 15.

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He further states that in 2012-13, a “black Transportation Operations Assistant”

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requested that he transport high school students “sitting three to a seat” in violation of the

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law, but he steadfastly “refused to break the law in the name of racism.” Id. at 14, 23. In

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2005-06, Hill was allegedly disciplined after refusing to perform an illegal traffic maneuver,

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“[b]ecause [he is] a white man that did [his] job correctly.” Id. Finally, he alleges that

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during the 2009-10 school year he drove a bus in accordance with certain construction signs,

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while two other drivers, a black man and a white woman, used traffic lanes not specified by

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the construction signs. After being told that he should also use the non-specified traffic lane,
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he concluded that “[a] Transportation Investigator for Clark County School District chose to

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endanger the safety and well-being of the students on three different buses, rather than

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enforce the rules on a woman or a black person.” Id.

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Hill claims that the “Clark County School District needs to get rid of the racism,

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slavery, harassment, and discrimination against white male employees and students. The

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only way to accomplish this is to require all employees to speak like they have a high school

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diploma, and all employees must follow the same rules regardless of race or gender.” Doc. 1

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at 16. Hill requests a host of injunctive orders against the School District, including ordering

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the district to:
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Stop workplace discrimination against white male employees and
students.

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Stop racism by requiring all employees to speak like they have a high
school diploma.

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Stop racism by requiring black people to follow the same rules as
white men.

4.

Stop discrimination to white men and require female employees to
follow the same rules as a white man.

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Never outsource or subcontract bus drivers.

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Stop making bus drivers work for free so they can pay for the Zonar
system.

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Compensate a white man when he has to do extra work to fix
something because female or black employees did not perform their
duties correctly.

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Doc. 1 at 11. Hill requests that Longmire pay him $9,589 in actual damages and $92,000 in

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punitive damages for her alleged workplace harassment. Doc. 1 at 11. Hill also seeks $5

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million in actual damages from the School District “for having to endure eleven years of

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harassment discrimination and racism.” Doc. 1 at 12.

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Hill filed his complaint in Nevada State court, and Defendants removed it to federal

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court on January 28, 2014, on the basis that Hill has filed two Charges of Discrimination with

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the EEOC, suggesting that he is asserting federal employment-law claims and giving this

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Court original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Doc. 1 at 2. Guessing that Hill’s
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complaint states only Title VII discrimination and hostile work claims, Defendants ask the

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Court to dismiss those claims because Hill has not yet completed his EEOC administrative-

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claims process and received his right-to-sue letter. Doc. 6 at 4-5. Alternatively, they argue

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that Hill fails to identify any cause of action or plead facts to support any cognizable claim,

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and it is simply impossible to respond to his complaint without completely guessing what

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claims he is attempting to plead. Hill opposes these requests and counters with “Motion for

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Relief from Workplace Harassment” and “Petition for Hearing” that reiterates his demand for

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damages and the various orders prayed for in his complaint. Doc. 12, 13, 14. Defendants

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also ask the Court to stay this case pending a decision on their motion to dismiss. Doc. 8.
Having fully considered all the parties’ filings and determined that these motions are

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appropriate for disposition without oral argument,1 the Court grants Defendants’ motion to

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dismiss and request for a more definite statement and gives Hill leave to amend to properly

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plead more identifiable claims in compliance with the rules of this Court. The Court denies

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Hill’s motion for relief and petition for hearing as moot in light of the dismissal and because

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he has articulated no legal basis for such relief. Finally, the Court denies Defendants’ motion

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to stay as moot.
Discussion

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A.

Motion to Dismiss

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) governs the standard for pleadings in a federal

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cause of action and provides, “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a

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short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the

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relief sought.”2 A district court may dismiss a complaint brought under Rule 8(a) for failing

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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.3

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Nev. L.R. 78-2.

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Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a).

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Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6).

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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

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accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”4 “[A] plaintiff’s

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obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels

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and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.

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Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”5

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The Court is also “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

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allegation.”6 To state a “plausible” claim for relief, the plaintiff must “plead[] factual content

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that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged.”7 This requires a plaintiff to state “enough facts to raise a reasonable

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expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the allegations charged.8
As a pro se litigant, Hill is not held to the same standard as an admitted attorney.9 A

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pro se litigant’s filings are to be judged by their function, with liberal construction of

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“inartful pleading[s].”10 Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not absolved from compliance with

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the Rules of Procedure simply because he has elected not to obtain representation.11

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Hill’s Federal Employment Discrimination Claims

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Defendants argue that Hill’s allegations appear to state Title VII employment-

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discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims but these claims are fatally premature

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because Hill failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies before initiating this lawsuit.

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discrimination against

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

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Id. (quoting Papsan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,
266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

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Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

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Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam).

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See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986).

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individuals on the basis of sex or race.12 It also prohibits employers from creating a hostile

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work environment through repeated discriminatory conduct.13 Before an employee may file a

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lawsuit alleging claims under Title VII, he must first exhaust the administrative-claim-review

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process with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and receive a right-

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to-sue letter.14

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Although Hill filed Charges of Discrimination with the EEOC, he has not yet received

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a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the Commission, which would trigger his right to file

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suit. Doc. 6 at 4-5. Hill admits he filed EEOC Charges of Discrimination and does not deny

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he has not yet received a right-to-sue letter. Instead, Hill responds by characterizing the

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EEOC’s administrative exhaustion scheme as “another problem white men face,” Doc. 13 at

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2, and he expresses frustration over the speed of the administrative process, claiming “I have

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had to file complaints against Clark County School District with the City of Henderson,

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Nevada State Fire Marshall, Nevada Highway Patrol, State and Federal Department of Labor,

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Federal Transit Administration, and EEOC. This needs to hurry up and get in front of an

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Honorable Judge.” Id. at 3.

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Hill’s generalized dissatisfaction with the administrative process is beyond the

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cognizance of a court tasked with applying the law to the facts. Hill does not allege in his

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complaint that he exhausted his administrative remedies, and his response to the motion to

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dismiss offers no valid argument for overlooking this prerequisite. Because Hill did not

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exhaust the administrative process for these employment claims before filing this suit, the

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Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Hill’s Title VII

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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

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Id. at § 2000e-5(e); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116-17 (2002).

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Sanchez v. Pacific Powder Co., 147 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1998); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles
Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). To exhaust administrative remedies, a plaintiff must
typically file a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the claimed conduct, receive a
Notice of Right to Sue letter from the EEOC, and file suit no later than 90 days after receipt of that letter. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). This filing period is extended to 300 days in “deferral” states, where an aggrieved
employee has brought discrimination claims before a corresponding state agency authorized to grant such
relief. Id. at § 2000e-5(e)(1). Defendants have not sought dismissal on statutes of limitations grounds, and
thus any distinction between the filing periods is not yet relevant to this case.

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employment discrimination and hostile work environment claims is granted, and these claims

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are dismissed.

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2.

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To the extent that Hill intends to plead any claims other than Title VII claims, those

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claims also fail to state a cognizable claim for relief in their present form.
a.

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Possible other claims

Thirteenth Amendment claim

Hill’s Complaint contains “points and authorities” under which he quotes the

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Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Doc. 1 at 20, and he alleges that the

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School District, among other things, “needs to get rid of the . . . slavery . . . against white

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male employees and students.” Id. at 16. And he claims that bus drivers should not be

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required to work for free “so they can pay for the Zonar system.” Doc. 1 at 11. It is unclear

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whether the use of the term “slavery” is merely intended as hyperbole or is intended to state a

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claim for relief.

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The Thirteenth Amendment provides: “Neither slavery not involutary servitude . . .

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shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”15 It “prohibits

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peonage—a condition in which the victim is coerced by threat of legal sanction to work off a

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debt to a master.”16 Hill’s slavery non sequiturs fall far short of stating a cognizable

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Thirteenth Amendment violation claim. To the extent that Hill has attempted to plead a

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Thirteenth Amendment claim by his use of the word “slavery,” it is dismissed under Rule

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12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
b.

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Civil rights or equal protection claims

If Hill intended to assert a civil rights or equal protection claim, he has also failed to

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achieve that goal. Hill generally alleges that Defendants have subjected him and other

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unnamed white male employees and students to different standards of conduct. See Doc. 1 at

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10-26. Although Hill never cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any other civil rights statute, or the

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U.S. Const. Amend. XIII.

Awadby v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9 th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988)).

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equal protection clause of either the Fourteenth Amendment or Nevada’s constitution, the

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Court is obligated to analyze this pro se plaintiff’s Complaint by its function.17 Out of an

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abundance of caution, the Court considers whether Hill may have meant to assert a civil

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rights or equal protection claim and—if so—whether it was adequately pled.

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The Court finds within Hill’s complaint no cognizable claim for civil rights violation

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or equal protection violation. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 covers actions by persons who

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“under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, or any State . . . subjects,

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or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . . the deprivation of any rights,

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

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injured.” To plead a civil rights claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the following:

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(1) that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff was committed under color of state law; and (2)

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the conduct violates a constitutional right.”18

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Hill’s Complaint fails to state that either Longmire or the School District violated a

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specific constitutional right, and thus he has failed to state a cognizable civil rights or equal

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protection claim. To the extent that Hill intended to state a civil rights or equal protection

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clause violation claim, those claims must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
c.

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State law claims

It is also possible that Hill intended to assert claims for violation of Nevada state

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employment laws. Hill alleges that Longmire “violated N.R.S. 613.100” when she defended

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another employee’s instruction to Hill to transport students three to a seat. Doc. 1 at 14.

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NRS 613.§ 100 makes it a misdemeanor to “willfully and maliciously, either alone or in

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combination with others, break a contract of service or employment, knowing or having

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reasonable cause to believe that the consequence of his or her so doing will be to endanger

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human life or to cause grievous bodily injury or to expose valuable property to destruction or

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Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21.

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Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

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serious injury.”19 Among the many deficiencies of this claim (assuming purely arguendo that

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NRS 613.§ 100 even affords a private right of action) is that Hill has not identified any

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contract of service or employment broken, and as Hill alleges that he disregarded this

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instruction anyway, his own allegations prevent the Court from inferring that any contract

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was, in fact, broken. Accordingly, Hill has failed to state a viable claim under NRS

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613.100.20

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B.

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Motion for a More Definite Statement
Defendants alternatively argue that because Hill’s complaint is “written like a stream

of consciousness and there are no identified cause[s] of action[]. The complaint does not

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contain numbered paragraphs as required by Rule 10 but merely is a diatribe jumping from

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one subject to another, often couched in bigoted references.” Doc. 6 at 5-6. Without

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identifiable causes of actions, Defendants contend, they are unable to respond to this

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complaint. Id. Thus, if nothing else, the Court should order Hill to provide a more definite

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statement under Rule 12(e). See id.

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Rule 12(e) provides that, “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a

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pleading to which a responsible pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that

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the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. If the court orders a more definite statement

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and the order is not obeyed . . . within the time the court sets, the court may strike the

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pleading or issue any other appropriate order.”21

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The Court gleans from Hill’s complaint and his response to the motion to dismiss that

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he acknowledges his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies for any Title VII claim.

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Thus, any proposed amendment to reallege those claims would be futile and will not be

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permitted. But the Court cannot rule out the possibility, however remote, that Hill may be

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able to allege some other viable claim—a claim that is not presently discernable from the

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Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.100.

As Hill has not stated any cognizable state law claim, the Court does not reach the question of
whether it would exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e).

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complaint as drafted. Given the liberal construction of pro se filings, the Court is all but

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required to provide Hill with at least one opportunity to return to the drawing board with

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some guidance and amend his complaint to more adequately identify his claims.

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Accordingly, the Court grants the request for a more definite statement. Hill shall have 15

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days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint that contains a more definite

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statement of any claim he intends to assert and which is not barred by his failure to exhaust

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the EEOC process. Hill is advised of the following:

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1.

If he chooses to file an amended complaint, it must comply with all rules of this

Court, which include the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (available on the U.S. Courts

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website at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/civil-procedure.pdf) and the Local Rules

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of Practice for the District of Nevada (available on this Court’s website at

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http://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/). A plaintiff is not relieved of the obligation to follow all rules

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of this Court simply because he has chosen to represent himself.22

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2.

Although the Court is in no way identifying all of the rules and procedures that

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Plaintiff must follow, it will highlight a few of the rules that specifically apply to the form of

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complaints. For example (and again, this list is in no way exhaustive and Plaintiff has the

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obligation to research, become familiar with, and comply with all of the rules of this Court):

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a.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) requires a party to “state its claims or

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defenses in numbered paragraphs.”23 (Much like the form of pages 10-11 of

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this order).

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b.

Hill’s Complaint must also comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,

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which (as noted above) requires a Complaint to contain:

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(1)

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a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the
claim needs no new jurisdictional support;

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See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (pro se litigants “must follow the same rules
of procedure that govern other litigants”); Carter v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“Although pro se, [plaintiff] is expected to abide by the rules of the court in which he litigates.”).
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Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 10(b) (emphasis added).

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(2)

a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and

(3)

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a demand for the relief sought, which 24
may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.

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c.

To survive dismissal, a complaint must give each defendant “fair notice of

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what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”25 While this standard requires

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inclusion of the factual and legal basis for each claim, lengthy narrative-style pleadings like

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the one filed in this case fail to provide the defendants with fair notice of the claims asserted

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against them. Thus, Hill’s amended complaint must specifically allege what law, statute, or

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constitutional provision he claims was violated by the conduct he alleges, such that

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Defendants will be on notice of the factual and legal basis for the claims he seeks to assert

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against them. Each claim should be broken out into a separate cause of action that contains

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all of the essential elements of the claim asserted and states the specific relief requested for

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that claim. And for each separately identified claim for relief, Plaintiff must also identify

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which defendant(s) is(/are) the target of each claim. (For example: “Count One - Civil

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Rights Violations by School District Defendant”).

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d.

Plaintiff is also cautioned that an amended complaint must be “complete in

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itself without reference to the” previous version of the complaint. See Local Rule 15-1(a).

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Therefore, Plaintiff must carry forward into the new draft any information that he wants to

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continue to plead; the Court cannot and will not simply refer back to a prior pleading for

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other information because an amended complaint supersedes all prior versions as if the prior

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versions never existed, and all allegations and claims not carried forward are deemed

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waived.26 However, Hill is also cautioned that no Title VII employment discrimination

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claims will be considered, as they are futile because Hill has not exhausted the EEOC

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process.

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Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a).

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007) (citation omitted).

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See Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011).

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e.

Given this specific guidance on pleading requirements, the Court is not inclined

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to grant Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint if the first amended complaint

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were found to be deficient. If Plaintiff fails to prosecute this action, or if he fails to comply

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with the rules or any Court order, the Court may dismiss the action with prejudice under Rule

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41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.27

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f.

Plaintiff’s failure to file a properly pled amended complaint that complies with

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the rules of this court within 15 days of this order will lead to the termination of this case

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without further notice because all of Hill’s claims have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
Conclusion

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Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons and with good cause appearing and no
reason for delay,
It is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 6] is

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GRANTED. Hill’s federal employment discrimination claims are DISMISSED for failure

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to exhaust his administrative remedies; to the extent that Hill intended to state any other

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claim for relief, all such claims are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

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It is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement

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is GRANTED. If Hill desires to proceed with this action, he must file an amended

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complaint that complies with all rules and procedures of this Court and the detailed

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instructions set forth above.

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It is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Stay Pending Motion to

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Dismiss [Doc. 8], Plaintiff’s Motion for Trial [Doc. 12], and Plaintiff’s Petition for Hearing

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[Doc. 14] are DENIED as moot in light of this order.

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DATED: April 3, 2014.

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_________________________________
JENNIFER A. DORSEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th
Cir. 1995).

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