Gustin v. Plano Molding Company et al

Filing 61

ORDER Granting #52 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Robert C. Jones on 3/25/15. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - TR)

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1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 6 7 _____________________________________ COLE GUSTIN, 8 Plaintiff, 9 10 vs. PLANO MOLDING CO. et al., 11 Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2:14-cv-00700-RCJ-CWH ORDER 12 This case arises out of an accidental shooting. Pending before the Court is a Motion for 13 14 Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52). For the reasons given herein, the Court grants the motion. 15 I. 16 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 9, 2012, Plaintiff Cole Gustin, who was ten years old, was playing in his 17 mother’s bedroom when he found a DoskoSport gun case (the “Case”) containing a pistol and 18 secured with two padlocks. (Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 1-1). Without unlocking either lock, Plaintiff 19 pulled the pistol out through the side of the Case and accidentally shot himself in the head. (Id. 20 ¶ 10). Plaintiff survived but was seriously and permanently injured. (Id. ¶ 11). 21 Plaintiff sued Defendants Plano Molding Co. (“Plano”) and Doskocil Manufacturing Co. 22 (“Doskocil”) in state court through his mother and guardian ad litem, Carmen Gustin, for strict 23 product liability and negligence. Plano removed and has now moved for summary judgment. 24 1 of 5 1 2 II. LEGAL STANDARDS A court must grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine 3 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 4 Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson 5 v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if 6 there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See 7 id. A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported 8 claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). In determining summary 9 judgment, a court uses a burden-shifting scheme: 12 When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case. 13 C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 14 and internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden 15 of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by 16 presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by 17 demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an 18 element essential to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 19 See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323–24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, 20 summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s 21 evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 10 11 22 23 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 24 2 of 5 1 Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing 2 party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the 3 claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing 4 versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 5 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment 6 by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by facts. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 7 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and 8 allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that 9 shows a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. 10 At the summary judgment stage, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 11 determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 12 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are 13 to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely 14 colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249–50. 15 III. 16 ANALYSIS Plano asks the Court to grant it summary judgment on both claims because it did not 17 design, manufacture, distribute, or sell the case. Plano has satisfied its initial burden on 18 summary judgment by presenting evidence that negates the above element of the claims. Plano 19 notes that Plaintiff has accused both Defendants of designing, manufacturing, distributing, and 20 selling DoskoSport gun cases. (See Compl. ¶¶ 13–14). Plaintiff refers to Defendants collectively 21 and interchangeably, however. (See id.). Plano notes that Doskocil admits that produced, 22 designed, and manufactured a gun case under the name “DoskoSport” between 2002 and 2007. 23 Plano’s verified responses to Plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories indicates that Plano did not 24 3 of 5 1 obtain Doskocil’s gun case molds until the Fall of 2007. (See Responses 2–5, ECF No. 52-4). 2 Furthermore, Plaintiff’s verified answers to Plano’s first set of interrogatories indicate that 3 Gustin received the Case from David Law as a gift, and that she could not recall the exact date 4 but believed it was over ten years before August 18, 2014. (See Responses 5–6, ECF No. 52-5). 5 Plano has satisfied its initial burden on summary judgment. Plano’s evidence negates at least the 6 causation elements of the strict liability and negligence claims, because the evidence shows that 7 the Case was purchased before Plano had the molds to make such a case, and it therefore cannot 8 have made the Case that is alleged to have caused the harm. 9 Plaintiff has not opposed the motion, but Doskocil has, noting that Carmen Gustin is 10 sscheduled to be deposed on February 24, 2015, and that David Law’s deposition is yet to be 11 taken. Law’s deposition is particularly important, because he will have the best knowledge of 12 when he purchased the Case. As Doskocil notes, Gustin’s answer to the interrogatory indicates 13 she is uncertain of the date she received the Case from Law. It is still possible that Law 14 purchased it after Plano received the molds from Doskocil, and therefore that Plano 15 manufactured the Case. 16 If a non-movant shows by affidavit or declaration that it cannot present facts essential to 17 the opposition, a court may deny or defer ruling on the motion, allow further discovery, or issue 18 any other appropriate order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1)–(3). Doskocil, however, has adduced no 19 affidavit or declaration supporting its request for additional discovery, as required by the rule. 20 The evidence Doskocil has adduced in opposition does not tend to create a genuine issue of 21 material fact over whether Plano manufactured the Case. The sole exhibit adduced is Doskocil’s 22 verified second supplement to its answers to Plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories, which does not 23 tend to show that Plano manufactured the Case. Nor will Doskocil be prejudiced by the present 24 4 of 5 1 ruling. If Doskocil later discovers evidence tending to show that Plano manufactured the Case, it 2 can move for summary judgment on that basis, or at least argue to the jury that it did not 3 manufacture the case. The potentially aggrieved party in such a situation would be Plaintiff, but 4 Plaintiff, perhaps confident that Doskocil is the proper Defendant, has not opposed Plano’s 5 motion. CONCLUSION 6 7 8 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52) is GRANTED. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated this 25th day of March, 2015. 11 12 13 _____________________________________ ROBERT C. JONES United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 5 of 5

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