Williams v. Collins et al

Filing 6

SCREENING ORDER. Plaintiff's 3 Motion/Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is Denied as moot. The Clerk of Court shall file the 1 -1 Complaint. The Complaint is Dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a claim with preju dice. The Court certifies that any in forma pauperis appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Robert C. Jones on 2/11/2015. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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FREDERICK V. WILLIAMS,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CHARLOTTE COLLINS et al.,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

2:14-cv-1144-RCJ-NJK
SCREENING ORDER

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Plaintiff, who is an inmate in federal custody at the Nevada Southern Detention Center

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(“NSDC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed

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an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1-1, 3). The Court now screens

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Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

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I.

SCREENING STANDARD

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Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner1

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seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss

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any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

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or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. Balistreri v.

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Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §

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1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the

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Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by

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“[T]he term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who
is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal
law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

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a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the Prison

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Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a federal court must dismiss a prisoner’s claim, if “the allegation

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of poverty is untrue,” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which

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relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

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relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

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relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court

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applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an

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amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should

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be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it

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is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment.

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See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel

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v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a

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claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the

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claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir.

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1999). In making this determination, the court takes as true all allegations of material fact

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stated in the complaint, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

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See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se

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complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.

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See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not

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require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and

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conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation

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of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id.

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Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that,

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because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the

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framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there
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are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

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whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a

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complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the

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reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

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Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may therefore be dismissed sua

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sponte if the prisoner’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes

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claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are

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immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as

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well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios).

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See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d

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795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

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II.

SCREENING OF COMPLAINT

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In the complaint, Plaintiff sues multiple defendants for events that took place while

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Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Nevada Southern Detention Center (“NSDC”), a Corrections

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Corporation of America facility, in Pahrump, Nevada.2 (ECF No. 1-1 at 1). Plaintiff sues

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Warden Charlotte Collins, Nevada Southern Detention Center, and Corrections Corporation

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of America. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges two counts and seeks injunctive relief. (Id. at 5, 9).

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The complaint alleges the following: Since January 2013, Plaintiff has been detained

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at NSDC and is awaiting trial. (Id. at 3-4). Plaintiff has repeatedly complained that the law

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library is inadequate because immigrant detainees have no access to immigration case law

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or research material. (Id. at 4). The warden refuses to provide the resources and responds

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that, pursuant to the facility’s contract with the U.S. Marshal Service, NSDC does not have to

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provide immigration law resources. (Id.). The denial of these resources has had an adverse

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effect on Plaintiff because he was denied his motion to the immigration court and to the Board

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of Immigration Appeals. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that, had the facility provided immigration law

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NSDC contracts with the U.S. Marshal’s service for federal pretrial detention. See
CCA at http://www.cca.com/facilities/nevada-southern-detention-center (last visited on
November 6, 2014); see
also
U.S.
Marshals Service
at
http://www.usmarshals.gov/prisoner/index.html (last visited on November 6, 2014).
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resources, he would have known about the procedures required to access the immigration

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courts. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that, without a change in policy, Plaintiff will be further prejudiced

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because he “anticipates” an appeal of his immigration case to the Ninth Circuit Court of

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Appeals. (Id.).

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Additionally, NSDC’s indigent policy forces Plaintiff to chose between printing motions

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and/or purchasing personal hygiene items. (Id. at 5). The facility has an indigent policy of

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$3.00 per 30-day period. (Id.). Plaintiff works as a porter at the facility and earns $5.90 per

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week and, thus, can never be considered indigent. (Id.). Because Plaintiff is not indigent he

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must choose between purchasing personal hygiene items or printing out his pro se motions.

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(Id.). Plaintiff asserts that this policy “also means that the plaintiff who is defending himself in

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his criminal case is never able to purchase adequate phone time necessary to make important

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phone call[s] to gather information necessary” to his defense. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges a denial

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of the right to access the courts. (Id. at 4-5).

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As an initial matter, although the Supreme Court has limited an inmate’s ability to bring

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a Bivens3 damages action against a private entity under contract with the federal government

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and its employees, the Supreme Court has acknowledged an inmate’s ability to bring a suit

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to federal court for injunctive relief against the federally contracted private entity. See Corr.

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Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (holding that inmates have full access to

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remedial mechanisms established by the federal agency, including suits in federal court for

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injunctive relief). In this case, Plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 9).

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Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518

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U.S. 343, 346 (1996).

This right “requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the

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preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law

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libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.

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817, 828 (1977). This right, however, “guarantees no particular methodology but rather the

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Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91
S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971).
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conferral of a capability—the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or

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conditions of confinement before the courts.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. It is this “capability,

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rather than the capability of turning pages in a law library, that is the touchstone” of the right

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of access to the courts. Id. at 356-57.

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To establish a violation of the right of access to the courts, a prisoner must establish

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that he or she has suffered an actual injury, a jurisdictional requirement that flows from the

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standing doctrine and may not be waived. Id. at 349. An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice

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with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline

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or to present a claim.” Id. at 348. Delays in providing legal materials or assistance that result

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in actual injury are “not of constitutional significance” if “they are the product of prison

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regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 362. The right of

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access to the courts is limited to non-frivolous direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus

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proceedings, and § 1983 actions. Id. at 353 n.3, 354-55.

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The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a colorable claim for denial of access to the

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courts based on the lack of immigration law resources at NSDC. Plaintiff is attempting to

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allege actual injury in his immigration proceedings. However, immigration proceedings are not

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non-frivolous direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus proceedings, or § 1983 actions.

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Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege a colorable denial of access to the courts claim with respect

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to the indigent policy at NSDC. Again, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has suffered

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actual injury and instead speaks hypothetically about a pro se criminal defendant who may one

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day be affected by this policy. These claims are dismissed with prejudice, as amendment

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would be futile.

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IV.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the application to proceed in forma

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pauperis (ECF No. 3) is denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file the complaint (ECF No.

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CONCLUSION

1-1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed in its entirety for failure to
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state a claim, with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court certifies that any in forma pauperis appeal
from this order would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
DATED: This 11th day of February, 2015
DATED: This _____ day of November, 2014.

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_________________________________
United States District Judge

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