Yax v. Caesars Operating Company, Inc., Harrah's Las Vegas
Filing
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ORDER granting 10 Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint; granting in part as to the claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and the federal claim of Retaliation and denying in part as to all remaining claims Defendants' 8 Motion to Dismiss. The Court is willing to entertain a second motion to amend Plaintiffs complaint. However, such a motion must be properly filed within one week of the entry of this order. Signed by Judge Kent J. Dawson on 12/18/2014. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DKJ)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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ERIC YAX,
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Case No. 2:14-CV-1503-KJD-GWF
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
CAESARS OPERATING COMPANY, INC.,
HARRAHS LAS VEGAS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint (#10), to which Defendants
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responded (#16) and the time has long expired for Plaintiff to reply. Also before the Court is
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Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint (#8). Plaintiff responded (#9)
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and Defendants replied (#14).
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I. Motion to Amend
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Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to replace ROE 1 with “Caesars Operating
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Company, Inc. Agent for Harrah’s Las Vegas,” as a defendant in this matter. Plaintiff has already
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named Caesars Operating Company, Inc., Harrahs Las Vegas as a defendant. Defendant Harrah’s
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Las Vegas, LLC asserts that it is the only proper defendant, and that Plaintiff has incorrectly
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identified it.
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A. Legal Standard
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Plaintiff moves to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) which states that
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“[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Typically, amendment is
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permitted “unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is sought in bad faith,
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is futile, or creates undue delay.” Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep't of Revenue, 176
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F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted).
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B. Analysis
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Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion is futile because some—but not all—of
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Plaintiff’s claims are subject to a meritorious motion to dismiss. Regardless of whether the
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motion to dismiss has merit, the existence of claims unaffected by the motion to dismiss
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eviscerates this argument. The amendment would clearly not be futile as to the remaining claims.
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Defendants also argue that amendment is improper under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). However, Rule 15(c)
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deals with the relation back of amendments. Whether the amendment relates back is not an issue
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currently before the Court, making Defendants’ argument irrelevant. At bottom, despite the
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Court’s misgivings that the amendment will ultimately be futile, the Court finds that justice
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requires that Plaintiff be given leave to amend.
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II. Motion to Dismiss
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Both of the parties represent to the Court that the only change in what is now the First
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Amended Complaint is the adding of a named defendant. Accordingly, as the substance of the
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complaint has not changed, the Court will consider Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#8) as a
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motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint.
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A. Legal Standard
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A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
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can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “a short and
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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require
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detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and conclusions or a formulaic
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recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
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(citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
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speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
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complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
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face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
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In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply
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when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all well-pled
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factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions or mere recitals of the elements
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of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, are not entitled to the assumption
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of truth. Id. at 678. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual allegations in the
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complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the
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plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the
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defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. Further, where the complaint does not
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permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
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“alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (internal
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quotation marks omitted). Thus, when the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from
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conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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Moreover, “[a]ll allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in
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the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399,
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1403 (9th Circ. 1996) (citation omitted).
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B. Analysis
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i. State Law Claims of Disability Discrimination and Retaliation
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These claims are brought under NRS 613.310 et seq., making them subject to NRS
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613.430, a statute of limitation which requires that such claims be brought within “180 days after
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the date of the act complained of.” However, the statute is tolled during the pendency of the
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complaint before the Nevada Equal Rights Commission. NRS 613.430.
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Here, the last act complained of occurred on February 23, 2013, the date Defendants
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terminated Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff had until August 23, 2013 to file his state actions
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authorized under NRS 613.310 through 613.435. However, on August 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a
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charge with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission (NERC), which tolls the period.
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Unfortunately, neither party has provided evidence regarding when the NERC terminated the
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complaint. Nor have Defendants provided any authority for their assumption that issuance of a
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right-to-sue letter by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is synonymous
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under NRS 613.420 with NERC failing to conclude that an unfair employment practice occurred.
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Accordingly, the Court is unable to determine whether Plaintiff’s state law claims are timely
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filed.
ii. Federal Claim for Retaliation
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This claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., which requires that upon the
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EEOC’s failure to file a civil action (including by dismissing the charge), the EEOC shall notify
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the aggrieved person that they have ninety days from the date of notice to bring a civil action
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against the respondent named in the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This ninety-day period is
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a statute of limitations, and failure to file within the period bars a plaintiff’s action. Scholar v.
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Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Here, Plaintiff filed a charge of retaliation with the EEOC on March 1, 2013. The EEOC
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issued a dismissal and right-to-sue letter on April 12, 2013, triggering Plaintiff’s ninety-day
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window to bring a civil action. Thus, Plaintiff had until July 12, 2013 to file his claim. However,
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suit was not filed until September of 2014, more than a year after the statute of limitations had
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expired.
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Plaintiff also filed a second charge which included both disability discrimination and
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retaliation on August 12, 2013, stemming from precisely the same conduct originally charged,.
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However, that second charge is irrelevant to this Court’s analysis of the timeliness of Plaintiff’s
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retaliation claim. The Ninth Circuit has bluntly stated “To accept the EEOC's action in issuing
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[a] second letter as proper would vitiate the congressionally mandated period of limitation in
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favor of a hodgepodge of ad hoc determinations by the EEOC.” Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft
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Co., 509 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 1975) overruled on other grounds. At bottom, “[t]he EEOC
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ha[s] no authority to issue such a letter” meaning that the statutory period runs “from the
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issuance of the first letter.” Id. at 1030. Nor is the Ninth Circuit alone in this conclusion;
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calculating the ninety-day period from any date other than the initial right-to-sue letter would
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render the statutory limitation “meaningless, because potential Title VII plaintiffs could evade
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those requirements simply by seeking additional Notices of Right to Sue whenever they
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pleased.” Soso Liang Lo v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 787 F.2d 827, 828 (2d Cir. 1986).
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iii. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden. Not only has Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient
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facts to move the claim from the speculative to the plausible, but Plaintiff has entirely failed to
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plead some elements of the claim, such as a physical manifestation of emotional distress. See
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Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P.2d 1382, 1387 (Nev. 1998). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed
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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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III. Conclusion
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint (#10) is HEREBY GRANTED.
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The Clerk shall file Exhibit #1 to the Motion (#10) as the First Amended Complaint. Further,
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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#8) is HEREBY GRANTED in part as to the claim of
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Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and the federal claim of Retaliation. Defendants’
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Motion (#8) is DENIED in part as to all remaining claims. Because it appears to the Court that
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Plaintiff may be able to correct the deficiencies of the First Amended Complaint with regard to
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the claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, the Court is willing to entertain a
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second motion to amend Plaintiff’s complaint. However, such a motion must be properly filed
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within one week of the entry of this order.
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DATED this 18th day of December 2014.
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_____________________________
Kent J. Dawson
United States District Judge
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