Bridge v. Credit One Financial

Filing 126

ORDER Denying 13 Motion to Strike. It Is Further Ordered that 30 Motion for Leave to File a Third-Party Complaint and 118 Motion to Seal are Granted. Signed by Judge Lloyd D. George on 9/9/2015. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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WILLIAM BRIDGE, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,

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2:14-cv-1512-LDG-NJK
ORDER

Plaintiff,
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v.
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CREDIT ONE FINANCIAL, a Nevada
corporation, d/b/a CREDIT ONE BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.

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Plaintiff has filed a motion to strike the defendant’s affirmative defenses (#13, opposition

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#14, reply #15). Plaintiff maintains that the heightened pleading standards of Bell Atlantic Corp.

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v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), govern the

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pleading of affirmative defenses, as well as allegations in the complaint. Defendant argues that

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Rule 12(f) motions should be governed by Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). While a number

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of district courts have weighed in on whether Twombly/Iqbal applies to the pleading of affirmative

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defenses under Rule 8( c), there is no established precedent guiding the court. While taking no

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position as to the application of Twombly/Iqbal to Rule 12(f) motions based on Rule 8(a), the

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court agrees with FTC v. AMG Services, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-536-GMN-VCF, 2014 WL 5454170

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(D. Nev. 2014), that because Rule 8( c) imposes no “short and plain” standard, admissions under

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that rule fall into a different category than do statements of grounds for jurisdiction and claims

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under 8(a). Thus, the heightened pleading standard of Twombly/Iqbal will not be applied to

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defendant’s affirmative defenses.

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Plaintiff also argues that many of the affirmative defenses asserted by defendant are not

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affirmative defenses at all, but rather a recitation of the grounds of defendant’s case. While that

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may be so, the court will not order that such defenses be stricken at this time as their presence

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would not unduly expand the scope of the case. Rather, those defenses shall await any relevance

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determinations conducted by the magistrate judge during discovery or by this court subsequently.

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Defendant has filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint naming Nancy Bridge

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as a third-party defendant (#30, opposition #45, reply #53). The court, based on the arguments

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presented, will grant defendant leave to file the third-party complaint. The tactics of a party in

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moving to file the complaint should be of no matter in this Rule 14 analysis. Most, if not all, of

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the claims in the third-party complaint are anticipated to be issues in the trial of the original

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complaint. The third-party practice will not unduly delay the trial, or pose a burden for the court.

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Nor is the motion for leave untimely; the motion was filed before the close of discovery, and the

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court finds insufficient prejudice.

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While the court will grant the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint, it will

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reserve questions regarding jurisdiction and sufficiency of claims for Rule 12 motions.

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Accordingly,

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THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s
affirmative defenses (#13) is DENIED.
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that defendant’s motion to file a third-party complaint
(#30) is GRANTED.
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that plaintiff’s motion to seal (#118) is GRANTED.
DATED this ____ day of September, 2015.

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________________________
Lloyd D. George
United States District Judge

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