Frederick v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et al

Filing 23

ORDER Remanding Case back to Clark County District Court. Signed by Chief Judge Gloria M. Navarro on 12/12/2014. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF; CC: State court with certified copies of docket sheet and order - SLR)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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Teresa Frederick,

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Plaintiff,

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vs.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

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Defendant.
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) Case No.: 2:14-cv-1602-GMN-PAL
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ORDER
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Pending before the Court is the case of Frederick v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., (2:14-

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cv-1602-GMN-PAL). On October 2, 2014, the Court ordered that Defendant show cause

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as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF

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No. 6). On October 15, 2014, Defendant filed a Response. (ECF No. 10). For the

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reasons stated herein, the Court will remand this case to Clark County District Court.

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I.

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BACKGROUND
This action centers upon Plaintiff Teresa Frederick’s allegations that she was

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wrongfully discharged by Defendant Wal Mart Stores, Inc. due to her filing a worker’s

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compensation claim. (Compl. 4:2-21, ECF No. 1-1). This case was originally filed in

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Clark County District Court on June 25, 2014. (Id. at 1). On September 30, 2014,

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Defendant removed the case, citing this Court’s diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28

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U.S.C. § 1332. (Pet. for Rem. 2:13-16, ECF No. 1).

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The Complaint sets forth two causes of action upon which Plaintiff seeks to

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recover general damages, special damages, consequential damages, and punitive

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damages, each in excess of $10,000. (Compl. 7:7-13).

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

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matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal statutes

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are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566

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(9th Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right

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of removal in the first instance.” Id. (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d

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1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). “Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that

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more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance

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of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold.”

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Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003).

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III.

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ANALYSIS
This Court has original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the amount in

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controversy: (1) exceeds the sum or value of $75,000; and (2) is between citizens of

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different States. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). As discussed infra, Defendant fails to establish that

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the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and therefore the Court will remand this

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action.

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In its Response, Defendant asserts that this case satisfies the amount in

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controversy requirement because Plaintiff seeks: (a) damages for up to three years of lost

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wages; (b) damages for emotional distress; and (c) punitive damages. (Def.’s Resp., ECF

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No. 10). The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.

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a. Lost Wages

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Defendant claims that Plaintiff may ultimately seek $52,496.00 in damages for

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lost wages. In support of this argument, Defendant states that Plaintiff was paid $9.65

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per hour at the time of her termination. (Def.’s Resp 4:7-19). Consistent with the

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Scheduling Order, (ECF No. 19), Defendant estimates that this case will proceed to trial

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in August 2015. (Def.’s Resp. 4:11-13). Assuming that Plaintiff would have continued to

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work an average of 34 hours per week, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff would have earned

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$52,496.00 in the 160 weeks between her termination on July 30, 2012, and the

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scheduled trial date in August 2015. Therefore Court finds that Defendant has

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sufficiently shown that Plaintiff could reasonably seek $52,496.00 in damages for lost

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wages.

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b. Emotional Distress

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Without citing to the Complaint or any evidence, Defendant states that “Plaintiff’s

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potential recovery of emotional distress damages could add at least $25,000 to the

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amount in controversy.” (Def.’s Resp. 5:11-13). While it is conceivable that Plaintiff

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could seek such an amount based on emotional distress, Defendant has failed to point to

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any particular facts or allegations showing that Plaintiff is likely to seek such a large sum.

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Thus, Defendant has failed to carry its burden and the Court will not consider this amount

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within its calculation.

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c. Punitive Damages

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Defendant asserts, without any reference to the facts of this case, that “[T]he

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amount in controversy on the punitive damages component of Plaintiff’s claims is

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potentially between $100,000.00 and $300,000.00.” (Def.’s Resp. 6:3-5). Though

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Defendant is correct that the Court can, in some instances, consider a potential award of

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punitive damages to be within the amount in controversy, “it is not enough to tell the

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Court that [a plaintiff] seek[s] punitive damages, [the defendant] must come forward with

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evidence showing the likely award if [the plaintiff] were to succeed in obtaining punitive

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damages.” Wilson, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (D. Idaho 2003); see also, e.g., Burk v. Med.

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Sav. Ins. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (D. Ariz. 2004). Furthermore, a court cannot

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consider awards issued in other actions unless a defendant identifies similarities which

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raise an inference that such an award might be warranted in the instant case. See, e.g.,

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Conrad Associates v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (N.D. Cal.

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1998). Because Defendant has failed to identify any particular facts or allegations which

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might warrant a large punitive damage award, the Court will not consider punitive

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damages within its calculation.

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Therefore the evidence put forward by Defendant demonstrates only that Plaintiff

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is seeking $52,496.00—far below the $75,000 minimum required for diversity

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jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court will remand this case.1

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IV.

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CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that this action is remanded to Clark County

District Court. The Clerk is instructed to close the case.

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DATED this 12th day of December, 2014.
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___________________________________
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge
United States District Court

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Because Defendant has failed to carry its burden as to the amount in controversy, the Court need not
determine whether complete diversity exists between Plaintiff and Defendant.

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