Hernandez v. Westates Property Management et al

Filing 7

ORDER Denying 2 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 5 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey on 12/12/2014. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLR)

1
2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

4
5

Josette Hernandez,
Case No.: 2:14-cv-02113-JAD-NJK

6

Plaintiff

7

v.

8

Weststates Property Management; Overton
Associates, LP, Freddy Ludena, and Alma Lopez,

9

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Emergency
Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction
[Docs. 2, 5]

Defendants

10
11
12

Plaintiff Josette Hernandez filed this action this afternoon in an attempt to stop her 5:00 p.m.

13

eviction from her apartment unit as ordered by the Moapa Valley Justice Court. She suggests that

14

she would appeal the justice court’s decision in the state-court system, but the Moapa Valley Justice

15

Court is closed today.1 So she turns to this court instead, alleges that her eviction violates the Fair

16

Housing Act,2 and moves for an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to

17

stop the eviction and the effect of the Moapa Valley court’s order.3

18

The standards for granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are the

19

same.4 Under Rule 65(d), “Every order granting an injunction . . . must: (a) state the reasons why it

20
1

21
22

Doc. 2 at 5 (“On December 11, 2014, the Justice Court of Moapa Valley erroneously granted
summary eviction against Hernandez . . . . Hernandez has no recourse to appeal the eviction because the
Moapa Valley Justice Court is closed on December 12, 2014.”).
2

Doc. 1.

3

Docs. 2, 5.

23
24
4

25
26
27
28

See Stuhlbarg International Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839
n.7 (9th Cir. 2001); Brown Jordan International, Inc. v. Mind’s Eye Interiors, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d
1152, 1154 (D. Haw. 2002); Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc. v. Sathers, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 655, 658 (D. Del.
1987) (applying preliminary injunction standard to temporary retraining order issued with notice).
Otherwise, a temporary restraining order “should be restricted to serving [its] underlying purpose of
preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing,
and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Board of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70,
Page 1 of 3

1

issued; (b) state its terms specifically; and (c) describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to

2

the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.”5 “A preliminary injunction

3

is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear

4

showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”6 It is never granted as of right.7 As the United States

5

Supreme Court explained in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the district court inquires

6

whether the movant has demonstrated: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable

7

injury, (3) that remedies available at law are inadequate, (4) that the balance of hardships justify a

8

remedy in equity, and (5) that the public interest would not be disserved by a favorable ruling.8

9

However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.9 Under Federal Rule of Civil

10

Procedure 12(h)(3), “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the

11

court must dismiss the action.”10 The Rooker–Feldman doctrine recognizes that a district court lacks

12

subject matter jurisdiction to review—directly or indirectly—a state court judgment.11 Its application

13

“is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-

14

court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district

15

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”12

16

The doctrine also bars relitigation of issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court

17
18

415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974).
5

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65(d).

6

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted).

19
20
7

21

See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). See also eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).

22

8

23

9

24

See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978).
10

25

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3).

11

26
27

See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 285 (2005); Noel v.
Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). The doctrine is derived from District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
12

28

Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.
Page 2 of 3

1

judgment.13 Thus, the fact that a particular provision of federal law was not raised in a state court

2

proceeding will not bar application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if the federal suit is an

3

impermissible de facto appeal.

4

In this case, although I am sympathetic to Hernandez’s plight, it is clear from her

5

representations that her request to enjoin her eviction proceedings is a de facto appeal of the state

6

court’s summary eviction decision. As I lack jurisdiction over this claim under the Rooker-Feldman

7

doctrine, Hernandez is unlikely to succeed on the merits of her claim. I need not reach the other

8

prongs of the conjunctive test before denying her request for injunctive relief.

9
10
11

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ emergency motion for temporary
restraining order [Doc. 2] and emergency motion for preliminary injunction [Doc. 5] are DENIED.
DATED: December 12, 2014 at 4:10 p.m.

12
13
_________________________________
Jennifer A. Dorsey
United States District Judge

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
13

28

Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005).
Page 3 of 3