Randy Jones v Clark County School District

Filing 26

ORDER Granting 11 Motion to Dismiss. Amended Complaint deadline: 4/21/2016. Signed by Judge Andrew P. Gordon on 3/31/16. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - TR)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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***

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RANDY JONES,

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Plaintiff,

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Case No. 2:15-cv-00010-APG-GWF

v.
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

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Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO
AMEND
(Dkt. #11)

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Plaintiff Randy Jones was a school bus driver for defendant Clark County School District

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(“CCSD”). He alleges that the school district engaged in a “campaign of harassment,

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intimidation and bullying” in order to interfere with his rights under the Family Medical Leave

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Act (“FLMA”). He alleges that the school district’s harassment inflicted severe emotion distress

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on him and resulted in his constructive discharge.

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The school district moves to dismiss these claims and Jones’s request for punitive

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damages. (Dkt. #11.) Because the complaint lacks sufficient facts, I dismiss Jones’s claims with

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leave to amend. And because punitive damages are not recoverable against the school district, I

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dismiss Jones’s request for punitive damages with prejudice.

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I.

BACKGROUND

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Since August 17, 1998, Jones was employed as a school bus driver by CCSD. (Dkt. #1 at

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¶¶ 5, 15.) Jones allegedly suffered from “adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed

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mood, insomnia, [and] occupational stress,” and took “several prescribed medications” for these

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conditions. (Id. at ¶¶ 19–20.)

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Around February 2012, Jones’s doctor recommended that he take a leave of absence. (Id.

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at ¶¶ 20, 24.) Jones advised CCSD of his conditions and “sought alternative employment” with

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the school district in order to avoid taking time off under the FMLA, but he did not succeed. (Id.

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at ¶ 25.) On March 13, 2013, Jones filed a charge of discrimination alleging that CCSD denied

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him a reasonable accommodation for his disabilities, forced him to take a leave of absence under

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the FLMA, and treated him unfairly because of his disability. (Id. at ¶¶ 21–22.) On May 1, 2013,

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he was allegedly forced into retirement because he had exhausted his FLMA leave and CCSD

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refused to offer him an alternative position. (Id. at ¶ 27.)

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On October 2, 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sent Jones a right

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to sue letter. (Id. at ¶ 5.) On January 5, 2015, Jones commenced this action. The school district

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moves to dismiss Jones’s claims for (1) interference with his FLMA rights, (2) constructive

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discharge, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) punitive damages.

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II.

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ANALYSIS
A properly pleaded complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim

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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands

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more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

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action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise

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above the speculative level.” Twombly 550 U.S. at 555. To survive a motion to dismiss, a

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complaint must “contain [ ] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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District courts must apply a two-step approach when considering motions to dismiss. Id. at

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679. First, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all

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reasonable inferences from the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.; Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc. 724

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F.3d 1235, 1247–48 (9th Cir. 2013). Legal conclusions, however, are not entitled to the

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assumption of truth even if cast in the form of factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Brown,

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724 F.3d at 1248. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by

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conclusory statements, do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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Second, the court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a

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plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the complaint alleges

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facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged

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misconduct. Id. at 663. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the

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mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but it has not shown—that the

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pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When the

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claims have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief

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will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the [district] court to draw on its judicial

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experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

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A.

Jones’s claim for interference with his FLMA rights is dismissed with leave to
amend.

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Jones alleges that CCSD interfered with his FLMA rights by harassing him, giving him

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“the run around,” refusing to honor his request for FLMA leave, and requiring him to take sick

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time before FLMA leave. (Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 47, 48.) The school district moves to dismiss this claim,

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arguing that Jones exhausted his FLMA leave and voluntarily retired and the complaints’

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allegations are legal conclusions couched in the form of factual allegations.

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CCSD’s first basis for dismissal rests on medical documents that Jones faxed to the school

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district on January 18, 2013. (See Dkt. #11 at 4.) It states, “[due] to circumstances beyond my

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control my doctor ha[s] advised me to retire from driver due to the serious health condition

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described above and on the following page. It would be irresponsible of me to drive my special-

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need students while on medication and suffering from other symptoms described above.” (Id.)

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Relying on this document, CCSD asserts that Jones voluntarily retired after he had already

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exhausted his FLMA leave, which occurred on October 18, 2012. Jones responds that I should

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not consider this document because it is outside the pleadings, and even if I did consider it, his

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FLMA claim is plausible.

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I generally do not consider any material outside of the pleadings when ruling on a Rule

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12(b)(6) motion. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However,

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“documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

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but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule

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12(b)(6) motion to dismiss” without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

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judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
Although Jones does not dispute the authenticity of the medical documents that he faxed

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to the school district, I exclude the documents from my analysis because its contents are not

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alleged in the complaint. But even if they were, I am not persuaded that the documents are fatal

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to Jones’s claim. Jones alleges that CCSD began interfering with his FLMA leave in February of

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2012. The medical documents the school district relies on to argue that Jones voluntarily retired

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are dated January 18, 2013. It is therefore possible, as Jones alleges, that CCSD somehow

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interfered with his FLMA rights between February of 2012 and January of 2013.
Nonetheless, I grant the school district’s motion to dismiss this claim because the

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allegations supporting it are legal conclusions couched in the form of factual allegations. For

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instance, Jones alleges that CCSD engaged in a “campaign of harassment, intimidation and

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bullying.” (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 47). In support, he alleges that CCSD refused to honor his requests for

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time off, ignored his requests for time off, and gave him “the run around.” (Id.) But he does not

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allege any dates on which this occurred, identify the supervisors or other employees who harassed

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him, or cite any other facts to support this claim. Because these allegations stop “short of the line

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between possibility and plausibility,” I dismiss this claim with leave to amend. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

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678.

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B.

Jones’s claim for constructive discharge is dismissed with leave to amend.

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Jones next alleges that CCSD constructively discharged him by forcing him to sign a

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CCF-164 form,1 which was presented to him because CCSD had “no other employment options”

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for him. (Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 58, 59.) CCSD asserts that Jones’s allegations are not factually plausible

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and, even if they were, they would not state a claim for constructive discharge.

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“[C]onstructive discharge occurs when the working conditions deteriorate, as a result of

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discrimination, to the point that they become sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to

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overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on

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A CCF-164 form is a notice of removal or retirement report.

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the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer.” Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174,

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1184 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000)).

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Although Jones’s complaint alleges that the school district engaged in a “campaign of

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harassment, intimidation and bullying,” it does not allege any facts that would allow me to draw

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the inference that his working conditions were “so intolerable that he felt compelled to resign.”

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Poland, 494 F.3d at 1184. I therefore dismiss Jones’s constructive discharge claim but grant him

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leave to amend if he can allege dates, identities, and facts surrounding the alleged harassment.

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C.

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Jones’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed with
leave to amend.

Jones alleges that CCSD intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him. To state a

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claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege (1) extreme and

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outrageous conduct with either the intention of, or reckless disregard for, causing emotional

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distress, (2) the plaintiff’s having suffered severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) actual or

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proximate causation. Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1998) (quoting Star v.

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Rabello, 625 P.2d 90, 91–92 (1981)). Jones’s allegations in support of this claim are largely

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conclusory. Nonetheless, his complaint contains allegations of systematic harassment that could

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support this claim if properly pleaded. I therefore dismiss Jones’s intentional infliction of

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emotional distress claim with leave to amend.

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D.

Jones’s request for punitive damages is dismissed with prejudice.

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CCSD moves to dismiss Jones’s claim for punitive damages because punitive damages

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cannot be awarded against a political subdivision of the State of Nevada, which CCSD is. See

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Nev. Rev. Stat. § 386.010(2); 41.035(1). Jones concedes that punitive damages are not

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recoverable on any of his claims. I therefore dismiss Jones’s punitive damages claim with

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prejudice.

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III.

CONCLUSION

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Clark County School District’s motion to

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dismiss (Dkt. #11) is GRANTED. Plaintiff Randy Jones may file an amended complaint curing

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the deficiencies in claims of FLMA violation, constructive discharge, and intentional infliction of

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emotional distress claim by April 21, 2016. If he fails to do so, the case will proceed on his

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remaining claims. Jones’s request for punitive damages is dismissed with prejudice.

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DATED this 31st day of March, 2016.

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ANDREW P. GORDON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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