Carter v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.

Filing 30

ORDER Granting Defendant's 27 Motion to Reconsider 26 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Strike, and Order on Motion to Compel. Signed by Chief Judge Gloria M. Navarro on 10/28/15. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - PS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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CHAD CARTER,
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Plaintiff,
vs.

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RENT-A-CENTER, INC.,
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Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:15-cv-00178-GMN-CWH
ORDER

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Pending before the Court is the Motion to Reconsider (ECF No. 27) filed by Defendant

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Rent-A-Center, Inc. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff Chad Carter (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response (ECF

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No. 28), and Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 29).

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Defendant asserts that the Court should reconsider its Order denying as moot

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Defendant’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 8). Specifically, “Defendant requests a new order from

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the Court clarifying that it granted Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration as to Plaintiffs

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individual claims only and, in also granting the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs case, thereby

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enforced the Class Action Waiver and eliminated his class claims entirely.” (Mot. Reconsider

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2:17–20).

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“[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual

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circumstances.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

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Reconsideration is appropriate where: (1) the court is presented with newly discovered

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evidence, (2) the court committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3)

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if there is an intervening change in controlling law. School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v.

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ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). However, a motion for reconsideration is not

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a mechanism for rearguing issues presented in the original filings, Backlund v. Barnhart, 778
F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985), or “advancing theories of the case that could have been
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presented earlier, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holmes, 846 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (S.D. Tex. 1994)

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(footnotes omitted). Thus, Rule 59(e) and 60(b) and are not “intended to give an unhappy

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litigant one additional chance to sway the judge.” Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 879, 889

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(E.D. Va. 1977).

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Here, the Arbitration Agreement requires that “arbitration shall be conducted on an

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individual basis.” (Arb. Agmt., ECF No. 27-1). Such a class-action waiver is enforceable. See

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AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). Accordingly, the Court clarifies that,

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in granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, the Court compelled arbitration solely

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as to Plaintiff’s individual claims. Moreover, in granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the

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Court eliminated Plaintiff’s class claims in their entirety.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider (ECF No. 27) is
GRANTED.
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DATED this _____ day of October, 2015.

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___________________________________
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge
United States District Judge

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