Grybowski et al v. Hewlett-Packard Company

Filing 46

ORDER Granting Plaintiffs' 40 Motion to Compel Continued Deposition of Phil Castillo. Castillo's second deposition is limited to a total of three and one-half hours with each side bearing its own costs. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cam Ferenbach on 12/21/2015. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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RYAN SMITH, individually and JAMES “JAY”
GRYBOWSKI, individually,

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Case No. 2:15–cv–484–GMN–VCF

Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs.
MOTION TO COMPEL CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF
PHIL CASTILLO IN EXCESS OF FOUR HOURS AND
FIFTY-EIGHT MINUTES (DOC. #40)

HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY,
Defendant.

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This matter involves Ryan Smith and James “Jay” Grybowski’s civil action against Hewlett-

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Packard. Smith and Grybowski (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) allege, among other claims, breach of

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contract and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Before the court is Plaintiffs’

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Motion to Compel Continued Deposition of Phil Castillo in Excess of Four Hours and Fifty-Eight

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minutes (Doc. #40), Hewlett-Packard’s response (Doc. #43), and Plaintiffs’ reply. (Doc. #45). For the

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reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND

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The instant motion arises out a dispute regarding the deposition of Phillip Castillo, Vice

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President of Sales and General Manager for the Enterprise Group for Hewlett-Packard. Castillo was

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Grybowski and Smith’s supervisor and manager at Hewlett-Packard. (Doc. #40 at 2).

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The parties convened on July 15, 2015 in Irvine, California for Castillo’s deposition. (Doc. #40

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at 2). The deposition began at approximately 10:34 a.m. and concluded at 4:58 p.m. Id. Castillo’s

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deposition covered a variety of topics including: (1) Castillo’s supervision and management of the

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Plaintiffs, (2) Castillo’s involvement in “the Macau deal,” (3) Castillo’s alleged involvement in the

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Plaintiffs’ termination from Hewlett-Packard, and (4) Castillo’s alleged sexual harassment of a female

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Hewlett-Packard employee. (Doc. #40-1).
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At approximately 4:17 p.m., Plaintiffs were unable to complete the full seven-hour deposition

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and asked to continue the deposition to another day. (Doc. # 40-1 at 14). Hewlett-Packard objected. Id.

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Castillo’s deposition concluded after approximately five hours of oral testimony. Id. Plaintiffs and

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Hewlett-Packard have met and conferred and were unable to resolve the instant dispute. (Doc. #40-9);

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(Doc. #40-10). Plaintiffs then filed the instant motion.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD
“[T]he scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding [1] any

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nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and [2] proportional to the needs of
the case.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
When the court determines if discovery is proportional to the needs of the action, it considers:

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“the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative

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access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the

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issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its benefits.” Id.

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“On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise
allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less

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burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the
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information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by
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Rule 26(b)(1).” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a deposition is limited to one day of 7

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hours.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1). “The court must allow additional time consistent with Rule 26(b)(1)

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and (2) if needed to fairly examine the deponent.” Id.

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“The party seeking a court order to extend the examination, or otherwise alter the limitations, is
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expected to show good cause to justify such an order.” FED. R. CIV. P. (d)(1) advisory committee’s note.

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“[C]ourts asked to order an extension—might consider a variety of factors.” Id. “If the examination will

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cover events occurring over a long period of time, that may justify allowing additional time.” Id.

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“Preoccupation with timing is to be avoided.” Id.

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III. DISCUSSION

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The parties’ present two questions: (1) whether good cause exists to extend Castillo’s deposition

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and (2) if Castillo’s deposition is extended, whether the Plaintiffs must pay Hewlett-Packard’s expenses

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related to Castillo’s extended deposition.

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1.

There is Good Cause to Extend Castillo’s Deposition

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Plaintiffs contend that they should be allowed an additional four hours and fifty-eight minutes to
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depose Castillo. This represents the remaining time on Plaintiffs’ original deposition plus an additional
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three hours. Castillo’s total deposition time would be ten hours. Hewlett-Packard argues that Plaintiffs
failed to show good cause to warrant an extension of Castillo’s deposition. Hewlett-Packard argues, in

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the alternative, that Plaintiffs are limited to two additional hours, for a total of seven hours, the

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presumptive limit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(1). The court finds good cause to

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grant Plaintiffs’ motion to extend deposition time, but limits additional time for Castillo’s second

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deposition to three and one-half hours.

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Neither party disputes that Castillo’s deposition is relevant to the instant action. (Doc. #40);
(Doc. #43). The court must now consider whether Plaintiffs’ discovery request is proportional to the
needs of the instant action. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiffs’ request to extend Castillo’s deposition is

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proportional to the needs of the instant action for the following reasons: (1) Castillo is an important
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witness and possesses information relevant to each of Plaintiffs’ claims, (2) Castillo’s oral testimony is
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an efficient manner for Plaintiffs’ to obtain relevant information on their claims, and (3) the burden on
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Hewlett-Packard to produce Castillo for a second deposition is outweighed by the benefit of the
additional information Plaintiffs will obtain from Castillo.
Hewlett-Packard emphasizes that Plaintiffs had an opportunity to question Castillo on the major

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issues in the instant action and additional deposition time is unwarranted. Plaintiffs, however, showed

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they anticipated Castillo’s breath of knowledge, but were not prepared for Castillo’s depth of knowledge

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on certain topics. (Doc. #40 at 5). Hewlett-Packard’s argument also fails to consider Plaintiffs’ desire to

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revisit topics already covered in Castillo’s deposition.

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Castillo’s deposition, however, may not be so long as to become unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). Given Castillo’s importance to Plaintiffs’ action, the court

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will allow an additional three and one-half hours to depose Castillo. This represents the remaining two
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hours presumptively permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(1), as well as an additional
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ninety minutes. The additional time will be sufficient to give Plaintiffs a fair opportunity to examine
Castillo on all relevant topics.
2.

Plaintiffs Are Not Required to Pay Hewlett-Packard’s Expenses Related to Castillo’s

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Second Deposition

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Hewlett-Packard argues that, if the court grants Plaintiffs additional deposition time, Plaintiffs

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should be required to pay Hewlett-Packard’s expenses related to Castillo’s second deposition. Hewlett-

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Packard relies, in part, on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(2) under which “[t]he court may

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impose appropriate sanctions—including the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by any
party—on a person who impedes, delay, or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.”

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Hewlett-Packard argues that Plaintiffs’ impeded their own deposition of Castillo when they
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concluded the deposition after five hours. After reviewing the parties’ moving papers, the court finds
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that Hewlett-Packard is not entitled to fees and costs associated with Castillo’s second deposition. Each
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side will pay its own costs.

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ACCORDINGLY, and for good cause shown,

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Continued Deposition of Phil Castillo is

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GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Castillo’s second deposition be limited to a total of three and
one-half hours, with each side bearing its own costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 21st day of December, 2015.

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_________________________
CAM FERENBACH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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