Republic Silver State Disposal Inc. v. International Brotherhood Of Teamsters Local 631
Filing
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ORDER Granting 54 Motion to Dismiss. THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that 50 Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., d/b/a Republic Services of Southern Nevada's Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award is DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Lloyd D. George on 10/11/16. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - ADR)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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REPUBLIC SILVER STATE
DISPOSAL INC.,
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Case No. 2:15-cv-00903-LDG (CWH)
Plaintiff,
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ORDER
v.
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INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 631,
Defendant.
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The plaintiff, Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., d/b/a Republic Services of
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Southern Nevada (Republic) filed a lawsuit alleging that, in May 19, 1999, an arbitrator
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rendered an opinion in its favor and against the defendant, International Brotherhood of
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Teamsters, Local 631 (Union). The Union did not move to vacate or otherwise set aside
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that award. In its only remaining claim for relief, Republic seeks confirmation of that 1999
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arbitration award, and has now moved for that relief (#50).
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The Union opposes the motion and cross-moves (#54) pursuant to Fed. Rule of Civ.
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Pro. 12(c) to dismiss the claim as barred by the statute of limitations. The Court agrees
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that Republic’s claim to confirm the arbitration award is untimely and will dismiss this
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matter.
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Prior Decision
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Republic argues that the Court should deny the Union’s motion to dismiss because
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the Court previously considered and “specifically denied” the Union’s argument that the
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statute of limitations barred Republic from commencing an action to confirm the 1999
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award. The Union did raise the argument in its first motion to dismiss. The Court denied
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that motion; thus implicitly the Union’s argument, but without specifically addressing the
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merits of the argument. Republic does not, however, cite to any authority precluding this
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Court from re-visiting the Union’s argument that commencing an action in 2015 to confirm
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an arbitration award issued in 1999 was untimely.
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Limitations Period to Confirm Arbitration Award
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Pursuant to NRS 38.239, “[a]fter a party to an arbitral proceeding receives notice of
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an award, the party may make a motion to the court for an order confirming the award at
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which time the court shall issue a confirming order unless the award is modified or
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corrected pursuant to NRS 38.237 or 38.242 or is vacated pursuant to NRS 38.241.” As
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Republic correctly points out, in adopting the Uniform Arbitration Act, Nevada did not adopt
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a limitations period specific to the commencement of an action to confirm and arbitration
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award.
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The lack of a limitations period specific to commencing an action to confirm an
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arbitration award, however, does not establish that the commencement of such an action is
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not governed by any limitations period. Rather, as noted in Comment 2 of §22, of the
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Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (which Act Nevada subsequently adopted), “The
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consensus of the Drafting Committee was that the general statute of limitations in a State
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for the filing and execution on a judgment should apply.” The comment appears consistent
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with the primary purpose of confirming an arbitration award: to cause it to become
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enforceable as a civil judgment. Pursuant to N.R.S. 11.190, “an action upon a judg ment or
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decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United
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States, or the renewal thereof” must be commenced within six years. The Court holds that
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this general limitations period applies to actions commenced to confirm an arbitration
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award. Accordingly, the Court finds Republic’s 2015 commencement of this action to
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confirm a 1999 arbitration award to be untimely, and will dismiss the claim as such.
Further, even if Nevada’s limitations period for commencing an action upon a
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judgment does not govern the timeliness of Republic’s commencement of its claim to
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confirm the 1999 arbitration award, the Court would dismiss the claim as untimely pursuant
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to the doctrine of laches. “Laches is an equitable doctrine which may be invoked when
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delay by one party works to the disadvantage of the other, causing a change of
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circumstances which would make the grant of relief to the delaying party inequitable.”
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Building & Constr. Trades v. Public Works, 108 Nev. 605, 610–11, 836 P.2d 633, 636–37
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(1992). “Thus, laches is more than a mere delay in seeking to enforce one's rights; it is a
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delay that works to the disadvantage of another.” Carson City v. Price, 113 Nev. 409, 412,
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934 P.2d 1042 (1997).
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In moving to dismiss, the Union argues that the Court should not “put its imprimatur
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upon an arbitral award in a vacuum;” that is, that the Court should consider context in
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determining whether to cause the arbitration award to be enforceable as a civil judgment.
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Generally, the Court would disagree. Confirmation of an arbitration award is intended to be
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a summary procedure. Specific methods to challenge an arbitration award are provided
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separately, and the permissible challenges are limited. Nevertheless, when a party delays
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sixteen years in seeking confirmation, such delay will create a vacuum of context that
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precludes confirmation without first considering whether the delay in seeking this Court’s
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judgment confirming the award has worked to the disadvantage of the other party.
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Republic argues that its “merely asking this Court to confirm” the award (emphasis
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original). It further argues that confirmation is concerned with the propriety of the award
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and is unrelated to enforcement. The latter argument is irrelevant. The former argument is
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incomplete: Republic is not merely asking the Court to confirm the award, but is asking the
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Court to confirm an award sixteen years after it was issued by the arbitrator.
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To confirm the award after such a significant delay the Court must consider whether
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the delay itself will cause the entry of a civil judgment confirming the award to be
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inequitable to the Union. Republic offers no argument that, in obtaining a confirmation of
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the award, any advantage it obtains over the Union will result solely from reducing the
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award to an enforceable civil judgment rather than as a result of the significant delay in
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seeking the confirmation. Rather, the pleadings of Republic’s complaint, and its arguments
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to the Court, indicate that Republic is seeking confirmation in response to changes in the
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circumstances subsequent to 1999 that were relevant to the award, which changes have
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favored the Union, and which changes may have limited the applicability of the 1999 award
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to present disputes between the parties. In short, Republic’s own pleading best exemplifies
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that it will be the significant delay in confirming the award, resulting from Republic’s
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significant delay in commencing an action to confirm the award, that will work to the
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disadvantage of the Union. Accordingly, even if the present action is not barred by
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Nevada’s six-year statute of limitations, the Court finds that Republic’s 2015 action to
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confirm the 1999 arbitration award is barred pursuant to the doctrine of laches.
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Therefore, for good cause shown,
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THE COURT ORDERS that Defendant International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
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Local 631's Cross-Motion to Dismiss (#54) is GRANTED; Republic Silver State Disposal
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Inc., d/b/a Republic Services of Southern Nevada’s remaining claim for confirmation of
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arbitration award is DISMISSED as untimely.
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THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., d/b/a
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Republic Services of Southern Nevada’s Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award (#50)
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is DENIED as moot.
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DATED this ______ day of October, 2016.
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Lloyd D. George
United States District Judge
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