Ali v. City of North Las Vegas et al

Filing 50

ORDER that 15 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 32 Defendants' Motion for Sanctions and Dismissal are GRANTED; FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims now pending before this Court are DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Kent J. Dawson on 3/22/17. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - MMM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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FALASHA ALI,
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Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:15-CV-02171-KJD-GWF

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v.

ORDER

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CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Presently before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#15) and Defendants’ Motion
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for Sanctions and Dismissal (#32). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (#36) to Defendants’
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Motions for Sanctions and Dismissal (#32).
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A. Background
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Plaintiff is an inmate who was housed at the North Las Vegas Detention Center (hereinafter
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referred to as “NLVDC”) from March 2007 through November 2008. On May 16, 2016, Plaintiff
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filed a complaint alleging several violations of 42 USC §1983. Plaintiff’s first claim for relief asserts
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that he was the victim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC §12101
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(hereinafter referred to as “ADA”), for a period of time from January 2007 through November 2008
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when Plaintiff was housed in secure housing unit (hereinafter referred to as “SHU”) due to mental
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illness. Plaintiff’s second claim alleges violations of various Fourteenth Amendment rights from
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January 2008 through November 2008, specifically, that Plaintiff was placed in SHU for more than
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five-hundred days, nearly twenty-four hours a day. Finally, Plaintiff’s third claim alleges violations
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of the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when he was denied drug/alcohol treatment,
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religious services, access to the law library, communal dining, outdoor recreational activities, and
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medical care. Plaintiff further alleges that his due process rights were violated during November

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2008.

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In 2:10-cv-01690-KJD-PAL (hereinafter referred to as the “prior case”) Plaintiff filed a

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complaint on September 28, 2010 alleging substantially similar allegations as those alleged in the

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instant matter. See Case No. 2:10-cv-01690-KJD-PAL. On January 14, 2014, the Ninth Circuit

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issued a Mandate wherein it reversed and remanded Plaintiff’s appeal with respect to the City of

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North Las Vegas to this Court for dismissal due to lack of proper service. See (#37 in 2:10-cv-01690-

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KJD-PAL). This Court subsequently issued its Order on Mandate (#40 in 2:10-cv-01690-KJD-PAL),

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complying with the order of the Ninth Circuit and dismissing the claims against the City of North

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Las Vegas without prejudice. Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint (#41 in 2:10-cv-01690-

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KJD-PAL) on May 9, 2014 after the action had been closed. The Complaint in this case was filed on

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November 13, 2015 and served on the City on July 15, 2016. However, the Complaint was never

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served on the other named Defendant, Joseph Chronister. The Complaint also names three Doe

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defendants who have not been identified.

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On August 3, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, based primarily on the expiration

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of all statutes of limitation. Plaintiff did not file a response. Rather, Plaintiff made two requests for

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extensions of time, citing extreme difficulties he has experienced in preparing a response due to his

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incarceration and various events occurring at the facility where he was incarcerated. The most recent

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of those requests was filed on October 14, 2016 which indicated that due to a prison lock down, he

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did not have access to the law library or case law. Plaintiff also requested that the Court contact the

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prison to verify his statements.

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Defendants submitted a declaration of Thomas Quintana, a correctional counselor at the

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facility where Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time of the prison lock down – Florence Correctional

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Institution (hereinafter referred to as “FCI”), with their Motion for Sanctions and Dismissal (#32).

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Mr. Quintana confirmed the occurrence of the lock down, however, he stated in his declaration that

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Plaintiff’s statements regarding the prison lock down were false. For instance, only the general
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population was subject to the lock down. Plaintiff was not in the general population at that time.

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Rather, he was housed in SHU from August 1, 2016 through October 24, 2016, when he was

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transferred to another facility. During that time, Plaintiff had access to the prison’s email system and

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electronic law library.

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B. Legal Standard

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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a Plaintiff’s complaint for “failure

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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A properly pled complaint must provide “a short

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require

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detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation

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of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Papasan

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v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the

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speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

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must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal,

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129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation omitted).

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In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when

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considering motions to dismiss. First, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations

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in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950.

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Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not

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suffice. Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must consider whether the factual allegations in the

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complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. A claim is facially plausible when the

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Plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1949. Where the complaint does not permit the

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court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but not

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shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the

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claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, Plaintiff’s complaint

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must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

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C. Statute of Limitations

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To state a cause of action under Section 1983, the claimant must allege (1) the violation of a

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right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that the alleged deprivation was

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caused by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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A Section 1983 civil rights claim accrues when a party knows or has reason to know of the

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injury which is the basis of his or her claim. In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the Supreme

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Court held that claims based on Section 1983 are to be characterized as personal injury actions for

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statute of limitations purposes. While federal rather than state law governs the characterization of

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Section 1983 claims for statute of limitations purposes, the length of a limitations period as well as

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any questions of tolling and application are to be governed by state law. Id. In Nevada, the statute of

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limitations for a personal injury claim is two years, thus the statute of limitations for Section 1983

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purposes is two years. See NRS 11.190(4)(e). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges incidents that occurred in

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2007 and 2008, more than two years ago. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to bring this action within the

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applicable statute of limitations.

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Further, despite filing two motions for extensions of time (## 23 & 30) to respond to

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss – the first of which this Court granted – as of the date of this Order,

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Plaintiff has failed to file a response within the time period established by the Court. While

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pleadings filed by pro se parties are to be liberally construed, pro se parties must adhere to both Local

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and Federal rules of procedure. The Court does not find that Plaintiff has adhered to these rules.

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Further, this Court does not find that Plaintiff exhibited diligence in this matter. As a result,

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Plaintiff’s causes of action pursuant to Section 1983 are barred by the applicable two-year statute of

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limitations and must be dismissed.

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E. Motion for Sanctions and Dismissal

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With respect to Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions and Dismissal (#32), Plaintiff’s response

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was not filed within fourteen days as required by Local Rule 7-2(b). Plaintiff waited thirty days to

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file his response. Again, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has adhered to both Local and Federal

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rules of procedure. Further, based on Plaintiff’s pattern of activity, this Court finds that Plaintiff has

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caused substantial delay in the resolution of this matter. As a result, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

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are GRANTED.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#15) and
Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions and Dismissal (#32) are GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims now pending before this Court are
DISMISSED.

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DATED this _____ day of March 2017.
22nd
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____________________________________
Kent J. Dawson
United States District Judge

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