Woodbury Law, Ltd. v. Bank of America National Association et al

Filing 37

ORDER setting a hearing on the 36 Stipulation re Discovery Matters for 5/16/2016 03:30 PM in LV Courtroom 3B before Magistrate Judge Nancy J. Koppe. Signed by Magistrate Judge Nancy J. Koppe on 5/10/2016. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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WOODBURY LAW, LTD.,

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Plaintiff(s),

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vs.

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BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, et al.,

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Defendant(s).
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Case No. 2:15-cv-02247-APG-NJK
ORDER

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“A scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly

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disregarded by counsel without peril. The district court’s decision to honor the terms of its binding

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scheduling order does not simply exalt procedural technicalities over the merits of [the parties’] case.

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Disregard of the order would undermine the court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon

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course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and the cavalier.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,

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Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “The use of orders

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establishing a firm discovery cutoff date is commonplace, and has impacts generally helpful to the

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orderly progress of litigation, so that the enforcement of such an order should come as a surprise to no

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one.” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006). A request to extend

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deadlines in the Court’s scheduling order must be supported by a showing of “good cause” for the

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extension. Local Rule 26-4; see also Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608-09. The good cause inquiry focuses

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primarily on the parties’ diligence. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir.

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2000). Good cause to extend a discovery deadline exists “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the

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diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

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Pending before the Court is a stipulation to extend various deadlines by a whopping 180 days,

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or equivalent to restarting the discovery clock completely. Docket No. 36 at 2; see also Local Rule 26-

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1(b)(1) (establishing presumptively reasonable discovery period of 180 days). Despite this case being

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only a few weeks away from the discovery cutoff, the parties have engaged in no discovery of any kind

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beyond providing initial disclosures. See Docket No. 36 at 2. Instead, it appears that the parties made

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a decision not to engage in discovery while they discussed potential settlement and await a decision on

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the pending motion to dismiss, which has not yet been fully briefed in light of the numerous stipulations

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to extend briefing. See, e.g., id. at 2-3. Because these circumstances are devoid of the required showing

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of diligence, the Court hereby SETS a hearing on the stipulation for 3:30 p.m. on May 16, 2016, in

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Courtroom 3B.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: May 10, 2016

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______________________________________
NANCY J. KOPPE
United States Magistrate Judge

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