Silvagni v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Filing 20

ORDER Denying without prejudice 19 Stipulation for Extension of Time (Second Request) re Discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge Nancy J. Koppe on 9/2/2016. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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CINDY SILVAGNI,
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Plaintiff(s),
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vs.
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WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
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Defendant(s).
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Case No. 2:16-cv-00039-JCM-NJK
ORDER
(Docket No. 19)

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“A scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly

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disregarded by counsel without peril. The district court’s decision to honor the terms of its binding

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scheduling order does not simply exalt procedural technicalities over the merits of [the parties’] case.

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Disregard of the order would undermine the court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon

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course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and the cavalier.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,

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Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “The use of orders

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establishing a firm discovery cutoff date is commonplace, and has impacts generally helpful to the

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orderly progress of litigation, so that the enforcement of such an order should come as a surprise to no

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one.” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Discovery closed in this case on August 22, 2016. See Docket No. 18 at 3. On September 2,

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2016, the parties filed the instant stipulation to reopen discovery and extend the subsequent deadlines.

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Docket No. 19. All requests to modify the scheduling order must be supported by good cause and those

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filed after the expiration of the pertinent deadline must also be supported by a showing of excusable

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neglect. See, e.g., Local Rule 26-4. While the pending stipulation identifies the excusable neglect

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standard, it does not meaningfully explain why a stipulation extending the discovery cutoff could not

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have been filed prior to August 22, 2016. See Docket No. 19 at 2.1 Moreover, it appears that the only

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affirmative discovery conducted to date is a Rule 35 examination, expert disclosures, and the deposition

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of Plaintiff. On the other hand, there appear to be at least ten depositions that have not been taken, see

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id., despite discovery being open in this case since January 22, 2016, see Docket No. 9 at 1 (identifying

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date of Rule 26(f) conference); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). The only reasons for the failure to timely

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complete this extensive volume of discovery are assertions of scheduling conflicts and mention of

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Plaintiff’s ongoing treatment. Docket No. 19 at 2. Such conclusory assertions do not establish good

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cause, which requires a showing of the parties’ diligence, especially for the number of depositions that

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were not completed in a timely fashion. That is especially true given that it appears the parties have

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been well aware of the need for this discovery and purportedly discussing scheduling for more than four

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months. See, e.g., Docket No. 10 at 4 (“Plaintiff has requested a meeting/conference to discuss the

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potential dates of Defendant corp. depositions and employee depositions”).

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Accordingly, the stipulation is DENIED without prejudice.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: September 2, 2016
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NANCY J. KOPPE
United States Magistrate Judge

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In several instances, the stipulation relies on “Local Rule 2.25.” See, e.g., Docket No. 19 at 2. No
such rule exists in this District.
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