Oner v. Creditors Specialty Servce et al

Filing 13

ORDER that 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge Gloria M. Navarro on 6/23/16. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - MMM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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AYDIN T. ONER,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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CREDITORS SPECIALTY SERVICE, et )
al.,
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Defendants.
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Case No.: 2:16-cv-00325-GMN-PAL
ORDER

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Pending before the Court is the unopposed Motion for Preliminary Injunction

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(ECF No. 2) filed by pro se Plaintiff Aydin T. Oner (“Plaintiff”). For the reasons set

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forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

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I.

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BACKGROUND
This case arises from Defendants Creditors Specialty Service, Tim Fuller, and

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Charles Stanley’s (collectively “Defendants”) alleged violations of the Fair Debt

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Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and the Nevada

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Deceptive Trade Practices Act pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes chapter 598. (Am.

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Compl. at 5–6, ECF No. 5). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants prevailed in a

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small claims case in the Las Vegas Justice Court, . . . have obtained a writ of execution,

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and are threatening to garnish [Plaintiff’s] paychecks.” (Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 2, ECF No.

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2). In the instant Motion, Plaintiff seeks “an injunction preventing any Defendant or their

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attorneys or agents from executing any writ of execution or otherwise enforcing any

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order or judgment of the justice court” for Defendants’ alleged violations of the FDCPA.

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(Id. at 2–3).

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II.

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LEGAL STANDARD
Preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders are governed by Rule 65

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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a “court may issue a

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preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to

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succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

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preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

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the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

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Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear

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showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. “[C]ourts must balance the

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competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or

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withholding of the requested relief.” Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Irreparable harm cannot be “economic injury alone . . . because such injury can be

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remedied by a damage award.” Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Tele. & Appliance Rental,

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Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991). However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized

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“intangible injuries” as well. Id. (indicating “advertising efforts and goodwill” as such

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injuries in a case regarding a non-compete clause of a contract); see also Regents of Univ.

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of Cal. V. Am. Broad. Cos., 747 F.2d 511, 519–20 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting in an antitrust

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case that “ongoing recruitment efforts and goodwill” qualify as irreparable harm).

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III.

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DISCUSSION
Having considered Plaintiff’s brief and accompanying exhibit, the Court finds that

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Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently establish his claim of irreparable harm. On this point,

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Plaintiff alleges that he will be irreparably harmed because Defendants seek to “garnish[

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his] paychecks and bank accounts.” (Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 2, ECF No. 2). As discussed

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above, however, Plaintiff’s injury “does not support a finding of irreparable harm,

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because such injury can be remedied by a damage award.” Rent-A-Center, 944 F.2d at

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603; see also Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (“[T]he temporary loss of

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income, ultimately to be recovered, does not usually constitute irreparable injury . . . .

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Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily

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expended . . . are not enough.”). Further, even if Plaintiff were to succeed under the

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FDCPA, because it only provides for the award of monetary damages and does not

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provide for injunctive relief, Plaintiff would not be entitled to the remedy he seeks. See

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15 U.S.C. § 1692k. Because Plaintiff has failed to show that such potential injury cannot

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be adequately remedied by monetary damages, the Court denies the Motion for

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Preliminary Injunction.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(ECF No. 2) is DENIED.
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DATED this _____ day of June, 2016.

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_________________________
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge
United States District Court

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