Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Independence II Homeowners' Association et al
Filing
115
ORDER that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1 ) is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 107 ) is denied as moot; SFR's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 108 ) is denied as moot; Clerk directed to close this case. Signed by Judge Miranda M. Du on 3/18/2019. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - LH)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
6
***
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
Case No. 2:16-cv-00536-MMD-GWF
COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR THE
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF IMPAC
ORDER
SECURED ASSETS CORP, MORTGAGE
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2007-1,
Plaintiff,
v.
INDEPENDENCE II HOMEOWNERS’
ASSOCIATION; SFR INVESTMENTS
POOL 1, LLC; and NEVADA
ASSOCIATION SERVICES,
14
Defendants.
15
16
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC,
Counter/Cross Claimant,
17
18
19
20
21
22
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR THE
CERTIFICATEHOLDRES OF IMPAC
SECURED ASSETS CORP, MORTGAGE
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2007-01; and CAROLINA
OSPINA MEDINA,
Counter/Cross Defendants.
23
24
I.
SUMMARY
25
This dispute arises from the foreclosure sale of property to satisfy a homeowners’
26
association lien. Before the Court are Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
27
(“Deutsche Bank”) as Trustee for the Certificateholders of IMPAC Secured Assets Corp,
28
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
1
No. 107) and Defendant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC’s (“SFR”) motion for summary
2
judgment (ECF No. 108). The Court has reviewed the parties’ responses (ECF Nos. 109,
3
110) and replies (ECF Nos. 113, 114). For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the
4
Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
5
II.
BACKGROUND
6
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
7
Dora Ardolino and Carolina Ospina Medina (“Borrowers”) purchased real property
8
(“Property”) located within Independence II Homeowners’ Association (“HOA”) on
9
December 11, 2006. (ECF No. 107-1 at 3-4, 22-24.) The Borrowers financed the purchase
10
with a $263,150 loan (“Loan”) evidenced by a note (“Note”) and secured by a first deed of
11
trust (“DOT”). (Id. at 3-4.) The DOT names Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
12
(“MERS”) as the nominee beneficiary. (Id. at 4.)
13
Plaintiff asserts that MERS assigned the DOT to Plaintiff on February 16, 2012
14
(“2012 Assignment”). (ECF No. 107 at 2 (citing ECF No. 107-2 at 2-3 (2012 Assignment)).)
15
This is the only assignment that Plaintiff attached to its motion for summary judgment.
16
SFR asserts that Plaintiff is not the beneficiary of the DOT and that the 2012 Assignment
17
is invalid based on another assignment dated April 14, 2011 (“2011 Assignment”) that
18
Plaintiff did not attach to its motion. (ECF No. 110 at 2-4, 10-14; ECF No. 108-22 at 2
19
(2011 Assignment).)
The Borrowers failed to pay HOA assessments, and the HOA eventually foreclosed
20
21
on the Property, presumably extinguishing the DOT. (ECF No. 107-7 at 2-4.)
22
Deutsche Bank filed the Complaint on March 10, 2016, asserting the following
23
claims: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment against all Defendants; (2) breach of NRS §
24
116.1113 against the HOA and Nevada Association Services, Inc. (“NAS”); (3) wrongful
25
foreclosure against the HOA and NAS; and (4) injunctive relief against SFR. (ECF No. 1
26
at 6-12.) SFR asserts counterclaims for declaratory relief/quiet title and injunctive relief.
27
(ECF No. 20 at 14-15.)
28
///
2
1
2
3
III.
DISCUSSION
SFR challenges Plaintiff’s Article III standing and prudential standing, arguing that
Plaintiff is not the current beneficiary of the DOT. (ECF No. 110 at 2-4, 10-14.)
4
“Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘Cases’ and
5
‘Controversies.’” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007). “To satisfy Article III’s
6
standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a)
7
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2)
8
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely,
9
as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
10
decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-
11
81 (2000) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The party
12
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. FW/PBS,
13
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990).
14
Prudential standing “encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising
15
another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
16
appropriately addressed in representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s
17
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Freedom Mortg.
18
Corp. v. Las Vegas Dev. Grp., LLC, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1179 (D. Nev. 2015) (quoting
19
United States v. Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642, 649-50 (9th Cir. 2007)). “The question of
20
prudential standing is often resolved by the nature and source of the claim. Essentially,
21
the standing question in such cases is whether the [statute] on which the claim [relies]
22
properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial
23
relief.” Id. (quoting The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane County, 632 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir.
24
2011)).
25
SFR bases its argument on the 2011 Assignment and 2012 Assignment. (See ECF
26
No. 110 at 2-4, 10-14.) At first glance, both assignments seem to name Deutsche Bank
27
as the assignee, but SFR asserts this is not the case. In the 2011 Assignment, MERS
28
assigned the DOT to “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee under the
3
1
Pooling and Servicing Agreement Relating to IMPAC Secured Assets Corp., Mortgage
2
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1” (ECF No. 108-22 at 2 (emphasis added)). In
3
the 2012 Assignment, MERS assigned the DOT to “Deutsche Bank National Trust
4
Company as Trustee for the Certificateholders of IMPAC Secured Assets Corp., Mortgage
5
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1” (ECF No. 108-25 at 2 (emphasis added)). SFR
6
contends that the first assignee is a different entity than the second assignee. (ECF No.
7
110 at 3-4.) SFR also argues that the 2012 Assignment must be invalid because MERS
8
had already transferred its interest in the 2011 Assignment. (Id.)
9
Plaintiff suggests that both assignments refer to Deutsche Bank. (See ECF No. 113
10
at 3.) This is true, but both assignments also refer to different trusts. And Plaintiff produces
11
no evidence to support its contention that “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as
12
Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Relating to IMPAC Secured Assets
13
Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1” is the same legal entity as
14
“Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee for the Certificateholders of IMPAC
15
Secured Assets Corp., Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-1,” the latter of
16
which is how Plaintiff identified itself in the Complaint. (See id.; ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff
17
may be the trustee for both trust entities and can sue on behalf of both trusts, but Plaintiff
18
offers no evidence to show that the two trusts—bearing two similar but not identical
19
names—are one and the same trust. It is only through a trustee that either of these trusts
20
(assuming they are different) could take any action to enforce the DOT. See Mathis v. Cty.
21
of Lyon, No. 2:07-cv-00628-APG-GWF, 2014 WL 1413608, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 11, 2014),
22
aff’d, 591 F. App’x 635 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A trust . . . is not a natural person capable of taking
23
action on its own behalf.”).
24
“To have standing to assert a quiet title claim, a plaintiff must have a current claim
25
to the land in dispute.” GMAT Legal Title Tr. v. Fitchner, No. 3:15-cv-00044-HDM-WGC,
26
2015 WL 7312881, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 19, 2015) (citing Daly v. Lahontan Mines Co., 151
27
P. 514, 516 (Nev. 1915), aff’d on reh’g, 158 P. 285 (1916)). Plaintiff asserts that it acquired
28
title when it was assigned the DOT from MERS in the 2012 Assignment (ECF No. 107 at
4
1
2), but Plaintiff has produced no evidence to rebut SFR’s evidence that MERS had no
2
interest in the DOT to transfer in the 2012 Assignment. In addition, Plaintiff has not
3
produced evidence to substantiate its implication that the 2011 Assignment transferred
4
the DOT to Deutsche Bank, as trustee of the trust on whose behalf Plaintiff is bringing this
5
action. (See ECF No. 113 at 3.) If Plaintiff was not the beneficiary of the DOT that was
6
allegedly extinguished in the foreclosure sale, then Plaintiff did not suffer any injury and is
7
not the proper party to bring this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Complaint
8
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the
9
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
10
the action.”).
11
IV.
CONCLUSION
12
The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several cases
13
not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and determines
14
that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the motions before
15
the Court.
16
17
18
19
20
21
It is therefore ordered that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 107) is
denied as moot.
It is further ordered that SFR’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 108) is
denied as moot.
22
It is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court close this case.
23
DATED THIS 18th day of March 2019.
24
25
MIRANDA M. DU
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
26
27
28
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?