Organogenesis, Inc. v. Ness

Filing 24

ORDER Granting Plaintiff's 9 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. This Order shall remain in place pending a full determination of Plaintiffs causes of action on the merits or upon further order of this Court. Signed by Chief Judge Gloria M. Navarro on 5/23/2016. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3

ORGANOGENESIS INC.,
4

Plaintiff,

5

vs.

6

FAYTHE NESS,
7

Defendant.

8

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: 2:16–cv–00989–GMN–CWH
ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 9)

9
10

filed by Plaintiff Organogenesis Inc. (“Plaintiff”) against Defendant Faythe Ness

11

(“Defendant”). Defendant filed a Response (ECF No. 19), and Plaintiff filed a Reply

12

(ECF No. 22).

13

I.

14

BACKGROUND
Defendant is a former employee of Plaintiff, a medical products company that

15

specializes in regenerative medical products. (Compl. ¶ 5, 13, ECF No. 1). In 2015, she

16

was hired by Plaintiff as a Tissue Regeneration Specialist (“TRS”) with a primary job

17

responsibility to market and sell Plaintiff’s products. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10, 13). As a condition of

18

her employment, she entered into a non-compete agreement (the “Agreement”) with

19

Plaintiff, which prohibited her from participating in any business which is competitive

20

with Plaintiff’s business, both during her employment and for two years thereafter. (Id. ¶

21

16). Specifically, the Agreement states that Defendant may not

22
23
24
25

participate within the United States, Canada, Western Europe
or Japan as an owner, stockholder, option holder, manager,
agent, consultant, director, lender of money, guarantor,
salesperson or employee of any other business, firm or
corporation which is, or by the action of Employee would
become, competitive with the Business of the Company nor
attempt to interfere with or entice away any customer,
Page 1 of 11

1
2
3

licensee or employee or consultant of the Company.
(Agreement, Ex. B to Adamson Decl., ECF No. 9-2). Furthermore, the Agreement
defines “Business of the Company as the

4

research, development, biological engineering work, technical
and clinical feasibility investigations (conducted or
contemplated), governmental approvals (obtained or applied
for) and the products and services that may be manufactured,
fabricated, packaged, sold, distributed, licensed, offered or
contemplated to be offered for sale or license by the
Company in the field of tissue regeneration, including living
and non-living tissue and organ replacement and repair
constructs, related to the fields of wound repair, bio-surgery,
and bio-aesthetics, including but not limited to: (a) living
dermal equivalents, living epidermal equivalents, living skin
equivalents, wound coverings and wound management
products; (b) living connective tissue constructs and
biomaterial constructs for the repair and/or replacement
tendon, ligament, body-wall, cardiac tissue, vasculature,
bone, cartilage, neural tissue; (c) injectable matrix
compositions, injectable cell compositions, topical
compositions containing cytokines, growth factors, and other
cell-communication compounds; (d) natural and synthesized
collagen compositions, and natural and synthesized
extracellular matrix compositions; (e) cell culture media for
culturing cells and living constructs; (f) stem cells [and] (g)
cell-delivery constructs.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(Id.).
On April 1, 2016, Defendant informed Plaintiff of her intention to resign from her
TRS position. (Id. ¶ 25). She is currently an employee of MiMedx, one of Plaintiff’s
competitors. (Id. ¶ 35).
Plaintiff alleges that, shortly before Defendant’s resignation, Defendant began
informing Plaintiff’s current Nevada-based customers of her intent to join MiMedx. (Id.
¶¶ 30–31) Defendant allegedly continued contacting these customers, despite written
correspondence from Plaintiff ordering her to cease and desist. (Id. ¶¶ 34–36).
Page 2 of 11

Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on May 2, 2016, alleges breach of contract and states

1
2

that Plaintiff will incur “immediate and irreparable injury” if Defendant is allowed to

3

continue her competitive activities. (Id. ¶¶ 37–43). On May 3, 2016, Plaintiff filed an

4

Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order to prevent Defendant from

5

participating in her former sales territory under Plaintiff’s employ as a salesperson or

6

employee of any other business which is competitive with Plaintiff or from interfering

7

with or enticing away any of Plaintiff’s customer within her former sales territory.

8

(Emergency Mot. for TRO 21:4–12, ECF No. 8). That same day, the Court granted the

9

Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and scheduled a hearing on the

10
11

instant Motion for May 23, 2016. (Order, ECF No. 10).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a “court may issue a

12
13

preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). A

14

Court may issue a preliminary injunction only if a plaintiff establishes: (1) likelihood of

15

success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

16

relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the

17

public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

18

“Injunctive relief [is] an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear

19

showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. Finally, “[i]n deciding a

20

motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court ‘is not bound to decide doubtful and

21

difficult questions of law or disputed questions of fact.’” Int’l Molders’ & Allied

22

Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting

23

Dymo Indus., Inc. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964)).

24

///

25

///

Page 3 of 11

1
2

III.

DISCUSSION
A.

3
4

Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1.

Choice of Law

The Agreement contains a choice-of-law provision stating that it is governed by

5

Massachusetts law. (Agreement, ECF No. 9-2). Defendant argues that, despite this

6

provision, the Agreement should be governed by Nevada law. (Resp. 6:21–10:18, ECF

7

No. 19).

8
9

“The first step in interpreting [a choice-of-law] clause is to apply the correct
choice-of-law rules.” Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1164

10

(9th Cir. 1996). “In determining the enforceability of a choice of law provision in a

11

diversity action, a federal court applies the choice of law rules of the forum state.”

12

Hatfield v. Halifax PLC, 564 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009). Nevada generally follows

13

the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in answering choice-of-law questions that

14

arise in contracts. Progressive Gulf Ins. Co. v. Faehnrich, 752 F.3d 746, 750–51 (9th Cir.

15

2014). “So long as ‘the parties acted in good faith and not to evade the law of the real

16

situs of the contract,’ Nevada’s choice-of-law principles permit parties ‘within broad

17

limits to choose the law that will determine the validity and effect of their contract.’” Id.

18

at 751 (quoting Ferdie Sievers & Lake Tahoe Land Co. v. Diversified Mortg. Investors,

19

603 P.2d 270, 273 (Nev. 1979)).

20

However, the situs specified in the contract must have “a substantial relation with

21

the transaction, and the agreement must not be contrary to the public policy of the

22

forum.” Sievers, 603 P.2d at 273; see also Siy v. CashCall, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00953-PAL,

23

2014 WL 37879, at *8 (D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2014) (upholding California choice-of-law

24

provision in employment contract because California “meets the substantial relationship

25

test, and . . . the agreement is not contrary to the public policy of Nevada”). To

Page 4 of 11

1

determine whether a given situs satisfies the substantial relationship test, Nevada

2

considers the following factors from section 188 of the Restatement: (1) the place of

3

contracting, (2) the place of negotiation of the contract, (3) the place of performance, (4)

4

the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (5) the parties’ domicile, residence,

5

nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business. Sotirakis v. United Serv. Auto.

6

Ass’n, 787 P.2d 788, 790 (Nev. 1990). A court applies the law of the state having the

7

more substantial relation with the transaction unless public policy concerns outweigh that

8

relation. Id.

9

Here, there is no evidence that, in signing a contract governed by Massachusetts

10

law, the parties acted in bad faith to avoid the law of any particular state. Given that

11

Plaintiff maintains its principal place of business in Massachusetts, and conducts business

12

in a number of other states, it is reasonable that Plaintiff would include a Massachusetts

13

choice-of-law provision in the Agreement. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 8, ECF No. 1). Further, the

14

factors from section 188 of the Restatement do not compel a determination that Nevada

15

has a more substantial relation to this action than Massachusetts. These factors do not

16

weigh so heavily in favor of Nevada as to preclude the application of Massachusetts law.

17

See Sotirakis, 787 P.2d at 790. While the parties executed the Agreement in Nevada, the

18

place of performance and location of the subject matter of the Agreement are both

19

Massachusetts and Nevada, as Defendant’s sales activity in her assigned region of

20

Nevada presumably had an effect on Plaintiff’s business in Massachusetts. (See Resp.

21

2:24–3:6).

22

Additionally, Defendant argues that Massachusetts law is contrary to “Nevada’s

23

strong public policy for protection of a person’s livelihood and prohibiting unreasonable

24

restrictions on free trade,” as codified at NRS 613.200. (Resp. 7:25–8:1). Specifically,

25

NRS 613.200(4) provides that a non-competition agreement constitutes an unlawful

Page 5 of 11

1

restraint of trade unless the agreement is (1) reasonable in its scope and duration and (2)

2

supported by valuable consideration. However, Massachusetts law similarly provides

3

that a non-competition agreement will only be enforced so long as it is “reasonable in

4

time, location, and other respects.” Struck v. Plymouth Mortg. Co., 605 N.E.2d 296, 298

5

(Mass. 1993). Thus, the Court finds that Massachusetts law is not contrary to Nevada

6

public policy.

7

Accordingly, this Court will apply Massachusetts law to the Agreement because

8

Nevada gives parties wide latitude in choosing the law they want to apply to their

9

contracts, Defendant assented to a choice of Massachusetts law by signing the

10

Agreement, Massachusetts reasonably has a “substantial relation with the transaction,”

11

and the Agreement is not contrary to the public policy of Nevada.

12
13

2.

Merits

The Winter test states that in order to show the necessity of injunctive relief, the

14

plaintiff must first prove a likelihood of success on the merits. 555 U.S. at 20. Here, the

15

Court recognizes that Plaintiff can likely show that Defendant violated the Agreement.

16

The Agreement requires Defendant to refrain from participating, for two years, in

17

any business which is competitive with Plaintiff’s business. (Agreement ¶ 2). Plaintiff

18

claims that Defendant violated the Agreement because she began working for a direct

19

competitor of Plaintiff, began contacting Plaintiff’s customers, and “is selling products on

20

behalf of MiMedx in her former Organogenesis sales territory that are directly

21

competitive to the Products, and calling upon the same customers on behalf of MiMedx

22

that she had called upon while working for Organogenesis.” (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 29, 36).

23

Plaintiff supports its claim with a declaration of Yvonne Irigoyen-Kirby, a Regional Sales

24

Manager of Plaintiff. (Irigoyen-Kirby Decl. ¶¶ 23–25, 27, ECF No. 9-1).

25

In Massachusetts, non–competition agreements are enforceable only if they are

Page 6 of 11

1

“necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited in time and space,

2

and consonant with the public interest.” Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d

3

572, 577 (Mass. 2004). Courts will not enforce non-competition agreements meant

4

solely to protect employers from run-of-the-mill business competition. Marine

5

Contractors Co., Inc. v. Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Mass. 1974). But the protection of

6

“trade secrets, other confidential information, [and] . . . the good will the employer has

7

acquired through dealings with his customers” constitute legitimate business interests.

8

Id.; see also Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Danahy, 488 N.E.2d 22, 28 (Mass. App. Ct.

9

1986).

10

Defendant asserts that the Agreement does not protect a legitimate business

11

interest. (Resp. 12:22–14:11). On the other hand, Plaintiff asserts that the Agreement is

12

necessary to protect its customer goodwill and confidential information. (Prelim. Inj.

13

14:1–15:24). Specifically, Plaintiff explains that its customer goodwill is protectable

14

because Defendant was Plaintiff’s “primary point of contact with its customers in its Las

15

Vegas territory and was responsible for building relationships with customers on

16

[Plaintiff]’s behalf.” (Id. 14:7–9). Plaintiff further explains that, in the course of her

17

employment, Defendant obtained confidential information regarding Plaintiff’s

18

customers, sales plans, sales data, and marketing strategies. (Id. 14:23–15:13 (explaining

19

that Defendant attended Plaintiff’s national sales meeting where she received confidential

20

and proprietary information concerning Plaintiff’s 2016 marketing strategy for its entire

21

product portfolio, including Plaintiff’s strategy for differentiating itself from its

22

competitors like MiMedx); Irigoyen-Kirby Decl. ¶¶ 17–19). The Court finds that the

23

Agreement protects legitimate business interests—customer goodwill and confidential

24

information—of the Plaintiff.

25

Moreover, the Agreement is reasonably limited in time. It imposes a two-year

Page 7 of 11

1

restriction, and Massachusetts courts have frequently found longer time restrictions to be

2

reasonable. See, e.g., Blackwell v. E.M. Helides, Jr., Inc., 331 N.E.2d 54, 56 (Mass. 1975)

3

(finding three-year restriction to be reasonable); Marine Contractors Co., 310 N.E.2d at

4

921 (finding that non-compete lasting less than three years was not excessive); All

5

Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481, 486 (Mass. 1974) (finding two-year restriction

6

to be reasonable).

7

As to the geographic scope of the Agreement, the Court finds, and Plaintiff

8

concedes, that the Agreement, as written, is too broad. However, “[i]f the covenant is too

9

broad in . . . space . . . , it will be enforced only to the extent that is reasonable and to the

10

extent that it is severable for the purposes of enforcement.” All Stainless, 308 N.E.2d at

11

485; see also Metro. Ice Co. v. Ducas, 196 N.E. 856, 858 (Mass. 1935) (“[I]f the

12

restrictive agreement would involve unreasonable restrictions in this commonwealth the

13

provision is nevertheless enforceable for so much of the performance as would be a

14

reasonable restraint.”); Whiting Milk Cos. v. O’Connell, 179 N.E. 169, 170 (Mass. 1931)

15

(“A contract in restraint of trade in which the territory is unreasonably extensive may be

16

divisible as to space and enforced in equity within a reasonable area.”). Rather than

17

enforce the Agreement to its most expansive geographical scope, Plaintiff “simply seeks

18

an injunction prohibiting [Defendant] from working for a competitor in her former [ ]

19

sales territory.” (Prelim. Inj. 16:26–28 n.3). The Court finds such a restraint on the

20

geographic scope of the Agreement is reasonable. Accordingly, because the Court finds

21

that the Agreement is enforceable and Plaintiff can likely show that Defendant violated

22

the Agreement, Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.

23

B.

24

To succeed on the second prong of the Winter test, the plaintiff must “demonstrate

25

that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasis

Likelihood of Irreparable Harm in the Absence of Preliminary Relief

Page 8 of 11

1

in original). In the Ninth Circuit, “[t]hose seeking injunctive relief must proffer evidence

2

sufficient to establish a likelihood of irreparable harm.” Herb Reed Enters., LLC v.

3

Florida Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1251 (9th Cir. 2013). A presumption that

4

irreparable harm is likely is not sufficient to justify the granting of a preliminary

5

injunction. See id. at 1242.

6

Irreparable harm cannot be “economic injury alone . . . because such injury can be

7

remedied by a damage award.” Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Tele. & Appliance Rental,

8

Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991). However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized

9

“intangible injuries,” which constitute irreparable harm. Id. (indicating damage to

10
11

goodwill as such injury in a case regarding a non-compete clause of a contract).
Based upon Irigoyen-Kirby’s declaration, Defendant has already begun calling

12

Plaintiff’s customers to inform them that she is now working for Plaintiff’s direct

13

competitor, MiMedx. (Irigoyen-Kirby Decl. ¶¶ 24–25, 27). Moreover, despite instructing

14

Defendant to not talk to Plaintiff’s customers, Defendant has continued to do so. (Id.).

15

The Court finds that such action by Defendant demonstrates that irreparable harm is

16

likely in the absence of an injunction.

17

C.

18

Defendant asserts that she will suffer a significantly greater hardship if she is

The Balance of Equities

19

prohibited from being employed by MiMedx in Las Vegas. (Resp. 16:23–25). While the

20

Court is sympathetic to the hardship of Defendant that will result from the injunction, the

21

Court cannot find that the balance of equities tips in her favor. Defendant willingly

22

signed the Agreement upon her employment with Plaintiff. Moreover, as discussed

23

above, Plaintiff has an interest in protecting its customer goodwill and confidential

24

information. Furthermore, the Court has narrowly tailored the injunction solely to enjoin

25

Plaintiff from employment with MiMedx in her former sales territory under her employ

Page 9 of 11

1

with Plaintiff.

2

D.

3

Before granting an injunction the Court must determine that an injunction is in the

Public Interest

4

public’s interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. The right to contract is fundamental and

5

includes the privilege of selecting those who will be employed by a company and under

6

what terms that employment will be. An injunction in this instance protects the public’s

7

interest in the integrity and enforceability of employment contracts. Therefore, the Court

8

finds that the public’s interest favors an injunction in this instance.

9

IV.

10
11
12
13
14

CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff Organogenesis has met its burden demonstrating the Winter

factors, the Court hereby grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Organogenesis’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED, as follows:
1. Defendant Ness shall not, within her former Organogenesis sales territory,

15

participate as a salesperson or employee of any other business, firm or corporation which

16

is, or by her action would become, competitive with the Business of Organogenesis,

17

including MiMedx; and

18

2. Defendant Ness, on her own or in concert with others, shall not attempt to

19

interfere with or entice away any Organogenesis customer within her former

20

Organogenesis sales territory.

21

For the purposes of this order, the “Business of Organogenesis” shall mean the

22

research, development, biological engineering work, technical and clinical feasibility

23

investigations (conducted or contemplated), governmental approvals (obtained or applied

24

for) and the products and services that may be manufactured, fabricated, packaged, sold,

25

distributed, licensed, offered or contemplated to be offered for sale or license by

Page 10 of 11

1

Organogenesis in the field of tissue regeneration, including living and non-living tissue

2

and organ replacement and repair constructs, related to the fields of wound repair, bio-

3

surgery, and bio-aesthetics, including but not limited to: (a) living dermal equivalents,

4

living epidermal equivalents, living skin equivalents, wound coverings and wound

5

management products; (b) living connective tissue constructs and biomaterial constructs

6

for the repair and/or replacement tendon, ligament, body-wall, cardiac tissue, vasculature,

7

bone, cartilage, neural tissue; (c) injectable matrix compositions, injectable cell

8

compositions, topical compositions containing cytokines, growth factors, and other

9

cellcommunication compounds; (d) natural and synthesized collagen compositions, and

10

natural and synthesized extracellular matrix compositions; (e) cell culture media for

11

culturing cells and living constructs; (f) stem cells; and (g) cell-delivery constructs.

12

Defendant Ness’s former Organogenesis sales territory shall mean the

13
14
15
16

municipalities and the associated zip codes set forth in the attached Exhibit A.
This Order shall remain in place pending a full determination of Plaintiff’s causes
of action on the merits or upon further order of this Court.
DATED this _____ day of May, 2016.
23

17
18

_________________________
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge
United States District Judge

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page 11 of 11

Exhibit
A
ZIP Code
84710
84714
84719
84720
84721
84722
84725
84729
84733
84735
84737
84738
84742
84745
84746
84753
84755
84756
84757
84758
84759
84760
84761
84762
84763
84765
84767
84770
84771
84772
84774
84779
84780
84781
84782
84783
84784
84790
84791
85325
85328
85334
85344
85346
85348
85357

City

State Name

ST Abbrev

ALTON

UTAH

UT

BERYL
BRIAN HEAD

UTAH

UT

UTAH

UT

CEDAR CITY

UTAH

CEDAR CITY
CENTRAL

UTAH
UTAH

UT
UT
UT

ENTERPRISE

UTAH

UT

GLENDALE
GUNLOCK

UTAH
UTAH

UT
UT

HATCH
HURRICANE
IVINS

UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

UT
UT
UT

KANARRAVILLE

UTAH

UT

LA VERKIN

UTAH

UT

LEEDS
MODENA
MOUNT CARMEL

UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

UT
UT

NEWCASTLE

UTAH

UT
UT

NEW HARMONY
ORDERVILLE
PANGUITCH

UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

UT
UT
UT

PARAGONAH
PAROWAN
DUCK CREEK VILLAGE
ROCKVILLE

UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

UT
UT
UT
UT

SANTA CLARA
SPRINGDALE
SAINT GEORGE
SAINT GEORGE

UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

UT
UT
UT
UT

SUMMIT
TOQUERVILLE

UTAH
UTAH

UT
UT

VIRGIN

UTAH

UT

WASHINGTON

UTAH

UT

PINE VALLEY
VEYO

UTAH

UT

DAMMERON VALLEY
HILDALE

UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

UT
UT
UT

SAINT GEORGE

UTAH

UT

SAINT GEORGE
BOUSE

UTAH
ARIZONA

UT
AZ

CIBOLA

ARIZONA

AZ

EHRENBERG
PARKER

ARIZONA
ARIZONA

AZ
AZ

QUARTZSITE
SALOME

ARIZONA
ARIZONA

AZ
AZ

WEND EN

ARIZONA

AZ

85359
85360
85371
86401
86402
86403
86404
86405
86406
86409
86412
86413
86426
86427
86429
86430
86431
86433
86436
86437
86438
86439
86440
86441
86442
86443
86444
86445
86446
88901
88905
89001
89002
89003
89004
89005
89006
89007
89008
89009
89010
89011
89012
89013
89014
89015
89016

WIKIEUP

QUARTZSITE

ARIZONA
ARIZONA

AZ
AZ

POSTON

ARIZONA

AZ

KINGMAN

ARIZONA

AZ

KINGMAN

ARIZONA

AZ

LAKE HAVASU CITY

ARIZONA

AZ

LAKE HAVASU CITY

ARIZONA

AZ

LAKE HAVASU CITY
LAKE HAVASU CITY
KINGMAN

ARIZONA

AZ

ARIZONA
ARIZONA

AZ

HUALAPAI
GOLDEN VALLEY

ARIZONA
ARIZONA

FORT MOHAVE

ARIZON

FORT MOHAVE

ARIZONA

AZ

BULLHEAD CITY

ARIZONA

AZ

BULLHEAD CITY
CHLORIDE
OATMAN

ARIZONA
ARIZONA
ARIZONA

AZ
AZ
AZ

TO POCK
VALENTINE

ARIZONA
ARIZONA
ARIZONA

AZ
AZ
AZ

MOHAVE VALLEY
DOLAN SPRINGS

ARIZONA
ARIZONA
ARIZONA

AZ
AZ
AZ

BULLHEAD CITY
TEMPLE BAR MARINA

ARIZONA
ARIZONA

AZ
AZ

MEADVIEW
WILLOW BEACH
MOHAVE VALLEY

ARIZONA
ARIZONA

AZ
AZ

ARIZONA
NEVADA

AZ
NV

NEVADA
NEVADA

NV

YUCCA
BULLHEAD CITY

THE LAKES
THE LAKES

AZ
AZ
AZ

ALAMO
HENDERSON
BEATTY

NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV
NV

BLUE DIAMOND
BOULDER CITY

NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV

BOULDER CITY

NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV

NEVADA

NV

DYER
HENDERSON

NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV

HENDERSON

NEVADA

GOLDFIELD

NEVADA

NV
NV

BUNKERVILLE
CALIENTE
HENDERSON

NV

HENDERSON

NEVADA

NV

HENDERSON

NEVADA

NV

HENDERSON

NEVADA

NV

89017
89018
89019
89020
89021
89022
89023
89024
89025
89026
89027
89028
89029
89030
89031
89032
89033
89034
89036
89037
89039
89040
89041
89042

89043
89044
89045
89046
89047
89048
89049
89052
89053
89054
89060
89061
89067
89070
89074
89077
89081
89084
89085
89086
89087
89101
89102

HIKO
INDIAN SPRINGS

NEVADA

NV

NEVADA

NV

JEAN

NEVADA

NV

AMARGOSA VALLEY

NEVADA

NV

LOGAN DALE
MANHATIAN

NEVADA

NV

NEVADA

MERCURY
MESQUITE
MOAPA
JEAN

NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV
NV
NV
NV

MESQUITE

NEVADA

NV

LAUGHLIN

NEVADA

NV

LAUGHLIN
NORTH LAS VEGAS

NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV

NORTH LAS VEGAS

NEVADA

NV

NORTH LAS VEGAS
NORTH LAS VEGAS

NEVADA
NEVADA

MESQUITE

NEVADA

NV
NV
NV

NORTH LAS VEGAS
COYOTE SPRINGS

NEVADA
NEVADA

CAL NEV ARI
OVERTON

NEVADA

PAHRUMP
PANACA
PIOCHE
HENDERSON

NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV

ROUND MOUNTAIN

NEVADA

NV

SEARCHLIGHT
SILVERPEAK
PAHRUMP

NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV
NV

TONOPAH

NEVADA

NV

HENDERSON
HENDERSON
LAS VEGAS

NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV

NEVADA

NV

PAHRUMP

NEVADA

NV

PAHRUMP
COYOTE SPRINGS

NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV

INDIAN SPRINGS

NEVADA

NV

HENDERSON
HENDERSON

NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV

NORTH LAS VEGAS
NORTH LAS VEGAS

NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV

NORTH LAS VEGAS
NORTH LAS VEGAS
NORTH LAS VEGAS

NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV

LAS VEGAS

NEVADA

NV

LAS VEGAS

NEVADA

NV

NV

89103
89104
89105
89106
89107
89108
89109
89110
89111
89112
89113
89114
89115
89116
89117
89118
89119
89120
89121
89122
89123
89124
89125
89126
89127
89128
89129
89130
89131
89132
89133
89134
89135
89136
89137
89138
89139
89140
89141
89142
89143
89144
89145
89146
89147
89148
89149

LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
,t.AS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS

NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV

89150
89151
89152
89153
89154
89155
89156
89157
89158
89159
89160
89161
89162
89163
89164
89165
89166
89169
89170
89173
89177
89178
89179
89180
89183
89185
89191
89193
89195
89199
89301
89310
89311
89314
89315
89316
89317
89318
89319
89404
89405
89406
89407
89408
89409
89412
89414

LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
NELLIS AFB
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
ELY
AUSTIN
BAKER
DUCKWATER
EAST ELY
EUREKA
LUND
MCGILL
RUTH
DENIO
EMPIRE
FALLON
FALLON
FERNLEY
GA BBS
GERLACH
GOLCONDA

NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA
NEVADA

NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV

89415
89418
89419
89420
89421
89422
89424
89425
89438
89442
89496
89801
89802
89803
89815
89820
89821
89822
89823
89824
89828
89830
89833
89834
89835
89883
92225
92226
92242
92267
92363

HAWTHORNE
IMLAY
LOVELOCK
LUNING
MCDERMID
MINA
NIXON
OROVADA
VALMY
WADSWORTH
FALLON
ELKO
ELKO
ELKO
SPRING CREEK
BATILE MOUNTAIN
CRESCENT VALLEY
CARLIN
DEETH
HALLECK
LAMOILLE
MONTELLO
RUBY VALLEY
TUSCARORA
WELLS
WEST WENDOVER
BLYTHE
BLYTHE
EARP
PARKER DAM
NEEDLES

NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
NEVADA
NV
CALIFORNIA CA
CALIFORNIA CA
CALIFORNIA CA
CALIFORNIA CA
CALIFORNIA CA