Marutyan et al v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

Filing 55

ORDER granting ECF No. 44 Motion to Dismiss; denying ECF Nos. 45 Motion to Stay and 50 Motion for Evidentiary Hearing; Plaintiffs granted leave to amend complaint to cure deficiencies; amended complaint deadline: 4/12/2018. Signed by Judge Miranda M. Du on 3/13/2018. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KW)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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ARA V. MARUTYAN; ARTHUR
MARUTYAN; and DIANA MARUTYAN,
individuals,

Case No. 2:16-cv-01089-MMD-GWF
ORDER

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Plaintiffs,
v.

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LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT, DOES 1 through 10; and
ROE ENTITIES 1 through 10,
Defendants.

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I.

SUMMARY

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Before the Court are three motions: (1) Defendant Las Vegas Metropolitan Police

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Department’s (“LVMPD”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 Claims for Violations

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of Substantive Due Process, the Second Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment

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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“Motion to Dismiss”) (ECF No. 44); (2) Defendant

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LVMPD’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings During the

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Pendency of Plaintiffs’ State Court Case (“Motion to Stay”) (ECF No. 45); and (3)

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Plaintiffs Ara V. Marutyan, Arthur Marutyan, and Diana Marutyan’s Motion for Evidentiary

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Hearing (ECF No. 50). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendant’s

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Motion to Dismiss and denies Defendant’s Motion to Stay as well as Plaintiffs’ Motion for

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Evidentiary Hearing.

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II.

BACKGROUND

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Plaintiffs allege that LVMPD violated their Fourth Amendment and procedural due

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process rights when police officers seized personal property during searches of their

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home and Diana Marutyan’s dorm room.

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Plaintiffs allege that LVMPD officers executed search warrants at their home on

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several occasions starting on February 13, 2014, and ending on March 27, 2014. (ECF

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No. 43 at 2.) During these searches, the officers seized more than 100 items including

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firearms, cell phones, computers, passports, social security cards, birth certificates, and

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other documents.1 (Id.) LVMPD executed a search warrant for the dorm room of Plaintiff

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Diana Marutyan and seized a cell phone on April 3, 2014. (Id. at 3.)

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Plaintiffs allege that they were never charged with a crime and that LVMPD never

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commenced any civil forfeiture proceedings for the seized property. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiffs

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further allege that they have contacted LVMPD many times in an attempt to recover their

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property but have been unsuccessful. (Id. at 5.)

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Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Clark County District Court (“State Suit”) on April 15,

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2015. (ECF No. 31 at 2.) The State Suit sought return of the property, compensatory

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damages, and attorney’s fees. (Id.) The court dismissed the case as a result of Plaintiffs’

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continued failure to name an indispensable party, and that issue is currently on appeal

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before the Nevada Supreme Court. (ECF No. 45 at 2.)

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Plaintiffs initiated this action more than a year after filing the State Suit. (ECF No.

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31 at 2.) This Court previously dismissed several of Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiffs’

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claims for violation of the Second Amendment and substantive due process rights were

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dismissed with prejudice. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment was

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dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. (Id.)

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III.

LEGAL STANDARD

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A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which

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relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must

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provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

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relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

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While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels

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passports and social security cards were returned after seven months.
(ECF No. 43 at 5.)

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and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft

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v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations

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must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

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at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

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matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.

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In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to

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apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all

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well-pleaded factual allegations—but not legal conclusions—in the complaint. Id. at 678.

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Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory

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statements, do not suffice. Id. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual

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allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is

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facially plausible when the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow a court to draw a

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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678.

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Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

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misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but has not shown—that the pleader is entitled

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to relief. Id. at 679. When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from

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conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

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Allegations in pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal

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pleadings drafted by lawyers and must be liberally construed. See Hamilton v. Brown,

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630 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, a plaintiff must still present factual

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allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,

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341–42 (9th Cir. 2010).

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IV.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY (ECF No. 45)

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Defendant argues that this Court should abstain from hearing this case based on

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the Pullman2 abstention doctrine and the State Suit appeal pending before the Nevada

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Supreme Court. (ECF No. 45 at 4.) “Pullman abstention ‘is an extraordinary and narrow

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2R.R.

Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

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exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate a controversy.’” Courthouse News

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Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wolfson v. Brammer, 616

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F.3d 1045, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010)). Three requirements must be satisfied for this Court to

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exercise discretion to abstain under Pullman:
(1) the case touches on a sensitive area of social policy upon which the
federal courts ought not enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is
open, (2) constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a definite
ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy, and (3) the
proper resolution of the possible determinative issue of state law is
uncertain.

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Courthouse News Serv., 750 F.3d at 783–84 (quoting Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483,
492 (9th Cir. 2003)).

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Defendant’s argument related to the first requirement—that the case touch on a

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sensitive area of social policy—is non-sequitur. Instead of identifying a sensitive area of

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social policy to which this case relates, Defendant argues that proceeding with this

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action will “create piecemeal litigation and affect the due process rights of Ms.

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Mrktchayan [sic].” (ECF No. 45 at 5.) Defendant does not describe how these issues

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relate to sensitive areas of social policy “such as land use planning, landlord-tenant

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relationships, foreclosure policy, and death penalty procedures.” McCoy v. Holguin, No.

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1:15-cv-00768-DAD-MJS (PC), 2017 WL 5495787, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2017),

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report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-cv-00768-DAD-MJS, 2017 WL 5483979

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(E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017).

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Defendant further argues that the second requirement is satisfied because the

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Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in the State Suit could terminate the parties’

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controversy. (ECF No. 45 at 3.) However, the appeal relates to the state court’s

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dismissal of the action for failure to join an indispensable party. (See id. at 2.) The issue

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before this Court—whether Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights—is entirely

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different. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant’s argument that the Nevada Supreme

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Court’s decision could terminate the controversy to be unpersuasive.

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Defendant further argues that the third requirement is satisfied because a

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question of state law is on appeal. (Id. at 5.) However, Defendant has not explained how

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the Nevada Supreme Court’s resolution of this state law question would obviate the

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need to decide the constitutional questions presented here.
Accordingly, the Court finds that it cannot exercise discretion to abstain from

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hearing this case because the Pullman requirements are not satisfied.

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V.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 44)

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A.

Dismissed Claims

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Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) contains

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claims for violation of the Second Amendment and substantive due process rights and

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argues for their dismissal based on the Court’s prior order. (ECF No. 44 at 4.) It is not

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entirely clear that Plaintiffs’ FAC contains such claims—the words “Second Amendment”

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and “substantive due process” do not appear in the FAC. (See ECF No. 43 at 1-8.)

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Nevertheless, to the extent that the Complaint contains such claims, they are dismissed

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based on the Court’s prior order dismissing these claims with prejudice. (ECF No. 31 at

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8.)

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B.

Fourth Amendment

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Defendant next argues that Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment

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should be dismissed with prejudice because the FAC contains only two new allegations.

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(ECF No. 44 at 6.) The first: LVMPD executed search and seizure warrants on several

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dates in early 2014 based on sealed affidavits, seizing personal property including nearly

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$100,000 in cash. (Id.) The second: Plaintiffs’ wire communications were intercepted and

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monitored. (Id.)

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This Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim because

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Plaintiffs did not allege facts to show the absence of probable cause. (ECF No. 31 at 7.)

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Plaintiffs’ additional allegations still do not show the absence of probable cause.

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Plaintiffs’ FAC does not include allegations describing the number and kind of

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electronics, firearms, and documents seized, the legitimate purpose of possessing those
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electronics and firearms, or why they kept nearly $100,000 in cash in their home.

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Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ FAC remains deficient with respect to their Fourth Amendment

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claim.

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VI.

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING (ECF No. 50)

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Plaintiffs’ Motion for Evidentiary Hearing will be denied because Plaintiffs do not

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explain why an evidentiary hearing should be held. The motion simply states that

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Plaintiffs move the Court to schedule an evidentiary hearing and cites to various filings.

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(See ECF No. 50 at 1-2.)

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VII.

LEAVE TO AMEND

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The Court grants leave to amend with respect to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment

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claim because it is not inconceivable that Plaintiffs could amend their FAC to cure the

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deficiencies that have resulted in dismissal of their claim. See Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd.

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of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Dismissal

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without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be

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saved by any amendment.”).

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VIII.

CONCLUSION

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The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several

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cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and

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determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the

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motions before the Court.

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Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 44)
is granted.

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It is further ordered that Defendant’s Motion to Stay (ECF No. 45) is denied.

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It is further ordered that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Evidentiary Hearing (ECF No. 50) is

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denied.

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It is further ordered that Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their Complaint to

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cure the deficiencies of the Fourth Amendment claim, if they so choose. The amended

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complaint must be filed thirty (30) days after the entry of this Order. Failure to file an
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amended complaint within this deadline will result in dismissal of the Fourth Amendment

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claim with prejudice.

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DATED THIS 13th day of March 2018.

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MIRANDA M. DU
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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