Buesing Corporation, an Arizona corporation v. Helix Electric of Nevada LLC
Filing
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ORDER Granting Buesing's 51 Motion for Reconsideration. The court's 50 Order is Vacated. Signed by Judge James C. Mahan on 3/20/2019. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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BUESING CORPORATION,
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Plaintiff(s),
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Case No. 2:16-CV-1439 JCM (NJK)
ORDER
v.
HELIX ELECTRIC OF NEVADA, LLC,
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Defendant(s).
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Presently before the court is plaintiff Buesing Corporation’s (“Buesing”) motion for
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reconsideration. (ECF No. 51). Defendant Helix Electric of Nevada, LLC (“Helix”) filed a
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response (ECF No. 54), to which Buesing replied (ECF No. 55).
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I.
Facts
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On August 7, 2015, Helix entered into a contract with Buesing for the performance of
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certain pile driving construction work at a project in Henderson, Nevada (the “solar project”).
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(ECF No. 33-3). The contract required Buesing to install 7,898 piles at a total cost of $313,296.00
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in accordance with certain project documents, including the SNWA Ninyo & Moore pile test (“the
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pile test report”). (ECF Nos. 1, 33, 33-3). The pile test report detailed soil and site conditions.
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(ECF No. 41-3). Based on the information in the report, Buesing anticipated that it would install
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approximately 527 piles per day. (ECF No. 41-6).
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On August 31, 2015, Buesing began working on the solar project. (ECF No. 41). Buesing
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almost immediately encountered soil conditions that were different than those disclosed in the pile
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test report. (ECF No. 41-6). After four days of work, Buesing had installed only 500 piles, many
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of which were damaged and required removal. Id.
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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
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On September 11, 2015, Buesing informed Helix that it encountered differing soil
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conditions. (ECF No. 41-9). On September 24, 2015, Helix and Buesing modified the contract in
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the amount of $130,000.00 for “pulling and drilling for remediation of piles.” (ECF No. 41-6).
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Despite the modification, Buesing encountered ongoing difficulties and, on October 2, 2015, the
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parties agreed to temporarily stop installing piles. Id.
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On October 9, 2015, Buesing informed Helix that it “can no longer continue the pile work”
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due to the differing soil conditions. (ECF No. 41-15). On October 12, 2015, Helix sent Buesing
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a written notice of default for Buesing’s abandonment of the solar project. (ECF No. 41-16). The
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next day, Buesing notified Helix that it would be on the site the following day “to work through
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the issues involved in completing the remediation work.” (ECF No. 41-17). Buesing allegedly
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did not cure its default but instead “demobilized its equipment, tapered down, stopped work, and
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performed only a minimal amount of sub survey work[.]” (ECF No. 33).
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On October 16, 2015, Helix terminated the contract for Buesing’s “failure to perform and
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job abandonment.” (ECF No. 41-19). On that same day, Buesing sent a letter to Helix, in which
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Buesing stated that it had not abandoned the solar project but that it could not complete
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performance without further modification of the contract. (ECF No. 41-18). Thereafter, Helix
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contracted with another company to compete the pile driving work. (ECF No. 33).
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On June 21, 2016, Buesing filed a complaint, asserting three causes of action: (1)
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declaratory judgment; (2) breach of contract; and (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith
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and fair dealing. (ECF No. 1). On July 8, 2016, Helix filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting
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three causes of action: (1) declaratory judgment; (2) breach of contract; and (3) breach of the
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implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (ECF No. 8).
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On November 27, 2017, Helix moved for summary judgment on (1) Buesing’s breach of
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contract claim; (2) Buesing’s good faith claim; (3) Helix’s breach of contract claim; and (4) Helix’s
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good faith claim. (ECF No. 33). On January 8, 2018, Buesing filed a cross-motion for summary
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judgment requesting that the court deny Helix’s motion. (ECF No. 41).
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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
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On July 13, 2018, the court issued an order holding that Buesing breached the contract by
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failing to install piles in compliance with the contract. (ECF No. 50). Now, Buesing moves for
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reconsideration. (ECF No. 51).
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II.
Legal Standard
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A motion for reconsideration “should not be granted, absent highly unusual
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circumstances.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880
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(9th Cir. 2009). “Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly
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discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3)
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if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d
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1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Rule 54(b) permits a district court to revise an order that does not terminate the action at
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any time before the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also Los Angeles v. Santa Monica
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Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2001). However, reconsideration is “an extraordinary
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remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.”
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Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). A motion
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for reconsideration is also an improper vehicle “to raise arguments or present evidence for the first
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time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals,
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571 F.3d at 880.
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III.
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Discussion
Good cause appearing, the court reconsiders the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment. See School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
a. Breach of contract
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Helix argues that Beusing breached the contract when it failed to install piles. (ECF No.
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33). Buesing argues that its deficient performance was excusable in light of the differing soil
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condition and that Helix breached the contract when it improperly terminated the agreement. (ECF
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No. 41).
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To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the existence
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of a valid contract; (2) that plaintiff performed or was excused from performance; (3) that the
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
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defendant breached the contract; and (4) that the plaintiff sustained damages. Calloway v. City of
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Reno, 993 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Nev. 2001); see also Sierra Dev. Co. v Chartwell Advisory Group,
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Ltd., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1103 (D. Nev. 2016).
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The contract at issue provides separate provisions for termination without cause and
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termination for cause. (ECF No. 33-3). Helix terminated the contract due to Buesing’s alleged
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“failure to perform and job abandonment.” (ECF No. 41-19). Thus, Helix terminated the contract
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for cause.
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Helix’s termination constitutes a breach of contract only if Buesing’s deficient performance
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was not a material breach. On the other hand, if Buesing was in breach, then Helix’s termination
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was proper. See Young Elec. Sign Co. v. Fohrman, 466 P.2d 846, 847 (Nev. 1970) (holding that a
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material breach excuses further performance by the non-breaching party).
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Buesing has provided evidence showing that it did not abandon the solar project and that
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its deficient performance was not a material breach in light of the differing soil conditions. (ECF
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Nos. 41, 41-6, 41-9, 41-16, 41-19). Helix has also provided evidence showing the contrary, that
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the pile test report disclosed substantially accurate soil conditions. (ECF No. 33-11, 41-13). This
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conflicting evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact and precludes summary judgment
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on the parties’ breach of contract claims. See T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors
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Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that at summary judgment courts do not “make
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credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.”).
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b. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
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A contractual breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing occurs
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“[w]here the terms of a contract are literally complied with but one party to the contract
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deliberately countervenes the intention and spirit of the contract.” Hilton Hotels Corp. v Butch
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Lewis Prods., Inc., 808 P.2d 919, 922–23 (Nev. 1991); see Shaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 201 F.
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Supp. 2d 1222, 1252 (D. Nev. 2016). Although the evidence before the court does not establish
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which party is in breach, it does establish that one of the parties did not comply with the terms of
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contract. Accordingly, the court will summarily deny both parties’ claims for breach of the implied
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Hilton Hotels Corp., 808 P.2d at 922-23.
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
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c. Declaratory judgment
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“[A] ‘claim’ for declaratory relief is not a substantive cause of action at all; it is merely a
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prayer for a remedy.” Pettit v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, no. 2:11-cv-00149-JAD-PAL, 2014 WL
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584876 (D. Nev. Feb. 11, 2014); see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, no. 2:15-
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cv-02257-JCM-CWH, 2017 WL 1902158, at *4 (D. Nev. May 9, 2017) (citing Stock West, Inc. v.
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Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989)). As Helix
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requests a remedy of declaratory relief, the court will dismiss the claim to the extent it purports to
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create a cause of action. See Wells Fargo, 2017 WL 1902158, at *4.
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IV.
Conclusion
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Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Buesing’s motion for
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reconsideration (ECF No. 51) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED, consistent with the
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foregoing.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court’s order filed on July 13, 2018, (ECF No. 50)
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be, and the same hereby is, VACATED.
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DATED March 20, 2019.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
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