Baker-Fertini v. Geico Casualty Company et al

Filing 16

ORDER granting 14 Motion to Remand to State Court. FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing on the motion for remand scheduled for 4/10/17 at 2:30 p.m. is VACATED. Signed by Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey on 3/28/2017. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF, cc: State Court with Certified Docket Sheet - JM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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Yvette Baker-Fertini,

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Case No.: 2:16-cv-2547-JAD-VCF

Plaintiff

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v.

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Geico Casualty Company,

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Order Granting Motion to Remand
[ECF No. 14]

Defendant

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Plaintiff Yvette Baker-Fertini moves to remand this case back to the Eighth Judicial District

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Court whence it was removed, arguing that the value of this case does not meet the jurisdictional

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threshold.1 Removing defendant Geico’s opposition to the motion was due two weeks ago, no

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opposition has been filed, and no extension of the deadline was sought. Having removed this case

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based on diversity, it is Geico’s burden to establish that the amount in controversy in this case

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exceeds the jurisdictional amount.2 The face of the complaint suggests only that the case value

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exceeds $50,000, and Geico has offered no response to Fertini’s remand motion, let alone evidence

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to support an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. Accordingly, because Geico has failed to

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satisfy its burden, and because Geico’s failure to oppose this motion “constitutes a consent to”

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granting it under Local Rule 7-2(d),

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to remand [ECF No. 14] is GRANTED. This

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case is remanded back to the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case No. A-16-743598-C, Dept.

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XXVIII;

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing on the motion for remand scheduled for
4/10/17 at 2:30 p.m. is VACATED.
DATED: March 28, 2017

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_________________________________
JENNIFER A. DORSEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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ECF No. 14.

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See, e.g., Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 1996).