JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Williston Investment Group, LLC, et al

Filing 32

ORDER Granting Defendant Heritage Estates Homeowners' Association's 9 Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. Signed by Judge James C. Mahan on 8/1/2017. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

6

***

7

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

8
9
10
11

Case No. 2:16-CV-2874 JCM (GWF)
Plaintiff(s),

ORDER

v.
WILLISTON INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC,
et al.,
Defendant(s).

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

Presently before the court is defendant Heritage Estates Homeowners’ Association’s (the
“HOA”) motion to dismiss JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s (“JPM”) complaint. (ECF No. 9). JPM
filed a response (ECF No. 16), and the HOA filed a reply (ECF No. 17).
I.

Introduction

The instant litigation involves competing interests in the real property at 5919 Stone
Hollow Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89156. (ECF No. 1). JPM asserts claims of declaratory relief,
quiet title, and unjust enrichment. (Id.).
The HOA argues that, inter alia, Nevada Revised Statute (“NRS”) § 38.310(1)(a), a statute
of limitation, laches, and a failure to properly allege superior title all warrant the dismissal of
JPM’s claims. See (ECF No. 9).
Notably, the foreclosure sale allegedly took place on December 14, 2012, and JPM initiated
the instant action on December 12, 2016. (ECF No. 1).
II.

Legal Standard

The court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a] short and

1

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

2

Although rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does require more than labels and

3

conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Furthermore, a formulaic

4

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

5

677 (2009) (citation omitted). Rule 8 does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed

6

with nothing more than conclusions. Id. at 678–79.

7

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state

8

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

9

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

10

liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent

11

with a defendant’s liability, and shows only a mere possibility of entitlement, the complaint does

12

not meet the requirements to show plausibility of entitlement to relief. Id.

13

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply

14

when considering a motion to dismiss. Id. First, the court must accept as true all of the allegations

15

contained in a complaint. However, this requirement is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id.

16

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id.

17

at 678. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

18

misconduct, the complaint has “alleged – but not shown – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.

19

at 679. When the allegations in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to

20

plausible, plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The Ninth Circuit addressed post-Iqbal pleading standards in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,

21
22

1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The Starr court held:

23

First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or
counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must
contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable
the opposing party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual allegations that
are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not
unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and
continued litigation.

24
25
26
27

Id.

28
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

-2-

1

III.

2

As an initial matter, declaratory judgment is a form of relief and not itself an independent

3

claim, particularly where the factual and legal allegations asserted in support of this claim are

4

largely reproduced in plaintiff’s claim for quiet title. See (ECF No. 1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)

5

(providing a remedy).

6

Discussion

A. Statutes of limitation

7

There is no issue of timeliness in this case because the action was brought within four years

8

of the foreclosure sale, and the statutes of limitation for unjust enrichment and quiet title provide

9

periods of four years and five years, respectively. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Woodland Vill.,

10

No. 3:16-cv-00501-RCJ-WGC, 2016 WL 7116016, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 6, 2016); In re Amerco

11

Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681, 703 (Nev. 2011) (citing NRS 11.190(c)(2)); (ECF No. 1).

12

B. Exhaustion

13

A claim of unjust enrichment must be mediated pursuant to NRS 38.310 before that claim

14

can be asserted in an action. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Tapestry at Town Ctr. Homeowners Ass’n, ---

15

F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 2:16-cv-255-JCM-NJK, 2017 WL 2882700, at *3 (D. Nev. July 6, 2017)

16

(“Tapestry”); see also (ECF No. 9) (unintentionally challenging the fulfillment of the mediation

17

requirement in this case). Thus, this claim will be dismissed as unexhausted.

18
19
20

However, this requirement does not extend to plaintiff’s quiet title claim. See Tapestry,
2017 WL 2882700, at *2; see also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 38.330.
C. Allegations of superior title

21

Under Nevada law, “[a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims

22

an estate or interest in real property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the purpose of

23

determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.010. “A plea to quiet title does not require

24

any particular elements, but each party must plead and prove his or her own claim to the property

25

in question and a plaintiff’s right to relief therefore depends on superiority of title.” Chapman v.

26

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013) (citations and internal quotation

27

marks omitted). Therefore, for plaintiff to succeed on its quiet title action, it needs to show that

28

its claim to the property is superior to all others. See also Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp.,

James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

-3-

1

918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996) (“In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff

2

to prove good title in himself.”).

3
4

Upon review of the complaint in this action, JPM has failed to sufficiently assert allegations
of fact or law suggesting it may be entitled to quiet title. (ECF No. 1).

5

To clarify, JPM: (1) has not alleged how it has standing to assert a claim based on the

6

Federal Housing Administration’s interest in the property; (2) has not alleged why it would be

7

entitled to additional notice when it acquired its interest in the property after the HOA had already

8

recorded a notice of foreclosure sale; (3) admits that it “made preservation payments for the

9

Property” after the foreclosure sale had already occurred; (4) makes conclusory allegations as to

10

how there was some kind of “fraud, oppression, and/or unfairness” and therefore does not make

11

allegations sufficient to surmount the Long v. Towne, 639 P.2d 528, 530 (Nev. 1982), test for

12

commercial unreasonability;1 (5) ignores the narrow holding in Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells

13

Fargo Bank, N.A., 832 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-1208, 2017 WL 1300223

14

(U.S. June 26, 2017) (“Bourne Valley”); (6) is incorrect in its suggestion that SFR Investments

15

Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014), should not be applied retroactively; and (7) does

16

not recognize that the allegation of the HOA’s failure to identify the super-priority portion of an

17

HOA lien does not, by itself, entitle a plaintiff to quiet title. (ECF No. 1 at 2–11); see also Bank

18

of America, N.A. v. Travata and Montage at Summerlin Centre Homeowners Ass’n, et al., No.

19

2:16-cv-473-JCM-VCF, 2017 WL 3037785, at *2 (D. Nev. July 18, 2017) (collecting cases); Bank

20

of Am., N.A. v. Valley View Meadows Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-275-JCM-CWH, 2017

21

WL 2870087, at *8 (D. Nev. July 5, 2017); Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Maplewood Springs

22

Homeowners Ass’n, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 2:15-cv-1683-JCM-CWH, 2017 WL 843177, at *7

23

(D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2017).

24
25

Thus, JPM has not plausibly pled that it is entitled to quiet title. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216
(9th Cir. 2011).

26
27
28
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

1

The complaint also contains a variety of other relevantly conclusory allegations. See
(ECF No. 1).
-4-

1

IV.

2

In sum, JPM’s complaint will be dismissed as to all three claims.

3

Accordingly,

4

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the HOA’s motion to

5
6
7
8

Conclusion

dismiss (ECF No. 9) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED, without prejudice.
DATED August 1, 2017.
__________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

-5-