Solarcity Corporation v. Girma

Filing 23

ORDER denying ECF No. 21 Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. Signed by Judge Miranda M. Du on 10/24/2017. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KW)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 9 *** 10 SOLARCITY CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Case No. 2:17-cv-00464-MMD-VCF 11 ORDER Plaintiff, 12 13 14 v. FETEHE GIRMA, an individual, Defendants. 15 16 The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and entered default 17 judgment against Defendant Fetehe Girma on August 1, 2017. (ECF Nos. 17, 18.) Before 18 the Court is Defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment (“Motion”). (ECF No. 21.) 19 Plaintiff opposes the motion (ECF No. 21) and Defendant has failed to timely reply. For 20 the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion is denied. 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) provides that the court may set aside a final default judgment 22 under Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b), in turn, provides that a court may relieve a party from a final 23 judgment only in the following circumstances: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 24 excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) the judgment is void; (5) 25 the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 26 judgment. Stewart v. Dupnik, 243 F.3d 549, 549 (9th Cir. 2000). See also De Saracho v. 27 Custom Food Mach., Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the district court’s 28 denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). Moreover, in 1 determining whether good cause exists to set aside default judgment, a court considers 2 three factors: “‘(1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced, (2) whether the defendant has 3 a meritorious defense, and (3) whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the 4 default.’” Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 653 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) 5 (quoting Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984)). “These factors . . . are 6 disjunctive.” Brandt, 653 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Falk, 739 F.2d at 463)). Thus, the court 7 may refuse to set aside default if it holds any one of the three factors is true. U.S. v. 8 Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). 9 However, strong policy in the Ninth Circuit is to decide cases on their merits. 10 “‘[J]udgment by default is a drastic step appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a 11 case should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits.’” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091 12 (quoting Falk, 739 F.2d at 463) (alternation in original). The Falk factors are more liberally 13 applied in the context of a clerk's entry of default than in the default judgment context. 14 Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091 n.1 (quoting Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 631 (7th 15 Cir. 2009)); see also Haw. Carpenter's Trust v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 513 (9th Cir. 1986). 16 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant has not offered any valid reason to 17 set aside the default judgment. Defendant contends that “the clerk” told him he had sixty 18 days from when he sought an extension in March 2017 to seek legal counsel. (ECF No. 19 21 at 1.) The docket reflects that Defendant’s request for an extension of time to respond 20 to the complaint was granted, giving Defendant until April 15, 2017 to respond. (ECF No. 21 8.) Defendant did not respond or otherwise appear until he filed the Motion. Defendant 22 offered no explanation for such failure to appear. Defendant claims that he moved to a 23 new address on April 1, 2017. (ECF No. 21 at 1.) However, Defendant knew of the April 24 15, 2017, deadline for him to respond because the order granting his requested for 25 extension was issued on March 21, 2017. (ECF No. 8.) A change in address does not 26 explain or excuse Defendant’s failure to timely respond to the complaint. In fact, 27 Defendant has a duty to notify the Court of any change in his mailing address. See LR IA 28 3-1. Moreover, Defendant does not address the merits of his defense, offer facts for the 2 1 Court to find that the default judgment was not a result of his culpable conduct, or any 2 other reason justifying relief from default judgment. 3 4 5 It is therefore ordered that Defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment (ECF No. 21) is denied. DATED THIS 24th day of October 2017. 6 7 MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3

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