Salvati-Bryant v. Berryhill
Filing
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ORDER that 22 Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Salvati-Bryant and against the Commissioner in the amount of $5,300, less any applicable processing fees allowed by statute. Signed by Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey on 7/17/2018. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - MMM)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 Susanne Salvati-Bryant,
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Case No.: 2:17-cv-01406-JAD-CWH
Plaintiff
Order Granting Motion
for Attorney Fees
5 v.
[ECF No. 22]
6 Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
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Defendant
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Susanne Salvati-Bryant brought this action for judicial review of the Commissioner of
10 Social Security’s final decision denying her request for disability insurance benefits under 42
11 U.S.C. § 405(g). 1 On the parties’ stipulation, I remanded the matter for further administrative
12 proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) with instructions to vacate the prior ruling
13 and reconsider the disability claim. 2 Salvati-Bryant now moves for attorney fees and costs under
14 the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 3 I grant Salvati-Bryant’s motion and
15 award her $5,300 in fees and costs.
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Discussion
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The EAJA authorizes courts to “award to a prevailing party other than the United States
18 fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . unless the court finds
19 that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances
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ECF No. 22 at 2.
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ECF No. 19.
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ECF No. 22.
1 make an award unjust.” 4 The district court has discretion to award attorney fees under the EAJA
2 with no limit aside from a statutory hourly-rate cap. 5
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I find that Salvati-Bryant qualifies for attorney fees and costs under the EAJA because
4 she is the prevailing party, and I do not find special circumstances that would make an award
5 unjust 6—indeed, her motion is unopposed. So I consider the reasonableness of her request using
6 the lodestar method. 7 “To calculate the lodestar amount, the court multiplies ‘the number of
7 hours reasonably expended on the litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate.’” 8 “Many district
8 courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range most often requested and granted in
9 social security cases.” 9 But this range is not a “de facto policy,” and a “determination will
10 always depend on case-specific factors including, among others, the complexity of the legal
11 issues, the procedural history, the size of the record, and when counsel was retained.” 10
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The statutory cap for attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) is adjusted for
13 inflation and is capped at $196.79 per hour for work performed in 2017. 11 Salvati-Bryant’s
14 attorney requests an hourly rate of $195.95, 12 which falls within the statutory cap. I find that
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28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 1998);
Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013).
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1996); Atkins v.
Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1998).
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See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300 (1993) (explaining that a party is the “prevailing
19 party” when a court grants a remand under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
7
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Costa v. Comm’r of Social Security Admn., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012).
8
Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)); see also Stetson v. Grissom, 821
F.3d 1157, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2016).
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Costa, 690 F.3d at 1135.
22 10
Id.
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https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039.
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ECF No. 22 (Exhibit B).
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1 26.2 hours is reasonable. Counsel successfully obtained a remand of the Commissioner’s
2 decision denying Salvati-Bryant’s benefits, but that agreement came only after counsel filed her
3 motion to remand. In light of the detailed remand motion and its successful effect, I find that
4 26.2 hours was a reasonable time expenditure in this case. So I award Salvati-Bryant $4,900 in
5 fees.
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Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) gives me the authority to award “a judgment for costs . . .
7 to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency
8 or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having
9 jurisdiction of such action.” Salvati-Bryant seeks $400 for filing fees, mailing costs, and printing
10 and binding costs. I find these costs are awardable, and I also award Salvati-Bryant her $400 in
11 costs.
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13
Conclusion
Accordingly, with good cause appearing and no reason to delay, IT IS HEREBY
14 ORDERED that Salvati-Bryant’s motion for attorney fees [ECF No. 22] is GRANTED.
15 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Salvati-Bryant and against the
16 Commissioner in the amount of $5,300, less any applicable processing fees allowed by
17 statute.
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DATED July 17, 2018.
_________________________________
________________________
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U.S. District Judge Jennifer A Dorsey
. District Judge Jennifer A.
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