Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9338 Wilderness Glen Avenue et al
Filing
28
ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that 11 defendant's motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 14 plaintiff's motion for leave to conduct discovery be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge James C. Mahan on 6/21/2018. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - MR)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
6
***
7
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY,
8
Plaintiff(s),
9
10
11
Case No. 2:17-CV-1775 JCM (PAL)
ORDER
v.
SATICOY BAY LLC SERIES 9338
WILDERNESS GLEN AVANUE, et al.,
Defendant(s).
12
13
Presently before the court is defendant Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9338 Wilderness Glen
14
15
16
17
Avenue’s (“Saticoy Bay”) motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund
Society, FSB, as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust A, (“Wilmington”) filed a response
(ECF No. 13), to which defendant replied (ECF No. 17).
Also before the court is plaintiff’s motion for leave to conduct discovery. (ECF No. 14).
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
Defendant filed a response (ECF No. 18), to which plaintiff replied (ECF No. 19).
I.
Facts
This case involves a dispute over real property located at 9338 Wilderness Glen Avenue,
Las Vegas, Nevada, 89178 (“the property”). (ECF No. 1).
On October 13, 2005, Darren and Amy Baca purchased the property. Id. In connection
with their purchase, the Bacas obtained a loan in the amount of $448,523. Id. The loan was
secured by a deed of trust, recorded on January 19, 2006. Id. The deed of trust listed Bank of
America as the lender and beneficiary, and PRLAP, Inc. as the trustee. Id. On April 7, 2014, the
deed of trust was assigned to plaintiff (as trustee of ARLP Trust 3). Id.
1
On February 9, 2012, Leach Johnson Song & Gruchow (“the HOA trustee”), on behalf of
2
Yellowstone Homeowners Association (“the HOA”), recorded a notice of delinquent assessment
3
lien, listing an amount due of $973.49. Id. On April 27, 2012, the HOA trustee, on behalf of the
4
HOA, recorded a notice of default and election to sell, listing an amount due of $1,917.70. Id. On
5
February 5, 2013, the HOA trustee, on behalf of the HOA, re-recorded the notice of default and
6
election to sell, stating a current amount due of $4,234.06. Id.
On March 18, 2015, the HOA trustee, on behalf of the HOA, recorded a notice of
7
8
foreclosure sale, stating an amount due of $7,218.06. Id.
On September 24, 2015, the HOA trustee, on behalf of the HOA, re-recorded the second
9
10
notice of default and election to sell in order to correct the APN number. Id.
11
On February 25, 2016, the HOA foreclosed on the property. Id. Saticoy Bay purchased
12
the property at the foreclosure sale for $176,100. Id. Plaintiff contends that at the time of purchase,
13
Saticoy Bay was on “actual, constructive or inquiry notice of Plaintiff’s first Deed of Trust.” Id.
14
at 8.
15
II.
Legal Standard
16
The court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
17
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a] short and
18
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
19
Although rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does require more than labels and
20
conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Furthermore, a formulaic
21
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
22
677 (2009) (citation omitted). Rule 8 does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed
23
with nothing more than conclusions. Id. at 678–79.
24
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state
25
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
26
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
27
liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent
28
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
-2-
1
with a defendant’s liability, and shows only a mere possibility of entitlement, the complaint does
2
not meet the requirements to show plausibility of entitlement to relief. Id.
3
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply
4
when considering a motion to dismiss. Id. First, the court must accept as true all of the allegations
5
contained in a complaint. However, this requirement is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id.
6
Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id.
7
at 678. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
8
misconduct, the complaint has “alleged – but not shown – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
9
at 679. When the allegations in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to
10
plausible, plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The Ninth Circuit addressed post-Iqbal pleading standards in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
11
12
1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The Starr court held:
13
First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or
counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must
contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable
the opposing party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual allegations that
are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not
unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and
continued litigation.
14
15
16
17
Id.
18
III.
Discussion
19
As an initial matter, claim (4) of plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice
20
as the court follows the well-settled rule that claims for “injunctive relief” standing alone are not
21
causes of action. See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 490 F. Supp. 2d
22
1091, 1130 (D. Nev. 2007); Tillman v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. 2:12-CV-346 JCM RJJ, 2012
23
WL 1279939, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2012) (finding that “injunctive relief is a remedy, not an
24
independent cause of action”); Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1201
25
(E.D. Cal. 2010) (“A request for injunctive relief by itself does not state a cause of action.”).
26
Defendant’s motion asks the court to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff
27
argues, inter alia, that defendant’s motion to dismiss fails to identify the legal standard pursuant
28
to which it seeks dismissal. (ECF No. 13). Defendant responds that its “motion to dismiss states
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
-3-
1
at page 2, lines 17-18, that ‘[t]he complaint fails to state a cause of action against defendant upon
2
which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because defendant is a bona fide
3
purchaser . . . .’” (ECF No. 17 at 2). Nowhere else in defendant’s motion does it detail a relevant
4
legal standard or apply a legal standard to the facts of this case.
5
As plaintiff notes, “allegations made in the Complaint are generally taken as true and
6
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” (ECF No. 13). When viewed in such
7
a light, plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleges that defendant is not protected by the bona fide
8
purchaser doctrine, as plaintiff alleges that defendant was on actual, constructive, or inquiry notice
9
of plaintiff’s interest in the property prior to the foreclosure sale. See (ECF No. 1 at 8).
As defendant does not cite any legal standard to support the other arguments made in its
10
11
motion to dismiss, the court will deny the motion.
12
Plaintiff filed a motion seeking the alternative relief of discovery pursuant to Federal Rule
13
of Civil Procedure 56(d) if the court was inclined to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss. As the
14
court will deny defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s motion for leave to conduct discovery
15
pursuant to Rule 56(d) is moot. The court will deny the motion.
16
IV.
Conclusion
17
Accordingly,
18
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendant’s motion to
19
20
21
22
23
24
dismiss (ECF No. 11) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to conduct discovery (ECF
No. 14) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as moot.
DATED June 19, 2018.
__________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
25
26
27
28
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
-4-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?