Silva v. Williams et al

Filing 12

ORDER granting 9 Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition; ORDER granting 10 Motion for a Scheduling Order; Appointing FPD as counsel for petitioner. IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that petitioner shall have until up to and including ninety (90) d ays from entry of this order within which to file a second amended petition. IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that: (a) respondents shall not be required to respond to the first amended petition at this time (see order for details)IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the hard copy of any exhibits filed by either counsel shall be delivered for this case to the Reno Clerk's Office. Signed by Chief Judge Gloria M. Navarro on 12/29/2017. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - JM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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JOSE E. SILVA,
Petitioner,

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2:17-cv-02149-GMN-CWH

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vs.

ORDER

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BRIAN WILLIAMS, et al.,

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Respondents.

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This habeas matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 comes before the Court following upon

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the Federal Public Defender’s entry of an appearance together with petitioner’s motion (ECF

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No. 09) for leave to file a first amended petition and motion (ECF No. 10) requesting a

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scheduling order permitting petitioner to file a second amended petition.

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The motions collectively seek to pursue a “two-step” procedure whereby petitioner: (a)

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files an initial counseled amended petition preserving all then-known claims potentially free

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of possible relation-back issues; and (b) thereafter potentially files a second amended petition

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after petitioner’s newly-appointed federal habeas has had a full opportunity to independently

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investigate all potential claims.

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procedure in prior cases, and it does so here.

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2:14-cv-00076-APG-CWH, ECF No. 29 (D. Nev., May 29, 2014)(approving and explaining the

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Court's rationale in allowing a bifurcated amendment procedure in habeas cases where the

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limitation period potentially may expire before federal habeas counsel would be able to

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conduct a complete investigation).

The Court expressly has authorized such a two-step
See, e.g., McMahon v. Neven, No.

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The two-step procedure may be appropriate also in circumstances where the federal

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limitation period perhaps may only recently have putatively expired and counsel is seeking

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to cabin the period of time as to which equitable tolling may need to be sought. As noted

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below, the Court expresses no opinion as to the putative expiration date of the limitation

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period in this case.

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IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that the Federal Public Defender, through Megan C.

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Hoffman, Esq., is appointed as counsel for petitioner pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).

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Counsel will represent petitioner in all federal proceedings related to this matter, including any

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appeals or certiorari proceedings, unless allowed to withdraw.

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IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that petitioner’s motion (ECF No. 9) for leave to file a first

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amended petition is GRANTED and that the Clerk of Court shall file the first amended petition

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(ECF No. 9-1).

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IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the Clerk shall file the exhibits submitted with the

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amended petition in a manner most convenient to the Clerk, which potentially may include

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leaving the exhibits docketed where they currently are with ECF No. 9.

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IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that petitioner’s motion (ECF No. 10) for a scheduling
order is granted consistent with the remaining provisions of this order.

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IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that petitioner shall have until up to and including ninety

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(90) days from entry of this order within which to file a second amended petition and/or seek

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other appropriate relief. Neither the foregoing deadline nor any extension thereof signifies or

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will signify any implied finding as to the expiration of the federal limitation period and/or of a

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basis for tolling during the time period established. Petitioner at all times remains responsible

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for calculating the running of the federal limitation period and timely asserting claims, without

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regard to any deadlines established or extensions granted herein. That is, by setting a

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deadline to amend the petition and/or by granting any extension thereof, the Court makes no

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finding or representation that the petition, any amendments thereto, and/or any claims

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contained therein are not subject to dismissal as untimely. See Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d

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1225, 1235 (9th Cir. 2013).
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IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that: (a) respondents shall not be required to respond to

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the first amended petition at this time, but that (b) respondents shall file a response to the

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petition, as then amended, either within sixty (60) days of service of a second amended

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petition if filed or instead within sixty (60) days of the final expiration of the time to do so if

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petitioner does not file a second amended petition; and (c) petitioner may file a reply within

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thirty (30) days of service. The response and reply time to any motion filed by either party,

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including a motion filed in lieu of a pleading, shall be governed instead by the local rules.

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IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that any procedural defenses raised by respondents to

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the counseled amended petition shall be raised together in a single consolidated motion to

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dismiss. In other words, the Court does not wish to address any procedural defenses raised

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herein either in seriatum fashion in multiple successive motions to dismiss or embedded in

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the answer. Procedural defenses omitted from such motion to dismiss will be subject to

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potential waiver. Respondents shall not file a response in this case that consolidates their

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procedural defenses, if any, with their response on the merits, except pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2254(b)(2) as to any unexhausted claims clearly lacking merit. If respondents do seek

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dismissal of unexhausted claims under § 2254(b)(2): (a) they shall do so within the single

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motion to dismiss not in the answer; and (b) they shall specifically direct their argument to the

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standard for dismissal under § 2254(b)(2) set forth in Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614,

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623-24 (9th Cir. 2005). In short, no procedural defenses, including exhaustion, shall be

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included with the merits in an answer. All procedural defenses, including exhaustion, instead

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must be raised by motion to dismiss.

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IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the hard copy of any exhibits filed by either counsel
shall be delivered – for this case – to the Reno Clerk's Office.
DATED: December 29, 2017

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_________________________________
Gloria M. Navarro
Chief United States District Judge
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