Breazeale v. Southwest Airline Pilot's Association
Filing
14
ORDER Denying without prejudice Plaintiff's 10 Motion for TRO and 12 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Richard F. Boulware, II on 10/23/2017. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD)
1
2
3
4
5
6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
8
***
9
WILLIAM BREAZEALE,
10
Plaintiff,
11
12
13
Case No. 2:17-cv-02594-RFB-CWH
v.
ORDER
Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order
SOUTHWEST AIRLINE PILOT’S
ASSOCIATION; DOES 1-20; ROE CORPS. 120,
14
Defendant.
15
16
Before the Court is Plaintiff William Breazeale (“Plaintiff”)’s Motion for Temporary
17
Restraining Order (“TRO”), (ECF No. 10) and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 12).
18
For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions.
19
20
I.
BACKGROUND
21
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on October 5, 2017. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff also filed
22
a Motion for TRO on October 5, 2017. (ECF No. 4). The Court entered an Order denying the TRO
23
for failure to exhaust the remedies set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 482. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff filed an
24
Amended Complaint on October 12, 2017, against Defendant Southwest Airline Pilot’s
25
Association (“SWAPA”), and now alleges violations of the Labor Management Reporting and
26
Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 411. (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff asserts a breach of contract
27
cause of action, and a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cause of action,
28
alleging that SWAPA has violated SWAPA governance procedures in the current election for Las
1
Vegas Domicile Representative. Plaintiff also filed the instant Motion for TRO on October 12,
2
2017, (ECF No. 10) and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff asks the Court
3
to enjoin and restrain SWAPA from allowing SWAPA Las Vegas Domicile Representative
4
Candidate Matt Kenworthy (“Kenworthy”) from appearing on the ballot for the recent SWAPA
5
Las Vegas Domicile Representative Election, which opened on October 6, 2017. Plaintiff claims
6
that Kenworthy appears on the ballot in violation of SWAPA’s governing documents.
7
Plaintiff was nominated to be a candidate for the Domicile Representative seat for the
8
SWAPA Las Vegas domicile, which he accepted. (ECF No. 10 at 5). He alleges that he was
9
informed that someone filed to contest the Domicile Representative position one day before
10
nominations closed. (ECF No. 10 at 5). Plaintiff claims that Kenworthy was nominated as a
11
candidate, even though he was not assigned to the SWAPA Las Vegas domicile, was not present
12
in the state of Nevada with intent to remain, and was not a resident of Nevada at the time of the
13
nomination. (ECF No. 10 at 6). Believing that Kenworthy’s nomination was improper, Plaintiff
14
lodged a formal complaint with SWAPA’s 2nd Vice President, Tom Gasparolo (“Gasparolo”) via
15
email on September 25, 2017. (ECF No. 10-3). In his response on September 29, 2017, Gasparolo
16
purportedly upheld Kenworthy’s nomination and found it to be in accordance with SWAPA’s
17
governing documents. (ECF No. 10-4). On October 3, 2017, Plaintiff contacted a Department of
18
Labor (“DOL”) investigator to lodge a complaint about Kenworthy’s nomination, and the
19
investigator scheduled a meeting with Plaintiff and counsel later that week. (ECF No. 10-7). The
20
DOL investigator subsequently cancelled the meeting and informed Plaintiff that the investigation
21
would be put on hold until the election was completed. (ECF No. 10-8). The investigator
22
acknowledged that Plaintiff’s October 3, 2017 email would suffice as a formal complaint. (ECF
23
No. 10-8).
24
25
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
26
Under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, only the Secretary of Labor
27
may bring a cause of action in federal court for violations of Title IV of LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. § 482
28
(laying out procedures for enforcement). Prior to the Secretary of Labor filing suit, a plaintiff must
-2-
1
first lodge a complaint internally and exhaust all internal administrative remedies available
2
pursuant to the constitution and bylaws of plaintiff’s union. Id. Plaintiff may then file a complaint
3
with the Secretary of Labor, who conducts an investigation and has the authority to bring suit. See
4
Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 539-540 (1984).
5
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a
6
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
7
555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish four elements:
8
“(1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that the plaintiff will likely suffer irreparable harm
9
in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tip in its favor, and (4) that the
10
public interest favors an injunction.” Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 758 F.3d
11
1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (Mar. 11, 2014) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). A
12
preliminary injunction may issue under the “serious questions” test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies
13
v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming the continued viability of this doctrine
14
post-Winter). According to this test, a plaintiff can obtain a preliminary injunction by
15
demonstrating “that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships
16
tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,” in addition to the other Winter elements. Id. at 1134-35
17
(citation omitted).
18
19
III.
DISCUSSION
20
The Court finds that Plaintiff has followed the proper procedures with respect to filing a
21
complaint within his union, and lodging a complaint with the Department of Labor. However, the
22
Court finds that Plaintiff’s substituted causes of action do not permit him to bring suit. Recognizing
23
the apparent overlap between Title I and Title IV of LMRDA, the Supreme Court clarified the
24
distinction between the two statutory subsections in Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v.
25
Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 539-540 (1984). The Court stated: “[T]he primary objectives that
26
controlled congressional enactment of the LMRDA provide important guidance for our
27
consideration of the availability of Title I remedies during a union election. In particular,
28
throughout the congressional discussions preceding enactment of both Title I and Title IV,
-3-
1
Congress clearly indicated its intent to consolidate challenges to union elections with the Secretary
2
of Labor, and to have the Secretary supervise any new elections necessitated by violations of the
3
Act.” Crowley, 467 U.S. at 543. Discussing the private right of action for individual union
4
members pursuant to Title I of the statute, the Court continued: “Individual union members may
5
properly allege violations of Title I that are easily remediable under that Title without substantially
6
delaying or invalidating an ongoing election.” Id. at 546. The Court emphasized the importance of
7
minimizing judicial interference with union elections and relying on the expertise of the Secretary
8
of Labor to the greatest extent possible. Id. at 546-551. Crowley concluded that the “District Court
9
overstepped the bounds of ‘appropriate’ relief under Title I of the LMRDA when it enjoined an
10
ongoing union election and ordered that a new election be held pursuant to court-ordered
11
procedures.” Id. at 551.
12
In light of Crowley and its own review of Title I of LMRDA, the Court finds that Plaintiff
13
does not allege any of the particular circumstances warranting relief under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a). He
14
does not argue that he was prevented from nominating candidates, voting in elections or
15
referendums, or attending membership meetings. Plaintiff does not contend that he was precluded
16
from participating in the deliberations and votes upon the business of union meetings. While the
17
Court recognizes the protective nature of Title I in preventing discrimination between union
18
members, the Court does not find that such discrimination exists here in terms of the allegations.
19
Challenges to union elections and related procedures generally fall within the ambit of Title IV,
20
and can only be brought by the Secretary of Labor. Consequently, the Court finds that the Plaintiff
21
cannot prove a likelihood of success on the merits or a serious question as to the merits of his
22
argument on this issue.
23
Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established irreparable harm. The
24
LMRDA permits a Court (or the Secretary) invalidate a union election after it has occurred in
25
certain circumstances. See 29 U.S.C. § 482; see also Crowley, 467 U.S. at 540-41 (citation
26
omitted). There is therefore no need for the Court to impose injunctive relief at this time.
27
28
Given the Court’s findings, the remaining factors for consideration as to imposition of a
TRO or injunction need not be addressed at this time.
-4-
1
Therefore, the Court denies the Motion for TRO and Motion for Preliminary Injunction
2
with prejudice. Plaintiff shall not file any further injunctive motions on this issue unless given
3
leave from the Court. The Court also finds no reason to grant a hearing at this time.
4
5
IV.
CONCLUSION
6
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF
7
No. 10) is DENIED with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Preliminary
8
Injunction (ECF No. 12) is DENIED with prejudice.
9
10
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2017.
11
__________________________________
RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-5-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?