Schoenwald et al v. Unum Group et al

Filing 77

ORDER Granting 67 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge James C. Mahan on 9/25/2024. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - RJDG)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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HEATHER SCHOENWALD, et al.,

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Plaintiff(s),

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Case No. 2:20-CV-1948 JCM (BNW)
ORDER

v.
UNUM GROUP, et al.,

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Defendant(s).

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Presently before the court is defendants’ UNUM Group (“UNUM”) and Colonial Life &

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Accident Insurance Company’s (“Colonial Life”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 67).

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Plaintiff Tom Koch filed a response (ECF No. 68), to which defendants replied (ECF No. 72).

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For the reasons stated below, the court grants defendants’ motion.

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I.

Background

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This case involves an employment termination dispute. (ECF No. 67). Plaintiff Tom

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Koch worked for Colonial Life, a subsidiary of UNUM, alongside co-plaintiff Heather

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Schoenwald. (Id.). Colonia Life terminated Koch after Koch reported allegations that his co-

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worker, Scott Webb, was sexually harassing Schoenwald. (Id.). Koch is alleging retaliation

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under Title VII. (ECF No. X).

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Koch and Schoenwald reported allegations of Webb’s sexual harassment in 2019.

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Defendants’ Human Resources initiated an investigation pursuant to the company’s nepotism

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policy against close personal relationships. (ECF No. 68; ECF No. 67, Ex. 4). Witnesses in the

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company corroborated the allegations and Colonial Life terminated Webb. (Id.).

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In the course of the Webb investigation, the defendants also uncovered independent

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sexual harassment charges against Koch. (Id.). Witnesses reported Koch and Schoenwald

James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

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participated in “inappropriate sexual behavior.” (Id.). Defendants’ terminated Koch thereafter

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under the same nepotism policy. (Id.).

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Koch alleges defendants terminated him in retaliation for his complaint against Webb.

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(ECF No. 68). Koch contends he did not violate the company’s nepotism policy because he and

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Schoenwald were friends outside the workplace. (Id.).

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Koch and Schoenwald sued defendants and Webb for various claims, including

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discrimination and retaliation. (ECF No. 1). Webb was dismissed as a defendant upon his death

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(ECF No. 11) and the parties stipulated to dismiss Schoenwald as a plaintiff. (ECF No. 76). All

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that remains is Koch’s single retaliation claim against defendants. Defendants filed the instant

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motion seeking summary judgment. (ECF No. 67).

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II.

Legal Standard

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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits (if

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any), show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

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judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment

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is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

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317, 323–24 (1986).

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In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility

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determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Rather, it draws all inferences in the light most

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favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809

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F.2d 626, 630–31 (9th Cir.1987).

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When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can meet

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its burden on summary judgment in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential

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element of the non-moving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the non-moving party

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failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on which

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that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323–24. If the

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moving party fails to meet his initial burden, summary judgment must be denied, and the court

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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

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need not consider the non-moving party’s evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.

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144, 159–60 (1970).

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If the moving party satisfies his initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing

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party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

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Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute,

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the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is

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sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

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parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630.

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However, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on

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conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

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1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of

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the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine

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issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the nonmoving party’s evidence is merely

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colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v.

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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986).

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III.

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Discussion
A plaintiff must assert a prima facie retaliation claim. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234,
Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a “legitimate

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1243 (9th Cir. 2000).

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nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.” Id. If the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory

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reason, then the plaintiff “bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that the reason was merely

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a pretext.” Id.

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To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, an employee must prove

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that (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employee suffered an adverse

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employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between the employee’s protected activity

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and the adverse employment action. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018,

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1034-35 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Neither party disputes that plaintiff engaged in a protected activity when he reported

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Webb’s misconduct, and that an adverse employment action was taken against him. (ECF No.

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U.S. District Judge

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68). The sole dispute for the court to resolve is whether Koch was terminated as a result of his

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complaint against Webb. (Id.).

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Koch argues that because he was terminated after he reported his co-worker’s

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misconduct, a causal link between the two events is presumed. This argument is unavailing. To

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establish the causal link, plaintiff must show that his protected activity was a “but-for” cause of

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the alleged adverse action by the employer. University of Tex. Sw. Med. Center v. Nassar, 570

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U.S. 338, 360 (2013).

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Koch’s only argument rests on the timing of his termination. Although “causation can be

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inferred from timing alone,” this does not apply to all cases. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.,

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281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned against

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conducting a mechanical examination of the amount of time between a protected activity and

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adverse employment action. See Anthoine v. N. Cent. Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 751

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(9th Cir. 2010).

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Although plaintiffs cite to numerous cases in which courts inferred a causal link from

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timing of an adverse action, the present case is distinguishable because defendants had an

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independent basis for Koch’s termination: the corroborated evidence of his misconduct with

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Schoenwald.

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Witnesses alleged Koch was inappropriate with Schoenwald. (ECF No. 67). Koch

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admitted to previously seeing Schoenwald make sexually suggestive gestures to him. (ECF No.

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67, Ex. A-14). An employee reported seeing Koch and Schoenwald make these gestures on

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FaceTime. (ECF No. 67, Ex. A-6 at 89:24-90:6). In senior HR consultant Tiffany Harley’s

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deposition, she stated she watched a video of plaintiff and Schoenwald dancing inappropriately

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where other company employees were present. (ECF No. 67, Ex. 8).

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Without evidence of a retaliatory motive, timing alone may not sufficiently demonstrate a

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causal link to support a retaliation claim. See Vasquez v. City of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 646

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(9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff confuses retaliatory motive with genuine independent grounds for

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termination.

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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

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A reasonable jury could not conclude defendants terminated Koch based solely on his

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complaint against Webb when witnesses independently corroborated Koch’s own misconduct.

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There being no genuine dispute of material fact concerning Koch’s termination, the court finds

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summary judgment on Koch’s Title VII retaliation claim appropriate.

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IV.

Conclusion

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Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendants UNUM

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Group and Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment (ECF

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No. 67) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

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DATED September 25, 2024.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge

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