The Bureau Fashion Week LLC et al v. Nataliya Nova LLC

Filing 69

ORDER. IT IS ORDERED that the 27 Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The copyright claim is dismissed without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 42 Motion for Leave is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Gloria M. Navarro on 3/5/2025. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - AMMi)

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Case 2:24-cv-00233-GMN-EJY Document 69 Filed 03/05/25 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 5 THE BUREAU FASHION WEEK LLC, et al., Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 6 vs. 7 8 9 NATALIYA NOVA LLC, Page 1 of 6 Case No.: 2:24-cv-233-GMN-EJY ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT AND GRANTING PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant/Counter-Claimant. 10 Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 27), filed by Plaintiffs and 11 12 Counter-Defendants The Bureau Fashion Week LLC and The Society Fashion Week LLC 13 (collectively, “the Fashion Week LLCs”). Defendant and Counter-Claimant Nataliya Nova 14 LLC filed a Response, (ECF No. 29). Also pending before the Court is Nataliya Nova’s 15 Motion for Leave to File Document Supplementing Response, (ECF No. 42). For good cause appearing, Nataliya Nova’s Motion for Leave is GRANTED. 1 But 16 17 because Nataliya Nova does not allege that the copyright was registered when it filed the 18 counterclaim for copyright infringement, the Court also GRANTS the Fashion Week LLCs’ 19 Partial Motion to Dismiss. The Court further DENIES Nataliya Nova’s request for leave to 20 amend but dismisses the copyright claim without prejudice. 21 22 23 24 25 The Local Rules of Practice for the District of Nevada prohibit parties from filing supplemental evidence without leave of court granted for good cause. LR 7-2(g). Nataliya Nova requests leave to file the certificate of registration it obtained in October 2024 and incorporate the certificate into its Response. (See generally Mot. Leave, ECF No. 42). The motion is unopposed, and the Court finds good cause to grant leave because the evidence is central to the question in controversy and was acquired after Nataliya Nova filed its Response brief. 1 Page 1 of 6 Case 2:24-cv-00233-GMN-EJY 1 I. Document 69 Filed 03/05/25 Page 2 of 6 BACKGROUND The Fashion Week LLCs initiated the present action by bringing trademark 2 3 infringement and unfair competition claims against Nataliya Nova. (See generally Compl., ECF 4 No. 1). In response, Nataliya Nova answered and asserted six counterclaims against the 5 Fashion Week LLCs, including a copyright infringement claim. (Am. Ans. 18:16–19:10, ECF 6 No. 26). The Fashion Week LLCs seek to dismiss the copyright infringement claim because 7 Nataliya Nova failed to allege that it had registered the copyright. (Mot. Dismiss 8:3–5, ECF 8 No. 27). After Nataliya Nova’s Response was filed, it registered the copyright at issue and 9 filed a Motion to Supplement the Response with the copyright registration certificate. (Mot. 10 Leave, ECF No. 42). 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Dismissal is appropriate under FRCP 12(b)(6) where a pleader fails to state a claim upon 13 which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 14 555 (2007). A pleading must give fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on 15 which it rests, and although a court must take all factual allegations as true, legal conclusions 16 couched as factual allegations are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, Rule 17 12(b)(6) requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements 18 of a cause of action will not do.” Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 19 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 20 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A 21 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 22 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This 23 standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 24 25 If the court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted unless it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by Page 2 of 6 Case 2:24-cv-00233-GMN-EJY Document 69 Filed 03/05/25 Page 3 of 6 1 amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Pursuant 2 to Rule 15(a), the court should “freely” give leave to amend “when justice so requires,” and in 3 the absence of a reason such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 4 movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 5 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the 6 amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 The Fashion Week LLCs move to dismiss Nataliya Nova’s third cause of action for 9 copyright infringement because Nataliya Nova failed to allege the existence of a copyright 10 registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. (Mot. Dismiss 8:3–5). In response, Nataliya Nova 11 asserts that the Court may now recognize this claim because the Copyright Office has since 12 finalized the registration at issue. (Resp. 5:23–6:2); (Mot. Leave 3:16–18). Nataliya Nova also 13 argues that dismissing the claim at this stage of litigation will impede judicial efficiency, and it 14 asks the Court to grant it leave to amend the claim to cure the initial defect. (Resp. 6:5, 6:26– 15 27). The Court first considers whether the claim was properly pled. 16 A. 17 Motion to Dismiss Copyright Claim The Copyright Act of 1976 protects original acts of authorship and entitles a copyright 18 owner to institute a civil action for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). 19 These works are immediately protected upon their creation. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a); see Eldred v. 20 Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195 (2003). However, § 411(a) requires copyright owners to register 21 the copyright prior to pursuing an infringement claim in court. Fourth Estate Public Benefit 22 Corp. v. Wall-street.com, LLC, 586 U.S. 296, 301 (2019). This registration is a condition 23 precedent to initiating copyright infringement claims “akin to an administrative exhaustion 24 requirement.” Id. A registration “has been made” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) 25 Page 3 of 6 Case 2:24-cv-00233-GMN-EJY Document 69 Filed 03/05/25 Page 4 of 6 1 when the Copyright Office “has registered a copyright after examining a properly filed 2 application.” Id. at 302. 3 Here, Nataliya Nova asserted a copyright infringement claim but failed to allege that the 4 copyright was registered in compliance with § 411(a). Nataliya Nova filed the claim on May 6, 5 2024, but did not seek registration until June 5, 2024. (Am. Ans. 22:5); (Registration, Ex. A to 6 Mot. Leave, ECF No. 42-1). The Copyright Office registered the copyright on October 8, 7 2024. (Registration, Ex. A to Mot. Leave). Nataliya Nova therefore filed the copyright 8 infringement claim before taking any action to register the copyright. 9 Nataliya Nova argues that “upon registration of the copyright . . . a copyright owner can 10 recover for infringement that occurred both before and after registration.” (Resp. 5:23–24) 11 (quoting Fourth Estate, 586 U.S. at 299). However, Fourth Estate makes it clear that 12 registering a copyright remains a prerequisite to bringing an infringement action, even when 13 attempting to recover damages for past infringement. Fourth Estate, 586 U.S. at 308 14 (explaining that copyright owner suing for past infringement “must . . . apply for 15 registration . . . before instituting suit.” (emphasis added)). The copyright infringement claim 16 was filed before registering the copyright and is therefore DISMISSED. 17 B. Leave to File Amended Complaint 18 Nataliya Nova requests leave to amend the copyright claim because it has now received 19 the registration for the copyright. (Resp. 6:26–7:9). Under a different set of facts, some courts 20 may permit amendment to allege that the copyright was registered before the case was initiated. 21 See, e.g., Morton v. Critterden, No. 2:23-cv-00210-GMN-EJY, 2023 WL 2869910, at *3 (D. 22 Nev. Apr. 10, 2023) (citing Izmo, Inc. v. Roadster, Inc., No. 18-cv-6092-NC, 2019 WL 359228, 23 at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2019)). And courts have allowed an amendment to add newly asserted 24 copyright claims that matured after the initial complaint and were not included in the initial 25 complaint. See e.g., Lickerish Ltd. v. Maven Coal., Inc., No. CV 20-5621 FMO (Ex), 2021 WL Page 4 of 6 Case 2:24-cv-00233-GMN-EJY Document 69 Filed 03/05/25 Page 5 of 6 1 3494638 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2021); see also Philips North America LLC v. KPI 2 Healthcare, Inc., No. SACV 19-1765 JVS (JDEx), 2020 WL 3032765, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 3 2020). 4 However, courts have explained that “[a] plaintiff cannot cure its failure to meet the 5 preconditions set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) by amending its pending complaint.” UAB 6 “Planner 5D” v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-03132-WHO, 2019 WL 6219223, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 7 Nov. 21, 2019). Nataliya Nova fails to cite a case in which a court has permitted the 8 amendment of an existing claim that was brought pre-registration. And as this Court has 9 previously noted, “[a] plaintiff may not register a copyright after commencing an infringement 10 action and then file an amended complaint alleging that he or she has complied with 17 U.S.C. 11 § 411.” Morton, 2023 WL 2869910, at *3. Thus, the Court finds the Izmo court’s reasoning 12 persuasive that to permit amendment of an existing claim to remedy a party’s initial failure to 13 comply with § 411(a) “undermines the objectives animating” the statute and “render[s] much of 14 the statutory scheme superfluous.” Izmo, 2019 WL 359228, at *2 (discussing Fourth Estate, 15 586 U.S. at 308). 16 Nataliya Nova asserted a copyright infringement claim prior to securing registration of 17 the underlying copyright. (See Resp. 5:8–6:2). It may not now use amendment to “cure [its] 18 failure to comply with administrative exhaustion requirements.” Izmo, 2019 WL 2359228, at *2 19 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2019) (citing McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2002)). 20 And although Nataliya Nova argues that dismissing the copyright claim would impede judicial 21 efficiency, the Court may not grant Nataliya Nova leave to amend for the sake of convenience. 22 (See Resp. 6:5–24). In Fourth Estate, the Supreme Court concluded that “time and again, 23 Congress has maintained registration as a prerequisite to suit,” despite the possibility that it 24 may delay the vindication of rights protected under the Copyright Act. Fourth Estate, 586 U.S. 25 at 307; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Accordingly, amendment would not cure the defect in the Page 5 of 6 Case 2:24-cv-00233-GMN-EJY Document 69 Filed 03/05/25 Page 6 of 6 1 copyright claim. The Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. However, because Nataliya 2 Nova has since obtained registration of this copyright, the claim is dismissed without 3 prejudice. 2 4 IV. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Partial Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 27), is 5 6 GRANTED. The copyright claim is dismissed without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Leave, (ECF No. 42), is 7 8 CONCLUSION GRANTED. 9 DATED this _____ 5 day of March, 2025. 10 11 12 ___________________________________ Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge United States District Court 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Rule 13(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to “file a supplemental pleading asserting a counterclaim that matured or was acquired by the party after serving an earlier pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc 13(e). Because Nataliya Nova sought and obtained registration of this claim after serving the Answer, the claim is mature and can be filed in a supplemental pleading before this Court. 2 24 25 Page 6 of 6

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