Thomas v. Dzurenda et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING CASE without prejudice. Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. Signed by Chief Judge Andrew P. Gordon on 1/28/2025. (For Distribution by law library.)(Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - ASB)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 ANTHONY C. THOMAS,
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Plaintiff

Case No.: 2:24-cv-01238-APG-DJA
Dismissal Order

5 v.
6 JAMES DZURENDA, et al.,
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Defendants

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Plaintiff Anthony C. Thomas brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to

10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. ECF No.1-1. On
11 December 17, 2024, the magistrate judge ordered Thomas to update his address by January 17,
12 2025. ECF No. 4. That deadline expired without an updated address from Thomas, and his mail
13 from the court is being returned as undeliverable. See ECF No. 5.
14 I.

Discussion

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District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of

16 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case.
17 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may
18 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See
19 Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply
20 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S.
21 Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court
22 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1)
23 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its
docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of

1 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re
2 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,
3 833 F.2d at 130).
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The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the

5 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Thomas’s claims. The
6 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a
7 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading
8 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th
9 Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is
10 greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.
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The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to

12 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish
13 v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic
14 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord
15 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive
16 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives
17 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial
18 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have
19 been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before
20 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v.
21 Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed
22 without the ability for the court and the defendants to send Thomas case-related documents,
23 filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But

2

1 without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Thomas is
2 low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s
3 finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these
4 circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal.
5 II.

Conclusion

6

Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of

7 dismissal. I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on
8 Thomas’s failure to file an updated address in compliance with this court’s December 17, 2024,
9 order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No
10 other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Thomas wishes to pursue his claims, he
11 must file a complaint in a new case and provide the court with his current address.
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Dated: January 28, 2025
_________________________________
Chief United States District Judge

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