Goodin et al v. Laporte et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. IT IS ORDERED that: The 5 Report and Recommendation is VACATED. The Complaint (ECF No. 1 - 1 ) is dismissed in its entirety without leave to amend. The 1 Motion/Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is denied as moot. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Maximiliano D. Couvillier, III on 11/26/2024. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - MAM)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3

Lance Goodin and Justin Fanty,

4

Plaintiffs,

5

vs.

6

John Laporte, et al.,

2:24-cv-02156-MDC
ORDER

Defendants.

7
8

On November 26, 2024, the Court entered a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 5).

9

screening plaintiff’s complaint and denying his Motion/Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. This

10

filing was inadvertent and should have been entered as an Order and not a “Report and

11

Recommendation” because jurisdiction was designated to the undersigned Magistrate Judge per the

12

District Court’s General Order 2023-11. Therefore, the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 5) is

13

VACATED. The Court now enters the following Order.
DISCUSSION

14
15
16

I. COMPLAINT
A. Legal Standard

17

When a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, the court must screen the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

18

Section 1915(e) states that a “court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that (A) the

19

allegations of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state

20

a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

21

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii). Dismissal for failure to state a claim

22

under § 1915(e) incorporates the same standard for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

23

Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) A complaint should be

24

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) “if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

25

1

support of her claims that would entitle him to relief.” Buckley v. Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th

2

Cir. 1992).

3

“A document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, however

4

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

5

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)

6

(internal citations omitted). If the Court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be

7

given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from

8

the face of the complaint that deficiencies could not be cured through amendment.” Cato v. United

9

States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). At issue is whether plaintiff’s complaint

10

states a plausible claim for relief.

11

B. Analysis

12

Plaintiffs’ claims are for [1] perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621, [2] mail theft under 18 U.S.C. §

13

1708, and [3] defamation under 28 U.S.C. § 1401. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which

14

relief can be granted. Therefore, the Court dismisses their complaint in its entirety.

15

a. Judicial Immunity

16

Plaintiffs list a “Judge David Brown” as defendant. The eviction matter that seems to underly

17

plaintiffs’ claims was heard by Judge David Brown. See ECF No. 1-1 at 12. Plaintiffs’ claims against

18

David Brown are barred as a matter of law. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)

19

(“Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for

20

acts performed in their official capacities.”). “Judicial immunity applies ‘however erroneous the act may

21

have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” Ashelman,

22

793 F.2d at 1075 (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 106 S. Ct. 496, 500, 88 L. Ed. 2d 507

23

(1985)). “A judge loses absolute immunity only when he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdictions or

24

performs an act that is not judicial in nature.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.

25

1988) (internal citations omitted); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98

1

L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (a judicial act “does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or

2

corruption of motive”); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104–05, 55 L.Ed.2d

3

331 (1978) (“Grave procedural errors or acts in excess of judicial authority do not deprive a judge of this

4

immunity.”). This immunity extends to hearing masters. Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th

5

Cir. 1979); Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med, 363

6

F.3d 916, 923 (extending judicial immunity to "agency representatives performing functions analogous

7

to those" of "a judge"). Thus, claims against Judge David Brown are barred as a matter of law.

8

b. There Is No Private Right Of Action For Criminal Statutes

9

Title 18 of the United States Code is the federal criminal code. See 18 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.

10

(“Crimes and Criminal Procedure”). Federal criminal statutes “generally do not give rise to private

11

rights of action.” Robertson v. Catholic Cmty. Servs. of W. Wash., 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 12658, at *2

12

(9th Cir. 2023) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.

13

164, 190, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 128 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1994)). Courts are reluctant to “infer a private right of

14

action from ‘a bare criminal statute.’” Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. at 190. Courts have only

15

conferred a private right of action where “there was at least a statutory basis for inferring that a civil

16

cause of action of some sort lay in favor of someone.” Abcarian v. Levine, 972 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir.

17

2020) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 60 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1979)).

18

Neither one of plaintiff’s claims for perjury (18 U.S.C. § 1621) nor mail theft (18 U.S.C. § 1708)

19

provide for a private right of action. There is no common law, private right of action for perjury or mail

20

theft under Nevada law. See Klaneski v. Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

21

259083, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 2021) (“there is no private right of action by which a private citizen

22

could sue for damages under [NRS 199.120].”); see also NRS § 205.975 (the language of NRS §

23

205.975 does not provide for a private right of action).

24

//

25

//

1

c. 28 U.S.C. § 4101 Does Not Provide For Federal Jurisdiction In This Case

2

Plaintiffs also list a claim of “slander” under 28 U.S.C. § 4101. However, 28 U.S.C. § merely

3

defines defamation, as it relates to foreign judgments but does not create a basis for a cause of action.

4

Defamation is a state law claim. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1367 may allow for plaintiffs to bring state law

5

claims, plaintiffs cannot bring a state law defamation claim because her federal claims fail. See 28

6

U.S.C. § 1367 (“[T]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim

7

under subsection (a) if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

8

jurisdiction.”). As noted above, the only other federal claims plaintiffs allege are Title 18 claims, which

9

have no private right of action. Therefore, there is neither federal jurisdiction nor supplemental

10

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ defamation claim.

11

II. IFP APPLICATION

12

Because all of plaintiffs’ claims are barred as a matter of law, the Court denies the IFP

13

application as moot. However, denial is also appropriate because plaintiffs submitted a singular IFP

14

application. The Court reminds plaintiffs that each plaintiff seeking to proceed in forma pauperis must

15

submit an individual IFP application. Thus, denial is also appropriate on these grounds.

16

III. CONCLUSION

17

Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Two of

18

plaintiffs’ claims are Title 18 claims. Neither 18 U.S.C. § 1621 nor 18 U.S.C. § 1708 provide for a

19

private right of action. The remaining claim is a defamation claim under 28 U.S.C. § 4101 which merely

20

defines defamation as it relates to foreign judgments. Section 4101 does not by itself provide for a right

21

of action. Because plaintiffs’ other federal claims (i.e., the Title 18 claims) provide for no private right

22

of action, there is no supplemental jurisdiction for any state law defamation claims. Furthermore,

23

plaintiff names at least one defendant, “Judge David Brown” who is entitled to judicial immunity. All of

24

plaintiffs’ claims are barred as a matter of law and thus, amendment would be futile.

25

1

ACCORDINGLY,

2

IT IS ORDERED that:

3

1. The Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 5) is VACATED.

4

2. The Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is dismissed in its entirety without leave to amend.

5

3. The IFP application (ECF No. 1) is denied as moot.

6

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

7
8

DATED this 26th day of November 2024.

9

IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________
Hon. Maximiliano D. Couvillier III
United States Magistrate Judge

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

NOTICE
Pursuant to Local Rules IB 3-1 and IB 3-2, a party may object to orders and reports and
recommendations issued by the magistrate judge. Objections must be in writing and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen days. LR IB 3-1, 3-2. The Supreme Court has held that the courts of appeal
may determine that an appeal has been waived due to the failure to file objections within the specified
time. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985).
This circuit has also held that (1) failure to file objections within the specified time and (2)
failure to properly address and brief the objectionable issues waives the right to appeal the District
Court's order and/or appeal factual issues from the order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d
1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991); Britt v. Simi Valley United Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983).
Pursuant to LR IA 3-1, the plaintiff must immediately file written notification with the court of any
change of address. The notification must include proof of service upon each opposing party’s attorney,
or upon the opposing party if the party is unrepresented by counsel. Failure to comply with this rule may
result in dismissal of the action.