Reed v. AMCO Insurance Company et al

Filing 234

ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's 77 motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in-part and DENIED in-part. Defendant's fourth (4), sixth (6), and ninth (9) affirmative defenses are DISMISSED from its 21 answer to plaintiff's 18 amended complaint. Signed by Judge Larry R. Hicks on 2/21/2012. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KO)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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BRIAN REED,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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AMCO INSURANCE COMPANY,

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Defendant.

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3:09-CV-0328-LRH-RAM
ORDER

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Before the court is plaintiff Brian Reed’s (“Reed”) motion for judgment on the pleadings

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regarding defendant AMCO Insurance Company’s (“AMCO”) affirmative defenses. Doc. #77.

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AMCO filed an opposition (Doc. #85) to which Reed replied (Doc. #228).

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I.

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Facts and Procedural History
On August 15, 2008, Reed’s house was burglarized and his personal property, including a

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large number of automotive and household tools, was taken. At the time of the burglary, Reed was

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insured by defendant AMCO under a home owner’s policy which included coverage for property

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damage and loss of personal property. The day following the burglary Reed submitted a claim to

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AMCO for the loss.

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Subsequently, after more than a year of various issues between the parties, Reed filed a

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complaint against AMCO for breach of contract. Doc. #1, Exhibit A. On March 3, 2010, Reed filed

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an amended complaint alleging three causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the

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covenants of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) violation of Nevada’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.

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Doc. #18.

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In response AMCO filed an answer to the amended complaint. Doc. #21. In its answer,

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AMCO raised forty separate affirmative defenses. Id. Thereafter, Reed filed the present motion for

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judgment on the pleadings as to sixteen (16) of AMCO’s forty (40) affirmative defenses. Doc. #77.

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II.

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Legal Standard
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, “[a]fter the pleadings are

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closed - but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when there are no issues of material

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fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” General Conference Corp. of

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Seventh Day Adventists v. Seventh Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th

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Cir. 1989) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)). “The motion for a judgment on the pleadings only has

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utility when all material allegations of fact are admitted or not controverted in the pleadings and

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only questions of law remain to be decided by the district court.” 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur

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R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (3d. Ed. 2004).

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“In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, district courts must accept all material

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allegations of fact alleged in the complaint as true, and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-

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moving party.” Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361,

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1381 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Judgment on the pleadings is improper if the district court must go beyond

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the pleadings to resolve an issue. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550

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(9th Cir. 1989). Under such circumstances, summary judgment is the proper procedure. Id. A court,

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however, may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a Rule 12 motion

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into one for summary judgment. United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir.

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2008).

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III.

Discussion
Reed seeks judgment on sixteen (16) of AMCO’s affirmative defenses. Doc. #77. In

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particular, Reed seeks to dismiss AMCO’s fourth (4), sixth (6), seventh (7), ninth (9), tenth (10),

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thirteenth (13) through fifteenth (15), twentieth (20) through twenty-fourth (24), twenty-

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eighth (28), thirty-second (32), and fortieth (40) affirmative defenses. Id.

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The court notes that affirmative defenses number seven (7), ten (10), fourteen (14), twenty

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(20) through twenty-four (24), twenty-eight (28), thirty-two (32), and forty (40) have already been

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addressed in the court’s prior order granting in-part and denying in-part Reed’s motion for

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summary judgment on AMCO’s affirmative defenses (Doc. #49). See Doc. #112. Therefore, this

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order shall only consider those affirmative defenses that have yet to be addressed by the court:

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AMCO’s fourth (4), sixth (6), ninth (9), thirteenth (13), and fifteenth (15) affirmative defenses.

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A Fourth (4) Affirmative Defense - Estoppel

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In AMCO’s fourth affirmative defense, AMCO contends that Reed is estopped from

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seeking recovery because he withheld information during the insurance investigation with the

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intent that AMCO rely on those omissions to its detriment.

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The court has reviewed the documents and pleadings on file in this matter and finds that

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there are no allegations or evidence establishing any detrimental reliance by AMCO. Rather, the

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pleadings make clear that AMCO has denied Reed’s claim for coverage and has not paid him any

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money under the policy. Without detrimental reliance, there can be no claim for estoppel. See Las

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Vegas Convention & Visitors Auth. v. Miller, 191 P.3d 1138, 1157 (Nev. 2008). Therefore, the

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court shall dismiss AMCO’s fourth affirmative defense.

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B. Sixth (6) Affirmative Defense - Unclean Hands

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In AMCO’s sixth affirmative defense, AMCO contends that Reed’s claims are barred by the

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equitable doctrine of unclean hands.
The doctrine of unclean hands “bars a party from receiving equitable relief because of that
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party’s own inequitable conduct.” Las Vegas Fetish & Fantasy Halloween Ball, Inc. v. Ahern

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Rentals, Inc., 182 P.3d 764, 766 (Nev. 2008). The doctrine applies to situations in which a party’s

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conduct has been unconscientious, unjust, or in bad faith. Id.

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Here, Reed is not seeking equitable relief. Rather, all of his claims are contractual in nature

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and he seeks solely monetary damages. Therefore, the court finds that there is no basis for AMCO

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to allege the affirmative defense of unclean hands. Therefore, the court shall grant Reed’s motion

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as to this affirmative defense.

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C. Ninth (9) Affirmative Defense - Failure to Mitigate

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AMCO alleges that Reed has failed to mitigate his damages. However, the court fails to see

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how Reed could have mitigated his damages in this action, or what conduct he could have taken to

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prevent the underlying theft that would have resulted in a mitigation of his damages. Therefore, the

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court shall dismiss this affirmative defense.

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D. Thirteenth (13) Affirmative Defense - Fraud and Misrepresentation

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In AMCO’s thirteenth affirmative defense, AMCO contends that Reed engaged in fraud

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during the investigation of his insurance claim which precludes application of the insurance

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agreement.

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The court has reviewed the documents and pleadings on file in this matter and finds that

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there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether Reed’s alleged conduct in submitting false

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loss amounts precludes application of the insurance contract. Therefore, the court shall deny

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Reed’s motion as to this affirmative defense.

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E. Fifteenth (15) Affirmative Defense - Excused Performance

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AMCO’s fifteenth affirmative defense provides that Reed’s claims are barred “because

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performance under the Policy was excused or prevented by the conduct, acts, and omissions of

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other parties,” including Reed.

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The court finds that AMCO has sufficiently pled that Reed’s alleged conduct in failing to
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cooperate throughout the claims process and in failing to respond to requests for documentation

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excuses AMCO’s performance under the insurance contract. Therefore, the court shall deny Reed’s

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motion as to this affirmative defense.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

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(Doc. #77) is GRANTED in-part and DENIED in-part. Defendant’s fourth (4), sixth (6), and

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ninth (9) affirmative defenses are DISMISSED from its answer to plaintiff’s amended complaint

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(Doc. #21).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 21st day of February, 2012.

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__________________________________
LARRY R. HICKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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