United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Lakemont Homes, Inc et al

Filing 66

ORDERED that Ds' # 22 Motion for summary judgment is DENIED. FURTHER ORDERED that P's # 61 Cross-Motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Edward C. Reed, Jr on 8/30/2010. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DRM)

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Lakemont Homes, Inc et al

Doc. 66

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 8 COMMISSION, 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC"), ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) LAKEMONT HOMES INC.; LAKEMONT ) HOMES NEVADA, INC.; and DOES 1-10, ) ) Defendants ) ) ___________________________________) 3:09-CV-335-ECR-VPC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA RENO, NEVADA

Order

17 the federal agency charged with enforcing Title VII of the Civil 18 Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), brought this action on 19 behalf of Elizabeth Michelle Blackburn ("Blackburn") and other 20 similarly situated individuals. Defendants are Lakemont Homes, Inc.

21 and Lakemont Homes Nevada, Inc. (collectively "Lakemont"), builders 22 and sellers of homes in planned communities in Northern Nevada, and 23 the former employers of Blackburn and the similarly situated 24 employees. 25 Now pending are Defendants' motion for summary judgment ("MSJ")

26 (#22) on the basis of laches and Plaintiff's cross-motion for 27 summary judgment ("CMSJ") (#61) on the same. 28 and we now rule on them. The motions are ripe,

Dockets.Justia.com

1 2

II. Factual and Procedural Background Elizabeth Michelle Blackburn ("Blackburn") began working as (Blackburn

3 assistant sales agent for Defendants in November 2003. 4 Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 23 (#61).)

The similarly situated employees, Maggie

5 Link ("Link"), Kim Cox ("Cox") and Tracy Twarry ("Twarry"), began 6 working for Lakemont in March 2001, October 2001 and February 2004, 7 respectively. (Link Decl. ¶ 2, Ex 24; Cox Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 25; Twarry Blackburn and the similarly situated

8 Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 26 (#61).)

9 employees all claim that their supervisor, lead sales agent Scott 10 Hoerner, subjected them to sexual harassment over the course of 11 their employment. (Blackburn Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 23; Link Decl. ¶ 4, Ex 12 24; Cox Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 25; Twarry Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 26 (#61).) 13 Blackburn and the similarly situated employees also claim they 14 suffered such severe retaliation after complaining about the 15 harassment that they felt they had no choice but to leave their 16 employment. (Blackburn Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 23; Link Decl. ¶ 4, Ex 24;

17 Cox Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 25; Twarry Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 26 (#61).) 18 Although the similarly situated employees complained to

19 Lakemont about the harassment, only Blackburn filed a charge of 20 discrimination with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission ("NERC") and 21 the EEOC. The charge was filed on September 12, 2005. (Blackburn

22 Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 23 (#61).)

In January 2007, the NERC issued a

23 finding of probable cause of discrimination. (Blackburn Decl. ¶ 13, 24 Ex. 23 (#61).) NERC conducted an unsuccessful reconciliation (Id.) On February 21, 2007, NERC

25 meeting on January 31, 2007.

26 transferred Blackburn's case to the EEOC for further investigation. 27 (Id. ¶ 14.) 28 During the course of that investigation, the EEOC
2

1 discovered three additional claimants who were employed with 2 Blackburn and suffered the same harassment. The EEOC contacted

3 these individuals and notified them of the pending investigation. 4 (Link Decl. ¶ 13, Ex 24; Cox Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 25; Twarry Decl. ¶ 13, 5 Ex. 26 (#61).) 6 their behalf. Each of them authorized the EEOC to seek relief on (Id.) On December 10, 2008, the EEOC issued its

7 determination, in which the EEOC disclosed its findings of cause for 8 harassment and retaliation on behalf of Blackburn and the three 9 similarly situated individuals. (Determination, Ex. 8 (#61).) In

10 March 2009, the EEOC conducted another conciliation meeting, which 11 was similarly unsuccessful. 12 (Blackburn Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. 23 (#61).)

On June 26, 2009, the EEOC filed the complaint (#1) in the On October 30, 2009, before discovery had been

13 present lawsuit.

14 conducted, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (#22) on 15 the issue of laches. On December 7, 2009, we issued an Order (#32)

16 giving Plaintiff until twenty days after discovery closed to respond 17 to Defendants' motion for summary judgment (#22). On August 9,

18 2010, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants' motion and cross19 motion for summary judgment on the issue of laches (#61). On August

20 19, 2010, Defendants replied (#63) to Plaintiff's opposition (#61). 21 On August 23, 2010, Defendants filed an opposition (#64) to 22 Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. 23 Plaintiff replied (#65). 24 25 26 II. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment allows courts to avoid unnecessary trials N.W. Motorcycle Ass'n v. On August 30, 2010,

27 where no material factual dispute exists. 28
3

1 U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994).

The court

2 must view the evidence and the inferences arising therefrom in the 3 light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 4 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996), and should award summary judgment 5 where no genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute and the 6 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. 7 CIV. P. 56(c). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where

8 there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable 9 jury to find for the nonmoving party. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). Where

10 reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, 11 however, summary judgment should not be granted. Warren v. City of

12 Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 13 1261 (1996). 14 The moving party bears the burden of informing the court of the

15 basis for its motion, together with evidence demonstrating the 16 absence of any genuine issue of material fact. 17 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Celotex Corp. v.

Once the moving party has met

18 its burden, the party opposing the motion may not rest upon mere 19 allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific 20 facts showing that there exists a genuine issue for trial. 21 v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Anderson

Although the

22 parties may submit evidence in an inadmissible form - namely, 23 depositions, admissions, interrogatory answers, and affidavits 24 only evidence which might be admissible at trial may be considered 25 by a trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. FED.

26 R. CIV. P. 56(c); Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 27 1181 (9th Cir. 1988). 28
4

1

In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, a court must

2 take three necessary steps: (1) it must determine whether a fact is 3 material; (2) it must determine whether there exists a genuine issue 4 for the trier of fact, as determined by the documents submitted to 5 the court; and (3) it must consider that evidence in light of the 6 appropriate standard of proof. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Summary

7 judgment is not proper if material factual issues exist for trial. 8 B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 9 1999). "As to materiality, only disputes over facts that might

10 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly 11 preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

12 Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts should not be 13 considered. Id. Where there is a complete failure of proof on an

14 essential element of the nonmoving party's case, all other facts 15 become immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 16 matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Summary judgment is not a

17 disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather an integral part of the 18 federal rules as a whole. 19 20 21 III. Discussion Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment Plaintiff Id.

22 in their favor on the affirmative defense of laches.

23 contends that, as a matter of law, Defendants are not entitled to 24 the affirmative defense of laches. 25 The EEOC is not required to conclude its conciliation efforts

26 and bring an enforcement suit within any maximum period of time. 27 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 360 (1977). 28
5

1 Nevertheless, laches may constitute a defense to a Title VII action 2 when a party's "unexcused or unreasonable delay has prejudiced his 3 adversary." Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658, 667 The

4 (9th Cir. 1980)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 defense of laches requires proof of "(1) lack of diligence by the

6 party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the 7 party asserting the defense." 8 9 Id. at 666.

A. Unexcused or Unreasonable Delay As an initial matter, we note that the parties disagree about

10 what time frame is relevant to assessing Defendants' asserted 11 defense of laches. In particular, Defendants take issue with the

12 EEOC's characterization of the applicable time frame as the period 13 between the date Blackburn filed a charge of discrimination with the 14 EEOC and the date the EEOC filed the present lawsuit: "What is 15 somewhat misleading in Plaintiff's citations and discussion of 16 `delay' is that Plaintiff is unilaterally deciding that the 17 applicable time frame herein is the time between `Ms. Blackburn's 18 filing of her charge of discrimination and the EEOC's filing of this 19 suit . . . ." (D.s' Reply at 11 (#63)(quoting P.'s Opp. and Although Defendants do not explicitly

20 Counter-Mot. at 14-15 (#61)).

21 propose, or provide authority in support of, an alternative time22 frame, Defendants suggest that the time frame we should consider is 23 between the discriminatory acts at issue and the present lawsuit: 24 "[I]t is clear that many of the alleged acts date back to 2001 . . . 25 ." 26 (D.s Reply at 11 (#63).) Plaintiff has the better side of this dispute. The delay at

27 issue in a Title VII laches inquiry is the time between an employee 28
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1 filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the filing of a 2 lawsuit. See E.E.O.C. v. Alioto Fish Co., Ltd., 623 F.2d 86, 88 In this case, Blackburn filed her charge of

3 (9th Cir. 1980).

4 discrimination with the NERC and the EEOC on September 12, 2005.1 5 (Charge of Discrimination, Mallik Dec., Ex. 7 (#61).) 6 (#1) in the present lawsuit was filed on June 26, 2009. The complaint Thus, three

7 years and nine months have elapsed between the time Blackburn filed 8 her charge of discrimination and the EEOC filed this lawsuit. 9 Plaintiff contends not only that Defendants have failed to

10 establish that the delay in this case was unreasonable but that 11 summary judgment in its favor on the issue is appropriate. 12 Defendants submit that "there is no magic formula for determining 13 unreasonable delay, but clearly, delays in excess of four years (as 14 in the instant case) must be subject to the utmost scrutiny." 15 at 5 (#22).) (MSJ

First, we note that Defendants' assertion that the As

16 delay in this case is "in excess of four years" is incorrect.

17 discussed above, less than four years transpired between the charge 18 of discrimination and the filing of this lawsuit. Regardless, we

19 have not discovered, nor have Defendants provided, authority holding 20 that a delay of four years, let alone less than four years, is 21 unreasonable as a matter of law or gives rise to an inference of 22 lack of diligence. 23 24 25 26 27 28 As noted above, Blackburn is the only employee who filed a charge of discrimination. The similarly situated employees, on whose behalf the EEOC also brings suit, were discovered during the investigation of Blackburn's case. See Bean v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1979)("In a Title VII representative suit, unnamed class members need not individually bring a charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite to joining the litigation.").
7
1

Indeed, Defendants primarily rely on Alioto in

1 support of their position that the delay at issue in this case is 2 unreasonable. The delay at issue in Alioto, however, was 62 months,

3 id. at 88, more than a year longer than the delay in this case. 4 The lapse in time at issue in this case is, standing alone, Defendants

5 insufficient to support a finding of lack of diligence.

6 present no additional evidence suggesting lack of diligence on the 7 part of the EEOC. See Bratton, 649 F.2d at 666. We therefore

8 conclude that summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of 9 unreasonable delay, and hence on Defendants' asserted defense of 10 laches, is appropriate. 11 12 B. Prejudice We additionally note that even if the delay at issue in this

13 case were unreasonable or unexcused, there is no evidence in the 14 record indicating that Defendants suffered any prejudice from 15 Plaintiff's alleged delay. 16 In an EEOC enforcement action, the absence of inflexible time

17 limitations does not generally "subject [defendants] to the surprise 18 and prejudice that can result from the prosecution of stale claims." 19 Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 372. Indeed, "unlike the

20 litigant in a private action . . . the Title VII defendant is 21 alerted to the possibility of an enforcement suit within 10 days 22 after a charge has been filed. This prompt notice serves, as

23 Congress intended, to give him an opportunity to gather and preserve 24 evidence in anticipation of a court action." 25 Id.

Defendants contend that "the unavailability of witnesses, the

26 fading of memories, the relocation of documents and personnel, the 27 death of the alleged harasser and the very fact of the passage of 28
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1 time, require this Court to apply the laches criteria of Alioto and 2 enter judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims." 3 at 13 (#63).) (D.s' Reply

In support of this contention, Defendants refer In each excerpt the

4 generally to several deposition excerpts.2

5 deposed party indicates that he or she cannot remember some piece of 6 information. Defendants do not provide, however, any argument or

7 evidence elucidating in what respects the forgotten information 8 referred to in the deposition is necessary or important to their 9 defense. Moreover, Defendants provide no evidentiary support for

10 their other assertions that documents and personnel have been 11 relocated. Perhaps more importantly, there is no evidence in the

12 record indicating that Defendants made any effort to "gather and 13 preserve evidence in anticipation of court action," despite being 14 aware of the EEOC's investigation since September 2005. 15 Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 372. Occidental

We therefore conclude that, even if

16 Defendants were to establish an unreasonable delay, they have failed 17 to show they suffered any cognizable prejudice from that delay. 18 19 20 IV. Sanctions Defendants assert that Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary

21 judgment is "outside the ambit of what this court has allowed." 22 (D.s' Opp. at 2 (#64).) Defendants request we not consider the (Id. at

23 motion and award them five thousand dollars in sanctions. 24 3.) 25 26 27 28

First, we note that the deadline for dispositive motions has

With one exception, Defendants do not cite to any particular part of the attached deposition excerpts, violating thereby Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1).
9

2

1 not expired. 2 4 (#39).) 3 was timely.

(Amended Joint Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order at

Therefore, Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment Moreover, Defendants request for sanctions does not

4 comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ("Rule 11"). 5 Defendants have not brought a separate motion for sanctions. FED. R. 6 CIV. P. 11(C)(2). In addition, there is no indication that

7 Defendants have complied with the safe harbor provisions of Rule 11. 8 Id. 9 10 11 V. Conclusion The lapse in time at issue in this case is, standing alone, Defendants' request for sanctions will therefore be denied.

12 insufficient to support a finding of lack of diligence, and 13 Defendants present no additional evidence suggesting lack of 14 diligence on the part of the EEOC. Therefore, we conclude that as a

15 matter of law the delay at issue in this case is neither 16 unreasonable nor unexcused. Moreover, even if the delay were

17 unreasonable or unexcused, Defendants suffered no prejudice as a 18 result of Plaintiff's alleged delay. Therefore, we conclude that

19 summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of laches is 20 appropriate. 21 22 23 24 IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion for

25 summary judgment (#22) is DENIED. 26 27 28
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1

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's cross-motion for

2 partial summary judgment (#61) is GRANTED. 3 4 DATED: August 30, 2010. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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____________________________ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE