Mach 4 Construction, LLC v. Operating Engineers Local #3

Filing 127

ORDER denying 117 Motion for Attorney Fees; denying as moot 124 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge Larry R. Hicks on 09/18/2013. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KR)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 8 *** 9 MACH 4 CONSTRUCTION, LLC., 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL NO. 3, 13 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 3:09-CV-00565-LRH-RAM 14 15 Before the court is plaintiff Mach 4 Construction, LLC’s (“Mach 4”) Motion for Attorney’s 16 Fees (#1171). Defendant Operating Engineers Local No. 3 (“Local 3”) has responded (#122), and 17 Mach 4 has replied (#123). Local 3 has moved to strike Mach 4’s reply or, alternatively, for leave 18 to file a surreply (#124). 19 I. Facts and Procedural History 20 In May 2007, Mach 4, a construction industry employer, and Local 3, a union, signed a 21 collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Under this agreement, Mach 4 was obligated to make 22 fringe benefit contributions to various employee benefit plans organized under Section 3 of the 23 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(3), (37). 24 /// 25 26 1 Refers to the court’s docket entry number. 1 In September 2009, Mach 4 brought four claims for relief against Local 3, each of which 2 was based on Mach 4’s argument that it had effectively terminated its contractual relationship with 3 the union. (Complaint #1.) Local 3 brought two counterclaims (a breach of contract claim and a 4 declaratory judgment claim) based on the premise that Mach 4 had failed to effectively terminate 5 this relationship. (Amended Answer #16.) 6 The court granted summary judgment to Local 3 with respect to Mach 4’s claims, and the 7 parties proceeded to a bench trial on Local 3’s counterclaims. In granting summary judgment to 8 Local 3, the court found that the CBA was “clear and unambiguous with respect to Mach 4’s 9 termination rights and obligations” and that “Mach 4 failed to effectively terminate its contractual 10 relationships with [Local 3].” (Order #33, pp. 6-8.) 11 At trial, Local 3 introduced—for the first time—evidence that threw significant doubt on 12 the court’s earlier interpretation of the termination provisions. In particular, this evidence supported 13 Mach 4’s claim that it had effectively terminated the agreements with Local 3 in June 2008. In light 14 of this evidence, the court reversed its previous ruling that the agreements were “clear and 15 unambiguous with respect to Mach 4’s termination rights and obligations.” (Trial Transcript 16 (“Tr.”), pp. 763-64.) In its verdict, the court ruled against Local 3, finding (largely on the basis of 17 this new evidence) that Mach 4 had effectively terminated its CBA on June 30, 2008. 18 19 20 Mach 4 now moves for attorney’s fees. II. Legal Standard Unless specific authority provides otherwise, the prevailing party in a lawsuit may not 21 ordinarily collect attorney’s fees. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers v. W. Indus. Maint., 22 Inc., 707 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1983). However, such a fee award may be appropriate “when the 23 losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id. (citation 24 and quotation marks omitted). 25 26 “The bad faith requirement sets a high threshold.” Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 1997). “Mere recklessness” does not alone constitute bad faith; rather, 2 1 an award of attorney's fees is justified when reckless conduct is “combined with an additional 2 factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose.” Rodriguez v. United States, 542 3 F.3d 704, 709 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 4 III. 5 Discussion Mach 4 moves for attorney’s fees under the “bad faith” exception to the normal rule, 6 arguing that Local 3 acted in bad faith (1) when it failed to produce the new evidence prior to trial 7 and (2) when Local 3’s agents testified inconsistently. The court finds that an award of attorney’s 8 fees is not appropriate. 9 First, during the trial, the court found that Local 3’s new evidence should have been 10 produced during discovery. The court reversed its summary judgment ruling and reinstated Mach 11 4’s estoppel defense in part as a sanction for Local 3’s failure. (Tr. at pp. 763-64.) However, Mach 12 4 was unable to identify a request for production pursuant to which Local 3’s failure to disclose 13 merited sanctions. Nor has Mach 4 countered Local 3’s explanation that the new evidence fell 14 outside of its disclosure obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a). And Local 3 has 15 explained that it only became aware of the new evidence on the eve of trail. To its credit, Local 3 16 introduced the highly prejudicial evidence itself. While Local 3’s failure to produce this evidence 17 may have been negligent or even reckless, the court is satisfied that this failure was not coupled 18 with an improper purpose. Therefore, fee-shifting on this basis in inappropriate. 19 Second, Mach 4 argues that Local 3’s agents perpetrated a fraud on the court by offering 20 inconsistent testimony. Yet a fraud upon the court involves a “scheme” to “undermine the judicial 21 process,” and Mach 4 has failed to show anything behind Local 3’s agents’ inconsistencies apart 22 from bad memories and confusion. Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th 23 Cir. 1995). The court weighed these agents’ credibility and found it wanting; further adverse 24 consequences flowing from their inconsistencies are not warranted. 25 /// 26 /// 3 1 2 3 IV. Conclusion IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mach 4’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (#117) is DENIED. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Local 3’s Motion to Strike (#124) is DENIED as moot. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 DATED this 18th of September, 2013. 7 8 __________________________________ LARRY R. HICKS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 4

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