Brophy et al v. Day & Zimmerman Hawthorne Corporation

Filing 58

ORDER. IT IS ORDERED that DZHC's 50 motion to sever and for separate trials is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge Robert C. Jones on 3/14/2012. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KO)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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SHANNON BROPHY, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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DAY & ZIMMERMANN HAWTHORNE
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CORPORATION, et al.,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

3:10-cv-35-RCJ-WGC
ORDER

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This case involves claims of employment discrimination based on race and gender,

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pregnancy discrimination, and retaliation. Before this Court is the defendants’ motion to sever

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or, in the alternative, for separate trials (#50). For the following reasons, the Court denies the

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motion to sever and for separate trials.
BACKGROUND

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Plaintiffs Shannon Brophy, Khrstina Armstead, and Michael Lightfoot worked as

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firefighters for Defendant Day & Zimmermann Hawthorne Corporation and/or Defendant SOC

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Nevada Limited Liability Corporation1 (collectively “DZHC”). (Am. Compl. (#21) at 1-2).

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Brophy and Armstead are Caucasian women, and Lightfoot is a Caucasian man. Armstead

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has bi-racial children. Plaintiffs claim that they were subjected to a pervasively race- and

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gender-based hostile work environment while employed by DZHC, in violation of Title VII of

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Defendant SOC Nevada Limited Liability Corporation is the successor in interest of

Defendant Day & Zimmerman Hawthorne Corporation and was a joint or co-employer of the
Plaintiffs. (Am. Compl. (#21) at 2).

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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Id. at 2). Plaintiffs brought this complaint on

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January 19, 2010, alleging: (1) gender discrimination, (2) racial discrimination, (3) pregnancy

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discrimination, (4) retaliation, and (5) negligent supervision and training. (Compl. (#1); Am.

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Compl. (#21)).

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DZHC later filed motions for summary judgment. (Mot. for Summ. J. (##26, 27, 28)).

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The Court granted summary judgment as to Lightfoot in its entirety and consequently he is no

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longer a party to this action. (Order (#47) at 21). With regard to Brophy and Armstead, the

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Court granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part. (Id.). Brophy was left with a

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claim for gender-based hostile work environment and a claim for pregnancy discrimination.

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(Id.). Armstead was left with a claim for race-based hostile work environment, a claim for

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pregnancy discrimination, and a claim for retaliation. (Id.).

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On August 1, 2011, DZHC filed a motion to sever the claims of Brophy and Armstead,

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or in the alternative, for an order for separate trials of the two remaining Plaintiffs. (Mot. to

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Sever (#50) at 1). DZHC argues that because Brophy is pursuing a gender-based work

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environment discrimination claim while Armstead is pursuing a race-based work environment

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discrimination claim, there is a high risk that the jury may use evidence of one form of

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discrimination as evidence of the other, unduly prejudicing DZHC. (Id. at 7). Additionally,

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DZHC contends that the pregnancy discrimination and the hostile work environment claims

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involve different facts, arose at different times, and involve different witnesses, and therefore

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severance is warranted. (Id. at 6).
LEGAL STANDARD

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The district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to sever claims through Rule

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21 or grant separate trials under Rule 42(b).2 See Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d

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The difference between severance under Rule 21 and separation under Rule 42(b)

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is that severance results in separate and independent actions with separate final judgments,

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whereas separation does not. See 4 JAMES W M . MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §

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21.06[1] (3d ed. 2011).
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1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting the court has broad discretion to bifurcate a trial under Rule

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42(b)); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1297 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533

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U.S. 950 (stating the court has broad discretion to order a severance). Rule 21 states a court

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may “sever any claim against a party.” FED R. CIV. P. 21. Rule 42(b) authorizes the court to

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order the separate trial of any claim when separation is in the interests of judicial economy,

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will further the parties’ convenience, or will prevent undue prejudice. FED R. CIV. P. 42(b).

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Ordering separate trials is also appropriate when it simplifies the issues for the jury and avoids

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the danger of unnecessary jury confusion. Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir.

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1982). The party seeking separate trials bears the burden of proving that separation of the

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claims is necessary. See Roger-Vasselin v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 2006 WL 1506926, at *1 (N.D.

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Cal. 2006).

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DISCUSSION

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The Court finds there is no reason to sever Plaintiffs’ claims. The Ninth Circuit has

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noted that to join two claims in one action, “plaintiffs must meet two specific requirements: (1)

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the right to relief asserted by each plaintiff must arise out of or relate to the same transaction

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or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) a question of law or fact

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common to all parties must arise in the action.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th

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Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs have here satisfied both of these requirements.

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First, the claims all arise out of the same series of transactions or occurrences. Both

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Title VII claims arise from Plaintiffs’ employment with DZHC at the same time and at the same

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location. It was the same individuals who engaged in the alleged unlawful conduct under both

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claims. Both women were dealing with the same complaint process and the same chain of

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command in reporting the discrimination. Both women also have claims of pregnancy

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discrimination. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ right to relief arises out of the same series of

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transactions or occurrences and the first requirement is satisfied.

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Second, there are questions of law or fact that are common to all parties in this action.

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Both Plaintiffs must establish the same prima facie case for their Title VII claims. Both

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Plaintiffs also have pregnancy discrimination claims arising from their employment at the same
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location at the same time and involving the same individuals. Both Plaintiffs dealt with the

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same complaint procedure in reporting their claims to human resources. Finally, DZHC’s

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defenses that it has an effective anti-discrimination policy and took prompt remedial measures

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applies to the claims of both Plaintiffs. The second requirement is thus satisfied and these

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claims are properly joined in this matter. The Court accordingly denies DZHC’s motion to

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sever.

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The Court further denies DZHC’s motion for separate trials. Separate trials would not

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be in the interest of judicial economy as both claims will involve the same witnesses and

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parties and involve similar issues, such as the complaint process, remedial measures taken

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by DZHC, and DZHC’s anti-discrimination policies. The risk of undue prejudice to DZHC is

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also slight as the jury will be instructed that evidence of one type of discrimination may not be

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used as evidence of another type of discrimination. Furthermore, DZHC does not argue that

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the pregnancy discrimination claims should be tried separately from the race and gender

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claims, and if the jury can distinguish pregnancy discrimination from other forms of

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discrimination, they can certainly distinguish race from gender discrimination. Because the

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types of discrimination alleged in this matter are distinct from one another, it is unlikely that

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DZHC will be unduly prejudiced by holding the trials together or that the jury will confuse the

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issues.
CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that DZHC’s motion to sever and for
separate trials (#50) is denied.

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DATED: This 14th day of of February, 2012.
DATED: This _____ day March, 2012.

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_________________________________
United States District Judge

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