Panzarella Consulting, LLC v. SINGLE TOUCH INTERACTIVE, INC. et al

Filing 25

ORDER - ORDERED that the # 20 Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED in part. Attorney's fees are awarded against Attorney Gezelin, but not against Plaintiff, in the amount of $7027.50. Signed by Judge Robert C. Jones on 4/25/2011. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DRM)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 8 PANZARELLA CONSULTING, LLC, 9 Plaintiff, 10 vs. 11 SINGLE TOUCH INTERACTIVE, INC. et al., 12 Defendants. 13 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 3:10-cv-00424-RCJ-RAM ORDER 14 This case arises out of a corporation’s alleged issuance of additional stock without 15 maintaining Plaintiff’s proportionate ownership in the corporation. The Court has dismissed the 16 case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because all parties are citizens of California. Pending 17 before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 20). For the reasons given 18 herein, the Court grants the motion in part. 19 I. 20 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 12, 2010, Plaintiff Panzarella Consulting, LLC sued Defendants Single Touch 21 Interactive, Inc. and Anthony G. Macaluso in this Court on four causes of action: (1) Breach of 22 Contract; (2) Quantum Meruit; (3) Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty; and (4) Constructive 23 Trust. Three days later, Defendants’ Attorney Scott Russo sent Plaintiff’s Attorney John Gezelin 24 an email asking him to “[p]lease dismiss the lawsuit” because “there is no diversity 25 jurisdiction . . . .” (See Russo Email, July 15, 2010, ECF No. 20-1, at 6). Attorney Russo wrote 1 that if the lawsuit were not dismissed by the following day, he would file a motion to dismiss on 2 July 19th and seek costs. (See id.). Attorney Gezelin responded on July 19th, refusing to dismiss 3 the case. (See Gezelin Email, July 19, 2010, ECF No. 20-1, at 8). Attorney Gezelin wrote to 4 Attorney Russo again on July 23rd offering to stay the federal action, refrain from serving 5 Defendants with the Complaint for thirty days, and to participate in mediation in the meantime. 6 (See Gezelin Email, July 23, 2010, ECF No. 20-1, at 10). Attorney Russo responded by noting 7 that the existence of the lawsuit was causing damage to his clients and that he would be forced to 8 file the motion to dismiss if Plaintiff did not dismiss voluntarily. (See Russo Email, July 23, 9 2010, ECF No. 20-1, at 10). He also noted that Plaintiff would lose nothing by dismissal at that 10 stage but the filing fee. (See id.). Attorney Gezelin responded, writing “I see no reason to 11 dismiss the action.” (See Gezelin Email, July 23, 2010, ECF No. 20-1, at 12). Two weeks later, 12 Attorney Russo again wrote Attorney Gezelin and demanded that he dismiss the “frivolous” 13 action, threatening a sanctions motion if the case were not dismissed that day. (See Russo Email, 14 Aug. 6, 2010, ECF No. 20-1, at 14). He explained that the very existence of the lawsuit was 15 causing harm to his client’s shareholders. (See id.). He also explained why there was no 16 diversity in the case: “Because Panzarella Consulting, LLC and Single Touch Interactive are 17 citizens of California because of their principal offices, and because Anthony Macaluso lives in 18 California, there is no diversity.” (See id.). Attorney Russo wrote to Attorney Gezelin again two 19 days later (on a Sunday) to ask if he intended to dismiss the case. (See Russo Email, Aug. 8, 20 2010, ECF No. 20-1, at 17). He wrote yet again the following day, noting that his client’s 21 quarterly report was to be filed that Friday and that the existence of the “frivolous” lawsuit on 22 the report would harm the shareholders. (See Russo Email, Aug. 9, 2010, ECF No. 20-1, at 21). 23 He added, “Not dismissing the lawsuit will not lead to the hoped for extortion settlement.” (See 24 id.). 25 Plaintiff did not dismiss. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter Page 2 of 6 1 jurisdiction on August 9, 2010. At oral argument, Attorney Gezelin immediately conceded a 2 lack of jurisdiction after having finally “review[ed] the controlling authority.” (See Mot. Hr’g 3 10:29 a.m., Dec. 16, 2010). But by this time, Defendants had incurred the relevant legal bills. 4 The Court granted the motion to dismis, noting that Macaluso was a citizen of California, 5 Panzarella Consulting was a citizen of both California and Nevada, and Plaintiff was a citizen of 6 California. Defendants have moved for $19,486.75 in attorney’s fees against Plaintiff and 7 Attorney Gezelin for legal services in connection with the action. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 9 A federal court has the inherent power to sanction counsel via the assessment of 10 attorney’s fees. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 11 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978)). “[A] court may assess attorney’s fees when a party has ‘acted in 12 bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’” Id. at 45–46 (quoting Alyeska 13 Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975)) (internal quotation marks 14 omitted). 15 16 In this regard, the bad-faith exception resembles the third prong of Rule 11’s certification requirement, which mandates that a signer of a paper filed with the court warrant that the paper “is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” 17 Id. at 46 n.10 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)). “[S]anctions are available if the court 18 specifically finds bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith. Sanctions are available for a 19 variety of types of willful actions, including recklessness when combined with an additional 20 factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose.” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 21 994 (9th Cir. 2001). Sanctions are appropriate under a court’s inherent authority where a 22 plaintiff files a federal lawsuit in the face of a plain lack of jurisdiction. See Deigert v. Baker, 23 2010 WL 3860639 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding bad faith based on misrepresentations to the 24 court regarding the plaintiff’s residence); S. Shore Ranches, LLC v. Lakelands Co., LLC, 2010 25 WL 289291 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (finding bad faith based on filing a suit despite an obvious Page 3 of 6 1 lack of diversity), vacated based on new evidence by S. Shore Ranches, LLC v. Lakelands Co., 2 LLC, 2010 WL 2546112 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2010); Erum v. County of Kauai, 2008 WL 2598138 3 (D. Haw. June 30, 2008) (finding bad faith based on attempts to manufacture federal question 4 jurisdiction with frivolous federal claims). 5 III. 6 ANALYSIS The Court will grant the motion in part. A minimally competent attorney should know 7 the basic law of diversity jurisdiction before filing a case in federal court. It is virtually 8 inconceivable that Attorney Gezelin did not realize there was no subject matter jurisdiction over 9 this case in federal court. And if he honestly did not realize it, he should have examined the 10 authorities when opposing counsel specifically pointed out the lack of jurisdiction and the 11 reasons therefor. Attorney Gezelin either failed to check the easily accessible and clear authority 12 on the point until immediately before the hearing—which was approximately six months after he 13 filed the lawsuit—or he purposely and improperly pressed the suit in a court that he knew lacked 14 jurisdiction. Attorney Gezelin argues that sanctions under the Court’s inherent powers are not 15 appropriate for mere misapprehensions of law. But the Court finds that Attorney Gezelin did not 16 merely misapprehend the law. No minimally competent attorney could possibly have failed to 17 realize there was no diversity jurisdiction in this case even from the beginning, much less after 18 the facts and law were repeatedly pointed out to him by opposing counsel. That he simply made 19 a legal error is not a credible response. Attorney Gezelin never in any of his email responses to 20 Attorney Russo attempted any sort of legal or factual argument in support of jurisdiction, but 21 simply issued bald refusals to dismiss the suit. This makes it clear that the purpose of the suit 22 was to “extort” a settlement, as Attorney Russo put it. Attorney Gezelin has abused the legal 23 process with this suit and wasted not only Attorney Russo’s and Defendants’ time and resources, 24 but also the Court’s. 25 Defendants provide itemized invoices of legal services. (See Invoices, ECF No. 20-1, at Page 4 of 6 1 26). Some of the services listed relate to the motion to dismiss or procedural requirements born 2 purely of the improper federal filing, but some of the services relate only to the substance of the 3 Complaint. Attorney Gezelin’s improper actions in this case relate to the fact that he improperly 4 filed the case in federal court. The Court has made no ruling on the merits of the Complaint 5 itself. Unless and until a state court dismisses on the merits and finds the case frivolous in that 6 regard, the Court cannot say that the efforts undertaken by Attorney Russo with respect to the 7 merits of the case should be compensated based on the frivolity of the claims. If a state court 8 permits the case to proceed on the merits, or at least finds that the case is not frivolous in that 9 regard, then the efforts Attorney Russo expended relating to the merits of the case, even while 10 11 the case was improperly pending in federal court, will not have been unnecessary or wasted. The Court will grant fees in the amount of $7027.50 against Attorney Gezelin, but not 12 against Plaintiff. This is the amount in services rendered that relate purely to the improper 13 federal filing, and at a reasonable rate as determined by the Court. The remainder of legal 14 services provided concern the merits of the case and may be useful in state court litigation. 15 Plaintiff itself will not be sanctioned, because although a layperson can be expected not to pursue 16 suits that are obviously frivolous or improper even to a layperson, a layperson cannot be 17 expected to understand the law of federal diversity jurisdiction. Presumably, Plaintiff would 18 have been satisfied having its case filed in state court. The federal filing was almost certainly a 19 tactical decision by Attorney Gezelin. At the hearing on the present motion, Attorney Gezelin 20 argued that he had agreed to dismiss the case before the hearing on the motion to dismiss. But 21 by that time Defendants had already incurred the relevant attorney’s fees due to the improper 22 filing and were bound by the Court to attend the hearing on their motion, and opposing counsel 23 had long since pointed out the impropriety of the lawsuit to Attorney Gezelin. 24 25 Based on the evidence adduced, the Court finds that Defendants incurred the following attorney’s fees related to issues born of the improper federal filing: Page 5 of 6 1 2 3 4 8.75 hours by Attorney SR in July 2010 at $325/hr 11.50 hours by Attorney SR in August 2010 at $325/hr 3.75 hours by Attorney SR in September 2010 at $325/hr 2.80 hours by Attorney DGD in November 2010 at $375/hr 8.00 hours by Attorney SR in December 2010 at $325/hr 0.50 hours by Attorney SR in January 2011 at $325/hr 8.50 hours by Paralegal JAY in January 2011 at $150/hr 5 The Court therefore uses these hours for the lodestar calculation. Because the lack of diversity 6 was so clear and the issue so simple, however, the Court will only apply $175 per hour for 7 attorney labor and $100 per hour for paralegal labor, bringing the subtotals to $6177.50 for 8 attorney labor and $850 for paralegal labor. 9 10 CONCLUSION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 20) is GRANTED in 11 part. Attorney’s fees are awarded against Attorney Gezelin, but not against Plaintiff, in the 12 amount of $7027.50. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 25th day of April, 2011. 15 16 _____________________________________ ROBERT C. JONES United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Page 6 of 6

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