Wyman et al v. First Magnus Financial Corporation et al

Filing 71

ORDERED Ps' ## 9 , 34 Motions to Remand are DENIED. FURTHER ORD Ds' ## 5 , 28 Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. The complaint # 1 -1 is DISMISSED with prejudice. FURTHER ORD Ps' # 24 Motion to Strike is DENIED. FURTHER ORD Ps' # 25 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. FURTHER ORD THAT D Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac's # 62 Motion for Hearing is DENIED as moot. Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Edward C. Reed, Jr on 7/17/2012. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DRM)

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7 MARK TM VIS WYMAN, KRYSTA MICHELLE )

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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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FIRST MAGNUS FINANCIAL

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1 C P R TI N; G A MO TG E, ZL
1 OR O A O M C R AG
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DEUTSCHE BANM TRUST COMPANY
AMERICAS; RESI
OENTIAL FUNDING
COMPANY, LLC; EXECUTIVE TRUSTEE .
SERVICES, LLC;
FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC; CEREBRUS
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT; LSI TITLE CO.,
INC.; DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY a/k/a
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDV

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Defendants.
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3:12-cv-0O007=ECR-WGC
order

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This case aris
es out of a quiet title .
action alleging that
20 Defendants wrongfully foreclosed on Plaintiffs' home.
21

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1. Fact
ual and Procedural Backcro
und
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On or about September 6, 2006, Plaintiffs executed a Deed of

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24 Trust with regard to the real property located at 196 Taylor Creek

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25 Road , Gardnervi le , NV 89406 to secure a loan in the amount of
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1 $1, 000,000.00.
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(
Deed of Trust) (
. #30-1).) The Deed of Trust was

2 recorded on September ll, 2006 as document #0684234, and names
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3 Defendant First Magnus Financial Corporation as the lender, Western
4 Title Company Inc . as the trustee, and Mortgage Electronic

5 Règistration Systems, Inc. I'
'MERS' as the beneficiary and nominee
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6 of the lender. (
14.) The Deed of Trust allows the lender to
7 appoint a substitute trustee and provides that uxsas holds only

. 8 legal title to the

interests granted by Borrower in this Security

9 lnstrument,' but has the right to foreclose and sell the property as
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1 a nominee of the lender.
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(
Id.)

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On June 1l, 2011, MERS substituted Defendant Executive Trustee

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1 Servi
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ces, LLC C% ' as the trus
ETS')
tee under the Deed of Trus
t,
1 memorialized by a Substitution of Trustee recorded on June 16, 2011
3

1 as docu
4
ment #765318. (
Substitution of Trus
tee (
#30-3). Also on
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15 June 16r 2011, Defendant ETS recorded a Notice of B geac ; auu sayauyt
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sic) of Real Property Under Deed of
17 Trust as document #765319.
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(
Notice of Default (
#30-4).)

l Defendants Deutsche, ETS, GMAC, and RFC and Defendant
requested that the Court take judicial notiee of relevant FNMA have
publicly

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20 recorded documents, cop ies of which are filed in support of their

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respective Motions to Dismiss ( 5, 28). This Court takes judicial
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tic of thes public records. See Disabled Riahts Action Comm. v.
e
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a c s v n s, n 7judicial 6
2 L sVthe E e t maycw 3 . F 3 8 1notiee l (t C records) (o d n
2 that e a court I take 5 . d 6 ,8 6n.of 9 h i 2 0 of l i g
the r. 0 4 h state

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2 Evid. 201). I
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m/ortantly, '
Ua) court may . . . consi
der certain
materials - documents attached to the complaint, documents
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4 ncorporated by ref
erence in the complaint, or matters of judici
al

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25 summary judgment.' United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 9O8 (
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agencies and other undisputed matters of public record under Fed . R .

notice - without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for

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Ci 2 03 Th Co r t r o e c ns d rs t e j di a y n ti e J
r. 0 ). e u t he ef r o i e h u ci ll o c y

26 documents without converting the Motions to Dismiss ( 5, 28) to
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motions for summary judgment.

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On February 15, 2011, MERS executed an Assignment of Deed of

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2 Trust, assigning the beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust and
3 the underlying note to Defendant Deutsche Bank Trust Company

4 Americas (
nDeutsche').
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(
Assignment of Deed of Trust (
#30-5).) The

5 Assignment was recorded on February l9, 2011 as document #778756 .
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D
efendant E
TS, as trustee under the D
eed of Trust, recorded a
8s
econd Noti of Breach and D
ce
efaul and of Election to Ca
t
use'
sell
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9 (
sic) of Real Pro/erty Under Deed of Trust as document #779886 on

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1 March 14, 2011.
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On or about August 3, 2011, the State of Nevada Foreclosure

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(
Second Notice of Default (#30-8).)

1 Mediation Program issued a Certificate , recorded on November 7, 2011
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1 as docu
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ment #792196, noti Ehat Plaintiffs failed to attend and/or
ng
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1 produce the necessary for at the Foreclosure Mediation Conference
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ms
1 and authoriz
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ing the beneficiary to proceed with the f
orecl
osure

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Certificate (
#30-9).
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On November l6, 2011, Def
endant kTS recorde a Notice of
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1 Trustee' Sale, setting the sale date for December 21, 2011.
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1 (
9 Notice of Sale (
#30-10).)
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Plaintiffs subsequently filed a quiet title complaint (
#1-1) in

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he nth District court of the S
tate of Ne
vada in and for the
2 county of D
2
ouglas (
the ustate courtz) on Dece
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mber 19, 2011.

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23 Defendants Residential Funding Company C'
RFC'), ETS,'GMAC Mortgage,
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24 LLC (N
'GMAC')f and Deutsche removed the action to this Court on
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25 January 5, 2012, invoking the Court's federal question jurisdiction.
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26 (
Pet. Removal (
#1).)

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2 filed a Motion to Dismiss (
#5). On January 26, 2012 Defendant LSI
3 Title Cow Inc. C'
LSI') and Defendant Fannie Mae/preddie Mac
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4 (A
%FNMA') joined ( l3, l6) the motion. Plaintiffs reéponded (#10)
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5 on January 24, 2012, and the moving Defendants replied (
#19) on

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6 February 1, 2012 .

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9 RFC, ETS, GMAC and Deutsche responded (
#23) on February 8, 2012 .

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Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike (
#24) Defendant LST'S

11 joinder (
#13) to the Motion to Dismiss (
#5) on February 8, 2012.
1 Defendant LSI responded (
2
#26) on February 9, 2012.
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On February 8, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary

1 Judqment (
4
#25). Defendant FNMA responded (
#31) on Februarv 27,

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On January 24, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand (
#9).

8 Defendant FNMA responded (
422) on February 7, 2012, and Defendahts

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On January 12, 2012 , Defendants RFC, ETS, GMAC, and Deutsche

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1 2012. Additionally, on March 1, 2012, Defendants RFC, ETS, GMAC,
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1 and Deutsche filed their Response (
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#39), which was joined by
1 Defendants Cerebrus Capital Management (
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ncerebrus') LSI, and FNMA
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1 ( 40, 41. 42). Plaintiffs filed their Reply (
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#44) on March 7,
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p
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On February 17, 2012, Defendant FNMA filed a Motion to Dismiss

21 (
#28). Plaintiffs responded (
#33) on February 29, 2012. Defendant
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2 Ce e u j n d ( 3) F MA' Mo o t D mis ( 8) on Ma c 7,
2 r br s oi e #4 N S ti n o is s #2
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23 2012 .

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24 Hearing (
#62) regarding its Motion to Dismiss (
#28) on May 30, 2012.

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FNMA replied (
#45) on March 9, 2012. FNMA filed a Motion for

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On February 29, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike (
#34)
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2 which the Court construes as an additional motion to remand .

3 Defendant FNMA responded. (
#47) on March 13, 2012.

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On April 30, 2012, we found that federal question jurisdiction

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5 does not exist and ordered (#56) Defendants to submit evidence of

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6 the citizenship of the parties in order to determine whether the

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7 Court may e
xercise di
versi juris
ty
dicti over the matter.
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II. Plaintiffs/ Motions to Rem and (## 9 . 34)

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Legal Standard

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Under the federal removal statute, 28 U . C . 5 1441 (
S.
a),

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any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original

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jurisdiction, may be removed by thç defendant or the

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the dis
tric and division e
t
mbracing the place where such

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defendants, to the district court of the Dnited States for
action is pending .

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A district court has original jurisdiction over civil actions where
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the suit is between eitizens of different states and the amount in

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1 controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $75,000.00.
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1 28 U. C. 5 1332 (
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.S.
a). If a defendant has improperly removed a case

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over which the federal court lacks diversity jurisdiction, the
federal court shall remand the case to state court .

1447(
c). However, the district court should deny a motion to remand

to state court if the case was properly removed to federal court.
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C

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S. Cal. Admin . Corr . v . Manestic Housw

743 F.2d 1341,

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1343 (
9th Cir. 1984). The removing party bears the burden of

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establishing federal jurisdiction. Calif. ex re1 Loekver v. Dvneav,

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1 strictly construed, and any doubts as to the right of removal must

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2 be r o v d i f v r o r ma d ng t s a co r D h m v.
es l e n a o f e n i o t te u t. ur a
3 Lockheed Martin Coro w

445 F. 1247, 1252 (
3d
9th Cir. 2006).

4 B. Diseussion
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The Court finds on the basis of the pleaded facts in the
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6 P t t n f R mo al ( a d th a i o al s b t d e d c o
e i io or e v #1) n e dd ti n u mi te vi en e f
7 citiz
enshi tha the parties are co ' etely di
p
t
mpl
verse because none of

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8 the Defe
ndants are ci ens of the s
tiz
tate of.Nevada. Fur
thermore,
9 Plaintiffs do not contend that any Defendant is a citizen of Nevada

1 or that the parties are not otherwise completely di
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However,

Plaintiffs dispute in their Motion for Summary

1 J d m n (2 ) t a t e a o n i c n r v r y e c e s $ 5 0 0 a
2 u ge t #5 it h m ut n ot oe s xed 7 ,0 s
13 required by 28 U . . . 5 1332 . Where a defendant removes a state
S.C

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1 action on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the defendant must
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1 éither: ( demonstrate that it is facially evident from the
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1 plaintiff's complaint téat the plaintiff seeks in excess of $75,000,
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1 or ( prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in
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2)

18 controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold; Valdez v. Allstate
1 Ins. Col, 372 F.3d 1115 (
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9th Cir . 2004). In this case, it is clear

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2 from the fac of the co
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mplaint and the judicially noticed docu
ments

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21 that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. While Plaintiffs do

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22 not seek damagesr they do seek a declaration that the promissory

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23 note is fully discharged and that the Deed of Trust is nuîl and

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2 void. (
4
compl. at 2o (
#1-z). The Deed of Trust (
)
#30-1), whi is
ch
2 also attached to Plaintiffs' complaint (see compl. Ex A), secures a
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26 loan in the amount of $1,000,000. Thus, not only it is nfacially

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1 evident' from the complaint that this requirement is met, but the
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2 Deed of Trust establishes that the amount in controversy exceeds

3$ 50 0b ap eo drn e o t ee ie c
7 ,0 y rpn ea c f h v dn e.
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Plaintiffs' remaining objections to the Court's exercise of

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ederal Rules of Evidence and local rules governi appearances
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7 before this Cour
t. Plaintiffs' Motions to Remand ( 9, 34) must
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ore be denied.

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zzz . oerenaants ' Motzons . ozs

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Legal standard

Courts engage in a two-step analysis in ruling on a motion to

1 d mi s.As r t v. T b l S. C 19 7 (00 ; Be l At C r.
3 is s
hc of
c al, 29
t. 3 2 9) l l. or
1 v. Twombl , 550 U.S. 544 (
4
2007). First, courts accept only non-

1 conclusory allegations as true. Iabal, l29 S. Ct . at 1919.
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1 by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.' Id. (
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1 550 U S. at 555). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 udemands more
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1 than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.;
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20 Id . Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 udoes not unlock the doors of

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21 discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusion s.'
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23 of the plaintiff . See Mohamed v . Jeoresen Datarlan . Inc ., 579 F.3d
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9th Cir. 2009).
25

A fter accepting as true all non-conclusory allegations and

2 drawing al1 reasonable inferences i f
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1 Court must then determ ine whether the complaint ustates a plausible

2 claim for relief.' Tobalé 129 S. Ct . at 1949 (
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citing Twomblv, 550

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4 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

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5 inference that the defendant is liable fob the m isconduct alleged .'
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6I.a 14 (iigTobv 50US arequirementspasblt .
d t nis ctakin to a Aprobability 5) h,' but i asks
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8.for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
9 unlawfully.' Td. A complaint that npleads facts that are '
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1 consistent with' a defendant's liability.- 'stops short of the line
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quoting Twomblv, 550 U . at 557).
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1 B. Disc
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ussion

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Plaintiffs' complaint seeks to quiet title in Plaintiffs'

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1 party who claims an adverse interest in the subject property. NEv.
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1 Rs szsm s 4o.olo. 'zn a quiet title action, the burden of proof
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t e a n f o o e o tl n i e f.' e a t
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1 . Ouiet Title

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20 v Preferred Ecuities Corp., 918 P.2d 314, 318 (
Nev. 1996)
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citations omitted). When an adverse claim exists, the party

22 seeking to have another party's right to property extinguished must
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citing Biasa v. Leavitt, 692 P. 1301, 1304 (
2d
Nev. 1985)).
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26 that he has paid any debt owed on the property. Scarberrv v . Fid.

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l Mortc . of N . ., No . 2 ;
Y
12-cv-00l28-KJD-CWH , 2012 WL 2522812, at *5

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2 ( Nev. June 29, 2012) (
D.
citing Fercuson v. Avelo Mortc., LLC, No.
3 8223447, 2011 WL 2139143, at *2 (
Ca1.
App.2d June 1, 2011))7 see also

4 Go
mez v. Countrv
wide Bank, FSB, No. 2:
09-cv-01489
-RCJ-LR 2009 WL
L,
5 3617650, at *6 ( Nev. Oct. 26, 2009) (
D.
holding that a plaintiff may

6 not quiet title in hi elf where he does not 'allege that he is not
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n
ault).
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Plaintiffs have not alleged t
hat t
hey have paid the de owed
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9 on the property. The claim must therefore be dismissed. See Rivera

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1 v. Recontrust Co.. N . ., No . 2:l1-CV-0l695-KJD-PAL, 2012 WL 2190710,
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1 at *4 ( Nev . June 14, 2012) (
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D.
uplaintiff claims an adverse interest

1 in the Propert but has not alleged an absence of default, and has
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how that she has satisfied a11 encumbrances against the
1 Property . . . . According ï ,
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the clai for quiet title fails.'
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1 Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs have defaulted on the
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1 loan. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' quiet title #ction must be
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17 dismissed. See Ande/son v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 2:10-

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. PALI, 2010 WL 4386958, at *5 ( Nev.q
18 CV-1443 JCM (
D.
oct. 29, 2010)

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plaintiff's claim must be dismissed because plaintiff has not done

20 equity; it is undisputed that plaintiff defaulted on his loan.
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21 Accordingly, the f
quiet title) action is dismissed .'). Furthermore,
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22.the Court dismisses the aetion with prejudice as leave to amend
23 pursuant to Pederal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 ( would prove
a)

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2. Wronaful F
orecl
osure

2

Although the complaint (
#1-1) does not make it explicit,

3 Plaintiffs' all
egati may be construed to asse a cause of ac
ons
rt
tion
4 for wrongful foreêlosure under Nevada law. Specifically, it appears

5 that Plgintiffs claim that Defendants do not have authority to

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6 f e os b a e t s c i z ti of t e no e a d t e D e of
or cl e ec us he e ur ti a on
h t n h ed
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7 Trust have discharged Plaintiffs' obligations and because Defendants

8 a e n t t e h l er i d e c ur e of t e n t
r o h od s n u o s
h o e. ( e C m % 11
S e o pl.
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9 (
#1-1).) Plaintiffs further claim that .
Defendants do not have

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1 authoritv to foreclose where the note is usplit' from .
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the Deed of
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(
Id.)

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Finally, Plaintiffs claim that there is no evidence

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1 of transfer of ownership from the original lender to the party now
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(
Id. % 24.)

The Nevada Supreme Court has yet to address the split note

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1 is ue. S e Le v v.N l D au t S r ci c Co ow 2 P. d 1 75
5 s
e va
at' ef l e vi n r
55 3 2
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1 (
6 Nev. 2011) (nsince the documents . . . did not establish transfer
1 of either the mortgage or the note, we express no opinion on the
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1 issue addressed in the Restatement (
8
Third) of Property Mortgages

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1 section 5.4 concerning the effect on the mortgage of the note having
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20 been transferred or the reverse.. ). However, courts in this

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21 District and others have repeatedly rejected the theory advanced by

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23 trust and renders either a nullity or otherwise discharges a
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2 grantee;s obligations. See, e. , Park v. Gree
4
a.
er
npoint Mortc.
25 Fundinc, Incw No. 3:11-cv-00039-ECR-RAM, 2011 WL 5248171, at *4 (
D.

26 Nev. Nov. 1, 2011) (
rejecting Plaintiff's nsplitting the note

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1 theory'); Mandervslle v . Litton Loan servicinc , so . 2 :zo-cv-oz696,
D
-As plaintiff is
2 2olz wL 2149105, at .2 ( . xev. May 3l, 2o1z) (

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3 basing her quiet title claim on the '
split the note' theory, which

4 has been rejected by many courts with regards to nonjudicial
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5 foreclosures such as this, it cannot survive./); Birkland v . Silver
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6 State Fin . Servs ., Inc w No . 2 J10-cv-0 ooas, 2azo wL 3419372, at *2
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7 ( Nev. Aug. 25, 2010) (
D.
holding that the plaintiff is nincorrect'
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8 in nclaiming that the securitization - or placement of her note/loan
9 on the secondary market - makes it impossible to identify which
'
10 parties have purchased an interest in the note , and that the deed of

11 trust ' split from the note and is unenforceable .''). See also
is
'
I
I

1

i

1 Horvath v . Bank of N . ., N.
2
Y
A., 641 F.3d 617, 624 (
4th Cir. 2011)
1 (
3 nlf . . . the transfer of a note splits it from the deed of trust,
'

1 . . . there would be little reas for notes to exist in the fikst
4
on
15 place . One of the defining features of notes is their

1 transferability, . . . but on f
6
plaintilfl's view, transferring a
.
17 note would strip it from the security that gives it value and render

;

1 the note largely worthless. This cannot be - and is ndt - the
8
i

1 1aw.'); Commonwea1th Pror. Advocates v. Mortc. Elec. Recistration
9
'

i

20 Svs., Incw No. 2:
11-CV-214 TS, 2011 WL 1897826, at *2 ( Uta May
D.
h

!

21 18, 2011) C'(
A)s any assignment of the note necessarily carries with
.
22 it the deed of trust securing the property, the Court has found that
.
.

23 such a '
splât-note' scenario is untenable.'). The Court will
/

24 therefore again reject the theory that the securitization of a note
'

25 somehow voids Plaintiffs' obligations.
I

I

26
27

28

'

k

1
1

.

j

i

'
,

.

'

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.

.

1

1

Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot establish a cause of action for

2 wrongful foreclosure where they have defaulted on the loan:
I

3
4

I

the time the power of sale was exercixed or the
foreclosure occurred, no breach of condition or failure of

5

I

E
A)n action for the tort of wrongful foreclosure will lie .
(
only) if the trustor or mortgagor can establish that at

performance existed on the mortgagor's or trustor's part

which woul have authoriz the f
d
ed
orecl
osure or exercis of
e

6
the power of sale.
' 7 Collins v. Union Fed. Sav . & Loan Ass'n, 662 P.2d 610, 623 (Nev.
'

8 1983). Therefore, N tlhe material issue of fact in a wrongful
'l
'
9 foreclosure claim is whether the trustor was in default when the

'
10 power of sale was exercised.' Id .

I

Here , Plaintiffs' claim fails

'

1 because they cannot allege that ther were not in default on t
1
e
heir
I

1 l a o lgt o sw e fr co uep oe dn sw r ii itd n r
2 o n b ia in hn oe l sr ' ce i g e e n tae , o
r
I

1 that they made any attempt to cure the default.
3

I

1
4

1 procedurally proper non-judicial foreclosure x accord with Nev.
5
in

1 'Re Stat. 5 10t.
6 v
.
080. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs cannot
.

1 esta
7
blis a claim for wrongful foreclos
h
ure. Moreover, because the
j

18 Court finds that leave tq amend would prove futile, the claim will

1 be dis
9
miss wi pr
ed th ejudi
ce.
I

20
21

I

22

'

Finally, the judicially noticed documents evidence a

Tv .

#a4)
Plaintiffs . Motïon to Strike (

Plaintiffs ' Motion to Strike and Objection to Joinder to Motion
'

23 to Dismiss (
#24) is a largely incoherent dissertation on ncanons of

.

2 Ecclesti
4
astical E
sic) Law k
nown collecti
vely as Canonu De Lex
m
25 Ecclesium .' (
' Mot. Strike at l (
#24).) In the second half of the
26 fortv-baae motion, Plaintiffs have copied excerpts of the local
' . '
'' '
'
'
.

27

'

'

I
28

1
2

l

.
j

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J rules governing practice before this Court, the Federal Rules of

I
2 Evidence governinq hëarsay , and Federal Rule of Civil Proeedure 19
'
'

'

I

3 governing required joinder of parties. The motion also contains the

1

4 same argument, addressed above, that the Court lacks subject matter

1

5 jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have therefore provided no basis to strike

'
!

#13) to Deutsche, ETS, GMAC, and RFC'S
6 Defendant LST 's Jo inder (
.

7 Motion to Dismiss (
#5). Moreover, given that Plaintiffs'

8 substantive clai in their complaint (
ms
#1-1) have no meri s
t, triking
I

9 LSI' Joinder (
s
#13) would have little practical effect on this case.

I

1 Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion . Strike (
0
to
#24) will be denied.
,
'
11

1
2
I

1
3
1
4

I

V . Plaintiffs' Motion for Summarv Judcment (
#25)

. Snmmary Judgment Standard
Summarv iudament allows courts to avoid unnecessarv trials
' '
' '
' '
' ' '
'
'
'
'
'
'

.

1 where no material factual dispute .exists. NW . Motorcvcle A ss'n v .
5

1 U. D ' of A ricw 1 F. 1468, 1471 ( Cir. 1994). The court
6 S. e t
8 3d
9th
i

'
-

I

'

1 must view the evidenee and the inferences arising therefrom in the
7
'

'

1 light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Bacdadi v . Hazar, 84
8
I

.

1 F. d 1194, 1197 ( Cir. 1996), and s
9 3
9th
hould awar s
d ummary j ment
udg
I

20 where no genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute and the

'

21 movinc oartv is entitled to tudcment as a matter of law . FED. R.

I

' '
' '

.
'
1

'
.
'

'
'

.

2 cl P. 56(
2 v.
c). Judgment as a matter of 1aw is a opriate where
ppr
!

. 2 tee i n lg ly sfi in e ie ta yb ssf r ara o al
3 h r s o ea l u fce t v dn ir a i o e snb e

24 jury to find for the nonmoving party. PED. R. CI P. 50(
'
V.
a). Where

25 reasonable m inds could differ on the material facts at issue r

.
!

;
.

26 however, summary judgment should not be granted. Warren v. Citv of

!

27

1
1

28

1
3

1

.
.
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j

j
'

'

i

j

j

j

'

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*

,

1 Carlsbad, 58 F. 439, 441 (
3d
9th .
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U .
S.
2 1171 (
1996).

l

3

'

'

The moving party bears the burden of inform ing the court of the

4 basis for its motion, together with evidence dem onstrating the

.

I

5 absence of any genuine iss of material fact. Celotex Corr. v.
ue
I

.
6 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met'

7 its burden, the party opposing the motion may not rest upon mere

'
8 allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific
i

9f
acts

I
I

,

1 v. Libertv Lobbv, Inc., 477 U. 242, 248 (
0
S.
1986). Although the
11

i

'
showing that there exists a genuine issue for trial . Anderson
'

p

arties may submit evidence in an inadm issible form--namely,

1 depositions, admissions, interrogatory answersr and affidavits--only
2

1 evidence which might be admissible at trial may be çohsidered by a
3
1 trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. PED. R. Cl
4
v.
1 P. 56(
5
c); Bevene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Incw 854 F.
2d 1179, 1181
!

1 (
6 9th Cir. 1988).
'

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1
7

In deciding whether to grant summary juùgment, a court must

I

1 take three necessary steps: ( it must determine whether a fact is
8
1)
i

'

1 material; ( it must determine whether there exists a genuine issue
9
2)

I
I

20 for the trier of fact, as determined by the documents submitted to

21 the court; and ( it must c
3)
onsi
der that evi
dence in light of the

I
.

I

!
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22 appropriate standard of proof. Anderson , 477 U .S . at 248 . Summary

2 j ment is not proper if material factual issues exis f trial.
3 udg
t or
'

l

24 B. v. Plumas Unkfied Sch. Distw 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (
c.
9th Cir.

I

25 1999). As to materiality, only disputes over facts that might

I

26 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

.
'

-

27
28

'

.
1
4
.

;

1

i

!

I

1 p:eclude the entry of summary judgment. Disputes over irrelevant or
2 unnecessary facts should not be considered .

Id . Where there is a

3 complete failure of proof on an essential element of the nonmoving

4p ry scs a1o h rfc sb cm im t ra ,ad t em v n
at ' ae, 1 te a t e oe m a ei l n h o ig

.

i

5 party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.
S.

!

6 at 323. Summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut,
7 but rather an integral part of the federal rules as a whole. Id.

8 B. Discussion
'
'

9

.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (
#25) argues that

1 Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of laW because
0
:

11 Defendants have not presented evidence of an injury in fact to

i

1 establish Constitutional standing, Defendants have not presented
2
13 evideneç to establish a genuine issue of material fact, and

'

1 Defendants lack Constitutional standing.
4'

1 12 (
5
#25).) The Motion ( ' also contains arguments that the Court
#25)

'
.

i
I

(
Mot. Summ . J. at 2-5, lO-

1 lacks subject matter jurisdiction, which the Court addresses above.
6
.

1
7

.

.

Plaintiffs' argument that Defenda
nts have not and cannot

!

1 establish standing is misapplied. The authorities on standing, as
8

I

.
1 cited by Plaintiffs, make clear that is it a plaintiff ,s yurden to
9

i

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20 establish the three elements of standing because uthey are not mere
'
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21 pleading requirem ents but rather an indispensable part of the
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22 plaintiff's case .' Lun
'
'an v . Defenders of W ildlife, 504 U .S . 555,

23 56l (1992).

The cases cited by Plaintiff establish that A rticle III

I

24 standing requires that ( 'the olaintiff must have suffered an
l) '

!

25 'injury in fact'' that ( is ufairly traceable to the challenged
'
2)
26 aetion of the defendant,' and ( that plaintiff's injury .
'
3)
will be

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.

28

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1
5

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2

j
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1 . dr s e sy a , vo a e de s o
. es e
re
a r bz c ss nz, z a s o c ( s a o
d. t 6 -s z c t tz ns
I

I

.

-

1
.

l

i

.

4 completely unavailing .

5

.

Moreover, because Plaintiffs ' claims fail as a matter of law
'

6 and must be dismissed , '
Plaintiffs cannot establish that they are
'

7 entitled to summary judgment, nor have thev produced any evidence
8 establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material factr as is

9 their burden. Celotex, 477 U. at 323. Accordi y, Plaintiffsy
'
S.
ngl .
1 Motion for Summary Judgment (
0
#25) must be denied.
11
12

V I . Conclusion

1
3

The court mav Droperly exercise jurisdiction because the
' ' '.
'' '

1 parties are completely di
4
verse and the a
mount i controversy exceeds
n
1 $75,000. The judicially noticed documents establish that Defendants
5
1 have properly initiated a non-judicial foreclosure in compliance
6
17 with Nev . Rev. Stat . 5 107.080 after Plalntiffs defaulted on their

1 mortgage loan . Plaintiffs, quiet title action therefore fails as a
8
1 matter of law and must be dismissed with prejudice, and Plaintiffs
9

2 are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
0

21
i

22

i

2 Remand ( 9, 34) are DENI
3
##
ED.

IT IS , THEREFORE , HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motions to

24

.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (
##

l

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3 Defendants cannot s
how that they iave suffered an i
njury in fact is

1
I

.

2 omitted) (
emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiffs' argument that

.

2 5, 2 a e G H E T c m ai ( 1 1) i DI MI S D wi h
5
8) r RA Y D. he o pl nt # - s S S E t
'

26 orehudice .
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27

28

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6

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (
#24)

'

2 is DE ED.
NI
3

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

4 Judgment (
#25) is DENIED .

!

5

IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac's

I

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i
1

6 Motion for Hearing ( 2) is DENIED as moot .
#6

7

'

8

Tke clerk shall enter judgment accordinqly.
.

9
10

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11

'

1 o Eo: J y (7
2 AT
ul e

,

20 2.
1

1
3

.

'

1
4

)
M-

.

.J .

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15

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28

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