Gadsden et al v. Carpenter et al

Filing 143

ORDER denying ECF No. 137 Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Miranda M. Du on 05/10/2017. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KW)

1
2
3
4
5
6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

8

***

9 CHIOKE GADSDEN and NATHAN
Case No. 3:12-cv-00098-MMD-VPC
PETERSON,
10
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
11
v.
12 TARA CARPENTER, et al.,
13

Defendants.

14
15

I.

SUMMARY

16

The Court previously denied Defendants’ motion for leave to file a renewed motion

17

for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (“First Motion”). (ECF No. 131.)

18

Defendants have moved for reconsideration (“Motion”). (ECF No. 137.) Plaintiffs

19

responded (ECF No. 140) and Defendants replied (ECF No. 142). For the reasons

20

discussed below, Defendants’ Motion is denied.

21

II.

DISCUSSION

22

A.

Reconsideration

23

A motion for reconsideration must set forth the following: (1) some valid reason

24

why the court should revisit its prior order; and (2) facts or law of a “strongly convincing

25

nature” in support of reversing the prior decision. Frasure v. United States, 256 F. Supp.

26

2d 1180, 1183 (D. Nev. 2003). Reconsideration is appropriate if this Court “(1) is

27

presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision

28

was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist.

1

No. 1J v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). “A motion for reconsideration

2

is not an avenue to re-litigate the same issues and arguments upon which the court

3

already has ruled.” Brown v. Kinross Gold, U.S.A., 378 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1288 (D. Nev.

4

2005). A motion for reconsideration is thus properly denied when the movant fails to

5

establish any reason justifying relief. See Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th

6

Cir. 1985) (holding that a district court properly denied a motion for reconsideration in

7

which the plaintiff presented no arguments that were not already raised in his original

8

motion). Moreover, a district court may decline to consider claims and issues that were

9

not raised until a motion for reconsideration. Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 889 (9th

10

Cir. 1992). It is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to consider new arguments in a

11

reconsideration motion even though “dire consequences” might result. Schanen v. United

12

States Dept. of Justice, 762 F.2d 805, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1985).

13

Defendants argue that the Court committed clear error in denying them leave to

14

file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (“Renewed Motion”)

15

and that the Court’s decision has effectively denied them the opportunity to seek qualified

16

immunity and is therefore manifestly unjust. As support, Defendants recycle some of the

17

same arguments raised in their First Motion.

18

Defendants contend the Court erred in applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)’s “good

19

cause” standard to deny their Renewed Motion because deadlines in the Scheduling

20

Order were stale and did not apply after remand.1 However, Defendants cite to no

21

authority to support their contention. It is obvious that a reversal and remand following an

22

appeal does not automatically restart deadlines in a case. Rather, the case would resume

23

at the point where an appeal was taken, and deadlines in the scheduling order would still

24

control unless the remand order provided otherwise.

25

///

26
27
28

their First Motion, Defendants argue that their request is not subject to the “good
cause” standard because the Court permitted Plaintiffs to conduct discovery on remand
and did not set a deadline for dispositive motions or for when Defendants had to seek
leave to file a dispositive motion. (ECF No. 111.)
1In

2

1

Here, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and directed that

2

Plaintiffs be allowed to pursue discovery (ECF No. 89 at 4), which resulted in this Court

3

setting the discovery deadline for October 28, 2016.2 Thus, discovery was re-opened

4

pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, but the other deadlines in the Scheduling Order

5

remained unchanged. In fact, but for the Ninth Circuit’s direction to allow Plaintiffs to

6

obtain discovery, this case would have proceeded directly to trial following remand.

7

Defendants argue that even if the “good cause” standard applies, they have

8

demonstrated good cause to support their First Motion for several reasons. Defendants

9

contend that, because the Court did not set a deadline for dispositive motions or for when

10

to seek leave to file such motion, they filed their First Motion the same day they filed their

11

motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity in a similar case, Debarr v. Clark,

12

Case No. 3:12-cv-00039-LRH-WGC. However, the Court fails to understand how

13

Defendants’ self-selected deadline of filing their First Motion by the dispositive motion

14

deadline set in Debarr demonstrates good cause. This case and Debarr are dissimilar in

15

procedural posture; the filing of the dispositive motion in Debarr complied with the

16

dispositive motion deadline set in that case. In contrast, at the July 19, 2016, status

17

conference in this case, the Court denied Defendants’ initial request to file a renewed

18

motion and set the trial for January 23, 2017. (ECF No. 100.) Yet, Defendants waited until

19

December 12, 2016, approximately six weeks before the start of trial, to file their First

20

Motion. (ECF No. 111.) Such delay alone demonstrates a lack of diligence and a

21

disregard of the trial setting.

22

In denying the First Motion, the Court found that “the fact that discovery was

23

allowed on remand is irrelevant to the deadline for filing dispositive motions because

24

Defendants are not contending that discovery clarified the issues to be raised in the

25

Renewed Motion or that they could not have filed such a motion without completion of

26
27
28

2The

parties apparently agreed to leave open one deposition and allowed Plaintiffs’
counsel until the end of November to decide whether to reopen that deposition. (ECF No.
127-2; ECF No. 140 at 5.)
3

1

additional discovery.” (ECF No. 131 at 2.) Defendants now assert that the Renewed

2

Motion referenced “the information gleaned during the second round of discovery.” (ECF

3

No. 137 at 8.) However, in the First Motion, Defendants did not argue that the Renewed

4

Motion is based even in part on the additional discovery. Therefore, the Court need not

5

consider this new contention. See Hopkins v, 958 F.2d at 889. Even setting aside the

6

timing, the argument lacks support in the record. Defendants assert that the decision not

7

to seek summary judgment on qualified immunity within the deadline in the Scheduling

8

Order was “tactical.” (ECF No. 137 at 12-13.) As Plaintiffs correctly pointed out,

9

Defendants’ counsel informed the Court that they anticipated filing their Renewed Motion

10

at the July 19, 2016, status conference before any additional discovery had been

11

conducted. (ECF No. 140 at 5.)

12

Defendants’ argument that the denial of the First Motion was manifestly unjust

13

because they were denied the well-established right to pursue qualified immunity ignores

14

the procedural history of this case. Defendants chose as a matter of strategy not to pursue

15

qualified immunity when they filed their first motion for summary judgment. Under

16

Defendants’ view of justice, they should be able to pursue piecemeal summary judgment

17

motions regardless of the deadlines established in the Scheduling Order. For example, if

18

summary judgment on the merits had been denied, Defendants should then be permitted

19

to file a renewed motion seeking summary judgment on qualified immunity after the

20

dispositive motions deadline. Permitting Defendants to file a Renewed Motion at this

21

stage, particularly in the context of a bench trial, would only result in further delays in the

22

final resolution of this case and needlessly consume judicial resources.3 Moreover,

23

///

24
25
26
27
28

contend that if this case is tried the expenses “associated with this
case will be exponentially increased.” (ECF No. 137 at 9.) For instance, Defendants offer
the associated costs of travel required to bring counsel and some parties who are from
out of town to Reno. (Id.) Defendants suggest that the Renewed Motion may be briefed
and decided before the August trial date and would therefore avoid a potentially costly
trial. (Id.10.) The Court acknowledges and appreciates the expenses involved in travel
and in any trial, but Defendants fail to appreciate the Court’s case load and the hundreds
of motions currently pending and filed before Defendants’ Motion.
3Defendants

4

1

Defendants will have the opportunity to seek judgment as a matter of law at the close of

2

the evidence phase of the bench trial.

3

Finally, as the Court explained in exercising its discretion to deny Defendants’ First

4

Motion, the Court did peruse the Renewed Motion and while it will not address

5

Defendants’ arguments on the merits, the Renewed Motion “appears to present these

6

facts as undisputed and then presents the issue of qualified immunity based upon these

7

purported undisputed facts.”4 (ECF No. 131 at 3-4.) In light of this observation,

8

entertaining the Renewed Motion would only result in further unnecessary delays and

9

consume judicial resources.

10

B.

Certification

11

A district court may certify any interlocutory order for appeal to the circuit court if

12

the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for

13

difference of opinion and where immediate appeal of the order may materially advance

14

the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section 1292(b) should be

15

used only in exceptional situations where an interlocutory appeal avoids protracted and

16

expensive litigation. In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.1981).

17

Defendants have failed to show that the Court’s exercise of discretion to deny Defendants’

18

successive dispositive motions after expiration of the dispositive motions deadline

19

implicates a controlling question of law to which there is substantial ground for difference

20

of opinion. The Court thus denies Defendants’ certification request.

21

///

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

assert that the Renewed Motion “argued that based on the
information gleaned during the second round of discovery, Plaintiffs ‘failed to provide any
evidence that [they] or the other inmates were retaliated against due to their religious
beliefs or that the actions undertaken by Defendants had anything to do with preventing
them from exercising their religion.’” (ECF No. 137 at 7-8.) However, in reversing the grant
of summary judgment on the merits, the Ninth Circuit found that, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether they were retaliated against for exercising their First
Amendment rights after they properly utilized AR 740 to express legitimate concerns.
(ECF No. 89 at 2-3.) Defendants’ insistence on there being a lack of evidence ignores the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling.
4Defendants

5

1

III.

CONCLUSION

2

The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several

3

cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and

4

determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the

5

Motion.

6
7
8

It is therefore ordered that Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 137)
is denied.
DATED THIS 10th day of May 2017.

9
10
11
MIRANDA M. DU
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6