Fernandez v. Centric et al

Filing 304

ORDERED that Fernandez's # 211 Objection is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part. Signed by Judge Larry R. Hicks on 6/4/2014. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DRM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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*****

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KEVIN FERNANDEZ,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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DR. CENTRIC, et al.,

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Defendants.

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) 3:12-cv-00401-LRH-WGC
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) ORDER
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Before the Court is Plaintiff Kevin Fernandez’s (“Fernandez”) Objection to the

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Magistrate Judge’s Order (Doc. #200/2011) pursuant to Local Rule IB 3-1. Doc. #211. A

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magistrate judge’s orders operate as final determinations of pretrial matters under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Rule IB 1-3. Accordingly, a district judge may reconsider a magistrate

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judge’s order only if it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 72(a); LR IB 3-1(a).

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First, Fernandez objects to the Magistrate Judge’s characterization of his filings in this

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action as an unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of the proceedings, and requests that the

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Court modify the Order to omit the characterization. See Doc. #211, pp. 2-4. Contrary to

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Fernandez’s assertion, the Magistrate Judge did not find Fernandez’s filings to be unreasonable

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or vexatious. Rather, the Magistrate Judge merely cautioned Fernandez that, pursuant to 28

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U.S.C. § 1927, sanctions are available against a party “who multiplies the proceedings in any

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case unreasonably and vexatiously.” See Doc. #200, p. 5. The Magistrate Judge further advised

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Refers to the Court’s docket entry number.

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Fernandez that his filings are adversely impacting the Court’s ability to effectively manage the

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case and warned that the Court is not unwilling to impose any and all sanctions available under

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the aforementioned statute or any other rule. See id. at 1, 5. The Court finds that the Magistrate

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Judge’s averments in this regard were not contrary to law or clearly erroneous. Moreover, the

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Court reiterates the Magistrate Judge’s advisements.

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Second, Fernandez objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Order to stay various types of

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motions, arguing that magistrate judges are without authority to issue stays. See Doc. #211, p. 4.

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In this regard, Fernandez misunderstands the Magistrate Judge’s authority. Magistrate judges are

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only without authority to stay an action. See Reynaga v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414, 416-17 (9th

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Cir. 1992) (magistrate judge did not have authority “to enter a stay in that action or to order the

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Clerk to close the file until [plaintiff] exhausted his state remedies”). It was fully within the

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Magistrate Judge’s purview to stay discovery until after the screening of Fernandez’s anticipated

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amended complaint has been completed. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (district judge may

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designate a magistrate judge to hear any nondispositive pretrial matter pending before the court).

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Accordingly, the Court finds Fernandez’s objection in this regard to be without merit.

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Third, Fernandez objects to the Magistrate Judge’s summary denial of his motions for

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sanctions. See Doc. #211, pp. 4-5. Specifically, Fernandez argues that the Magistrate Judge’s

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denial of his motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) was inappropriate because he

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sought sanctions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(d), 26(g), and 36(a), and the

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Court’s inherent authority. See id. at 5. Indeed, the Magistrate Judge denied all of Fernandez’s

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Motions for Sanctions (Doc. #122, Doc. #151, Doc. #161, and Doc. #163) pursuant to Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), which provides that sanctions are generally only appropriate

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where there has been a failure to comply with a discovery order. See Doc. #200, p. 4 n. 4.

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However, Fernandez sought sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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37(d)(1)(A)(ii) for failure to respond to interrogatories (Doc. #122), the Court’s inherent

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discretionary authority for spoilation of evidence (Doc. #151), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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37(d)(1)(A)(ii) and 26(g)(3) (Doc. #161) for failure to respond to interrogatories and improper

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certification, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3) for failure to timely respond to
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requests for admissions (Doc. #163). Because the Magistrate Judge did not determine the merits

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of Fernandez’s Motions for Sanctions pursuant to the authority under which he sought relief, the

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Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s determination in this regard was contrary to law and

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remands for an appropriate determination thereof.2

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Fourth, Fernandez objects to the Magistrate Judge’s partial denial of his Motion to

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Compel. See Doc. #211, pp. 5-7. Specifically, Fernandez objects to the denial of his request for

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production of the following: (1) Fernandez’s mental health records, (2) Fernandez’s Nevada

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Department of Corrections (“NDOC”) “I,” “C,” and “OMD” files, and (3) audio recordings.

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With respect to Fernandez’s request that he be allowed to possess a copy of his mental health

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records in his cell, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s denial of this Motion to Compel

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was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. As an initial matter, the Magistrate Judge made

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clear that Fernandez has had the opportunity to examine his records. See Doc. #201, p. 3. As

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such, he has been able to “discover” his records in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 34, and there is no production to compel. Moreover, Fernandez fails to cite any

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authority for the proposition that the NDOC’s regulation, which, for safety and security reasons,

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prohibits inmates from possessing medical/mental health records in their cells, implicates his

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constitutional rights. Finally, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the regulation is valid because

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it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests—safety and security, and thus

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deserving of deference. For all of the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that the Magistrate

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Judge’s ruling in this regard was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. With respect to

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Fernandez’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his request to have possession of his

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NDOC “I” and “C” files in his cell, the Court also finds that the Magistrate Judge’s ruling was

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The Court takes no position as to the merits of Fernandez’s Motions for Sanctions.
Moreover, contrary to Fernandez’s suggestion, the Court does not have authority to conduct a de
novo review of Fernandez’ Motions for Sanctions and decide them on their merits. See Grimes v.
City and Cnty. of S.F., 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[p]retrial orders of a magistrate under
636(b)(1)(A) are reviewable under the ‘clearly erroneous and contrary to law’ standard; they are
not subject to de novo determination”) (quoting Merritt v. Int’l Broth. of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d
1013, 1017 (5th Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The Magistrate Judge ordered that these documents be

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made available for Fernandez’s inspection. As such, the Magistrate Judge’s ruling complied with

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, and there was no further production to compel. Finally, as to

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Fernandez’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order that the audio or video recording be

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produced for his inspection, the Court also finds that his ruling was not clearly erroneous or

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contrary to law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a) requires only that discoverable materials

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be produced for inspection. In sum, none of the Magistrate Judge’s rulings on Fernandez’s

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Motion to Compel were clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

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Fifth, Fernandez objects to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his Motion to Deem Matters

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Admitted and/or to Compel Supplements. See Doc. #211, pp. 7-9. Contrary to Fernandez’s

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assertion, that “parties have a duty to specifically state what efforts they made to make an inquiry

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to obtain such information,” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) requires only that a party state

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“that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is

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insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.” In Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,

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the Ninth Circuit held that “a response which fails to admit or deny a proper request for

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admission does not comply with the requirements of Rule 36(a) if the answering party has not, in

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fact, made ‘reasonable inquiry,’ or if information ‘readily obtainable’ is sufficient to enable him

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to admit or deny the matter.” 669 F.2d 1242, 1247 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit went on to

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say that the determination of whether a party has complied with Rule 36(a) is left to the sound

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discretion of the judge. Id. Here, the Magistrate Judge was satisfied that Defendants had

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complied with Rule 36(a) by making a reasonable inquiry into each of Fernandez’s requests.

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Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s ruling was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Fernandez’s Objection (Doc. #211) is
OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED this 4th day of June, 2014.

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__________________________________
LARRY R. HICKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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