Meisler v. Chrzanowski et al

Filing 58

MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS of the Honorable Magistrate Judge William G. Cobb, on 4/15/2015, denying Plaintiff's 54 Ex Parte Motion Seeking the Court to Accept a Prepaid Telephone Call. The Plaintiff is directed to cease making telephone calls to Chambers as they will not be accepted. Plaintiff will be subject to sanctions if he continues this practice. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

MICHAEL CHARLES MEISLER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
NADINE CHRZANOWSKI, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
________________________________________)

3:12-cv-00487-MMD-WGC
MINUTES OF THE COURT
April 15, 2015

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE WILLIAM G. COBB, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DEPUTY CLERK:

KATIE LYNN OGDEN REPORTER: NONE APPEARING

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF(S): NONE APPEARING
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT(S): NONE APPEARING
MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS:
Before the court is Plaintiff’s “Ex Parte Motion Seeking the Court to Accept a Prepaid
Telephone Call.” (Doc. # 54.1) For the reasons stated in this Order, Plaintiff’s ex parte motion is
denied.
As grounds for his request for the court to accept weekly calls from the Plaintiff, Mr. Meisler
avers that under Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) rules and regulations, a call which he
makes from his segregated housing unit to the Clerk’s Office does not qualify as a “privileged call.”
He argues that a call to the Clerk of the Court, as an official of the court, should be privileged and
not monitored. Plaintiff also represents that a call made to the Judge’s Chambers is considered
“exempt” as it is legal in nature and is not recorded (id., at 6-7). Plaintiff avers that calls to Chambers
are exempted and he can make those calls in unlimited quantity.2
Plaintiff has apparently grieved this “discriminatory” policy to the Nevada Department of
Corrections (id., at 5-6). Plaintiff submits that if he had still been a practicing attorney and not an
incarcerated inmate, a call to the District Judge’s or Magistrate Judge’s chambers would supposedly
be in the regular course of his daily activities as a trial attorney (id at 6). Pending a resolution of that
grievance, he requests that the offices of District Judge Du and Magistrate Judge Cobb accept the
prepaid calls from him so that “he can ascertain the status of his pending case.” Plaintiff suggests
that he be permitted one 7 minute prepaid call to Chambers per week. (Id., at 6-7.)
1

2

Refers to court’s docket number.

Plaintiff states that on April 7, 2015, he attempted 27 prepaid calls between his cell and the chambers of
District Judge Miranda M. Du and Magistrate Judge William G. Cobb (id., at 4).

MINUTES OF THE COURT
3:12-cv-00487-MMD-WGC
Date: April 15, 2015
Page 2
Despite Plaintiff’s representations to the contrary, the court does not accept routine phone
calls from attorneys about cases in which they may be involved. Local Rule 7-6 (a) states that
“[n]either party nor counsel for any party shall make an ex parte communication with the Court
except as specifically permitted by these Rules.” The phone calls to Chambers Plaintiff has made and
seeks authorization to continue to make are simply not authorized under the Local Rules, particularly
on an ex parte basis. The Plaintiff is directed to cease making telephone calls to Chambers as
they will not be accepted. Plaintiff will be subject to sanctions if he continues this practice.
Plaintiff’s motion also pertains to subject matter outside the purview of his First Amended
Complaint (FAC). As this court noted in its Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 21), Plaintiff’s
FAC “focuses on the fact that his cellular data was allegedly obtained without a warrant or court
order.” (Id., at 5; Report and Recommendation adopted by District Judge Miranda M. Du, Doc.
# 22.) The issues Plaintiff complains of in his motion, i.e., NDOC restrictions on his access to the
courts, is unrelated to the issues complained of in his civil rights complaint. Although the Ninth
Circuit has not addressed the issue directly, other circuits have repeatedly held that a plaintiff seeking
injunctive-type relief must show “[a] relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion
and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994);
accord Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2010); Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282,
299-300 (6th Cir. 2010); Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 111 F.3d 14, 16 (4th
Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff has not set forth any relationship between the NDOC restrictions on phone calls and
the claims currently pending in this action. Plaintiff is not permitted to file a complaint in federal
court and then use that action as a forum to air his unrelated grievances. Such complaints are
properly lodged using the prison grievance system and, if they remain unresolved, by filing a new
action. Thus, Plaintiff's motion should be denied for this additional reason.3
Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. # 54) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
LANCE S. WILSON, CLERK

By:

3

/s/
Deputy Clerk

Plaintiff’s motion also contends his “legal mail” has been “seized or destroyed by NDOC officials” and
that “critical deadlines have been missed....” (Doc. # 54 at 2). Plaintiff does not identify what deadlines have been
missed. Regardless, these complaints are also beyond the scope of Plaintiff’s FAC and will not be entertained by
the court via Plaintiff’s motion.