Flores v. Reno Disposal Co., Inc. et al

Filing 29

ORDERED that defendants' # 10 Motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's second cause of action for wrongful discharge is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Larry R. Hicks on 5/9/2013. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DRM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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VICTOR M. FLORES,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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RENO DISPOSAL CO., INC.; et al.,

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Defendants.

3:13-CV-0029-LRH-VPC
ORDER

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Before the court is defendants Reno Disposal Co., Inc. (“RDC”) and Waste Management of

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Nevada, Inc.’s (“WM”) (collectively “defendants”) motion to dismiss. Doc. #10.1 Plaintiff Victor

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M. Flores (“Flores”) filed an opposition (Doc. #22) to which defendants replied (Doc. #24).

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I.

Facts and Procedural History

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Plaintiff Flores was employed by defendant RDC and was terminated on March 13, 2012,

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for allegedly violating company policy. At the time of his discharge, Flores was a member of the

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Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers and Professional, Clerical, Public and

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Miscellaneous Employees, Local Union No. 533 of Donner and The Tahoe Basin, Reno and

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Northern Nevada (“Local 533"). During Flores’ time of employment, Local 533 had a collective

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bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with defendants.

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Refers to the court’s docket number.

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On November 29, 2012, Flores filed a complaint against defendants alleging two causes of

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action: (1) Title VII discrimination; and (2) wrongful discharge. Doc. #1, Exhibit 2. Thereafter,

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defendants filed the present motion to dismiss Flores’ claim for wrongful discharge. Doc. #10.

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II.

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Legal Standard
Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure

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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state

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a claim, a complaint must satisfy the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) notice pleading

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standard. See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). That

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is, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard does not require

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detailed factual allegations; however, a pleading that offers “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’” will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.

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Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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Furthermore, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter,

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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 1949 (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows

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the court to draw the reasonable inference, based on the court’s judicial experience and common

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sense, that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See id. at 1949-50. “The plausibility

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standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

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defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

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defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

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relief.” Id. at 1949 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as

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true. Id. However, “bare assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of

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the elements of a . . . claim . . . are not entitled to an assumption of truth.” Moss v. U.S. Secret

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Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951) (brackets in original)
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(internal quotation marks omitted). The court discounts these allegations because “they do nothing

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more than state a legal conclusion—even if that conclusion is cast in the form of a factual

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allegation.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.) “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to

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dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be

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plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Id.

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III.

Discussion

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In their motion, defendants argue that Flores’ claim for wrongful discharge is preempted by

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Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and should be dismissed for failure to exhaust

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the grievance procedures of the CBA. See Doc. #10. The court agrees.

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Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), found at 29 U.S.C. § 185,

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vests district courts with jurisdiction over suits alleging a violation of a collective bargaining

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agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 extends not only to “claims founded directly on rights

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created by collective bargaining agreements, [but] also [to] claims which are substantially

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dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.” Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 539

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(9th Cir. 2008). “The preemptive force of Section 301 is so powerful that it displaces entirely any

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state cause of action for violation of a collective bargaining agreement and any state claim whose

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outcome depends on analysis of the terms of the agreement.” Newberry v. Pacific Racing Assoc.,

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854 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988).

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Here, the court finds that Flores’ claim for wrongful discharge is preempted by Section 301

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because his claim requires the interpretation of the underlying CBA. Specifically, the CBA governs

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defendants’ rights to discipline and discharge employees for violations of company policy. Thus,

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resolution of Flores’ wrongful discharge claim necessarily depends on the interpretation and

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analysis of the CBA terms. Moreover, “[w]rongful discharge claims are precisely the kinds of

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claims that are usually preempted, since such claims typically amount to allegations that an

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employer had breached a CBA.” Berrymen v. Caesar’s Palace, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23565, *9

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(D. Nev. 2012). Therefore, the court finds that Flores’ claim is preempted by Section 301.
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Where, as here, a claim is preempted by Section 301, an employee’s remedies lie

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exclusively within the collective bargaining agreement. In this action, Flores has failed to exhaust

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the grievance procedures outlined by Article 12 of the CBA because he filed his claim for wrongful

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discharge prior to initiating arbitration procedures through the union. Accordingly, the court shall

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grant defendants’ motion to dismiss.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. #10) is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s second cause of action for wrongful discharge is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 9th day of May, 2013.

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__________________________________
LARRY R. HICKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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