Laurrance vs Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, et al

Filing 37

ORDERED that Defendants' # 19 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Laurrance's claim for fraud is dismissed without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Laurrance wishes to file an amended complaint he shall do so within 14 days of this Order. Signed by Judge Larry R. Hicks on 9/17/2015. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DRM)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 8 17 *** ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 18 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. #19.1 Plaintiff 9 ROBERT J. LAURRANCE, 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-5, MortgageBacked Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-5; POWER REO MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., a Corporation; HOMEWARD RESIDENTIAL, Inc., a corporation; and Does 1-50 13 14 15 16 Defendants. 3:13-cv-0694-LRH-WGC ORDER 19 Robert J. Laurrance (“Laurrance”) filed an Opposition (Doc. #29), to which Defendants replied 20 (Doc. #36). 21 I. Facts and Procedural Background 22 Laurrance is a retired captain formerly employed by the Metropolitan Fire District in 23 Sacramento, California. In late 2011, Laurrance began searching for a home in the Lake Tahoe area 24 to live in during his retirement. After inspecting numerous homes, Laurrance’s real estate agent 25 showed him a home located at 565 Buchanan Drive in Incline Village, Nevada. Laurrance liked the 26 1 Refers to the Court’s docket number. 1 home, and learned that Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“DBNT”) had acquired 2 the property following foreclosure of the prior owners. 3 On February 4, 2012, Laurrance submitted a purchase offer, which was accepted on 4 February 9. Also on February 9, Defendants signed a “Seller’s Real Property Disclosure Form.” 5 This form denied the existence of any “encroachments, easements, zoning violations or non- 6 conforming uses” in addition to “any substances, materials, or products which may be an 7 environmental hazzard such as, but not limited to, asbestos, radon gas, urea formaldehyde, fuel or 8 chemical storage tanks, contaminated water or soil on the property.” Doc. #29, Ex. 17. The form 9 also stated that the property was free of any features “shared in common with adjoining land 10 owners such as: walls, fences, road, driveways or other features whose use or responsibility for 11 maintenance may have an affect on the property.” Id. Finally, the form denied the existence of 12 “any other conditions or aspects of the property which materially affect [the property’s] value or 13 use in an adverse manner.” Id. Escrow for sale to Laurrance closed on March 13, 2012. 14 It is undisputed that Laurrance was not aware prior to the sale that an underground high 15 pressure gas transmission pipeline lies beneath the property. In fact, there are two pipelines on the 16 565 Buchanan Drive property; one is ten inches in diameter and the other is approximately eight 17 inches in diameter. On January 26, 2012, Southwest Gas Company (“Southwest”) notified Yun 18 Suh (“Suh”), an attorney in the legal department for Deutsche Bank AG (“DBAG”),2 a separate 19 corporate entity from DBNT, that Southwest’s subsidiary Paiute Pipeline Company has a pipeline 20 running across 565 Buchanan Drive, that the pipeline had been exposed by the previous owner, and 21 that the problem needed to be addressed as soon as possible. Suh responded that the message had 22 been forwarded, but did not indicate to whom the email was forwarded.3 Laurrance became aware 23 of the pipelines on his property in early May, 2012, when he received a letter from Paiute Pipeline 24 2 25 Deutsche Bank AG is not a party to this action. 3 26 Laurrance requested information about the contents and destination of this forwarded email in discovery. Defendants responded: “Those documents will not be produced, however, as they are all protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Doc. #19, Ex. B. 2 1 Company, a subsidiary of Southwest, requesting to set a meeting to discuss easement and pipeline 2 exposure issues. See Doc. #29, Ex. 3. Laurrance states that Paiute told Laurrance that “Deutsche 3 Bank had been notified” about the pipeline issues. Id., Laurrance Decl. ¶4. 4 Laurrance purchased the property for $474,900.00 but represents that he would not have 5 purchased the property if he had known about the pipelines that had not been disclosed. Laurrance 6 represents that discovery of the pipelines resulted in a loss of value to the property of at least 7 $71,235.00. On December 19, 2013, Laurrance filed a Complaint alleging five causes of action: (1) 8 violation of Nev. Rev. Stat (“NRS”) 113.110; (2) breach of contract; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) 9 fraud; and (5) negligence. Doc. #1. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on 10 December 17, 2014. Doc. #19. After multiple extensions of time, Laurrance filed a timely 11 Opposition, and Defendants filed a timely reply. 12 II. Legal Standard 13 Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to 14 interrogatories, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, and other materials in the record 15 show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 16 as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the 17 evidence, together with all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the 18 light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 19 Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 20 (9th Cir. 2001). A motion for summary judgment can be complete or partial, and must identify 21 “each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is 22 sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 23 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of 24 the basis for its motion, along with evidence showing the absence of any genuine issue of material 25 fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On those issues for which it bears the 26 burden of proof, the moving party must make a showing that no “reasonable jury could return a 3 1 verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). On 2 an issue as to which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, however, the moving party can 3 prevail merely by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element 4 of the non-moving party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 5 To successfully rebut a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must point to 6 facts supported by the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Reese v. Jefferson 7 Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000). A “material fact” is a fact “that might affect 8 the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. Where 9 reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not appropriate. 10 See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983). A dispute regarding a material fact is considered 11 genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 12 party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of 13 the party’s position is insufficient to establish a genuine dispute; there must be evidence on which a 14 jury could reasonably find for the party. See id. at 252. “[S]peculative and conclusory arguments 15 do not constitute the significantly probative evidence required to create a genuine issue of material 16 fact.” Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1982). 17 III. Discussion 18 A. Violation of NRS § 113.100 et seq. 19 Defendants argue that the pipelines do not constitute a “defect” under NRS § 113.100 et 20 seq., and that Laurrance has introduced no evidence to indicate that Defendants were aware of the 21 pipelines when the property was sold to Laurrance. Laurrance argues that Defendants are not 22 entitled to summary judgment on this claim because the pipelines constitute a defect as defined by 23 the statute, and disputed questions of material fact remain as to whether Defendants were aware 24 that there were pipelines underneath the property at the time of Laurrance’s purchase. 25 26 Section 113.100 et seq. requires a seller of residential property to provide the buyer with a written form “disclosing the conditions of the residential property,” including “the condition of any 4 1 electrical, heating, cooling, plumbing and sewer systems on the property, and the condition of any 2 other aspects of the property which affect its use or value.” NRS § 113.120(1). The disclosure 3 form requires the seller “to indicate whether or not each of those systems and other aspects of the 4 property has a defect of which the seller is aware.” Id. The statute defines “defect” as “a condition 5 that materially affects the value or use of residential property in an adverse manner.” 6 NRS 113.100(1). This is a continuing obligation; if “after service of the completed disclosure form 7 but before conveyance of the property to the purchaser, a seller or the seller's agent discovers a new 8 defect in the residential property that was not identified on the completed disclosure form,” the 9 seller must “inform the purchaser or the purchaser's agent of that fact, in writing, as soon as 10 practicable after the discovery of that fact but in no event later than the conveyance of the property 11 to the purchaser.” NRS § 113.130(1)(b). 12 13 1. Defect Laurrance’s primary argument that the undisclosed pipelines constitute a defect under 14 NRS 113.100 et seq. involves reduction in property value. Laurrance estimates that the actual 15 value of his property declined by fifteen percent—from $474,900.00 at the time of the sale, to 16 $403,665.00 after discovery of the pipelines. Doc. #29 at 11. Defendants argue that Laurrance’s 17 estimation of the property’s decline in value should be disregarded because it is not supported by an 18 expert report or other evidence in the record. However, “[a]n owner of property may testify to its 19 value . . . so long as the owner has personal knowledge, or the ability to provide expert proof, of 20 value.” Stephans v. State, 262 P.3d 727, 731 (Nev. 2011) (emphasis added). “A party to a lawsuit 21 may testify as to the value of her personal or real property when that value is an issue in the case.” 22 Dugan v. Gotsopoulos, 22 P.3d 205, 207 (Nev. 2001).4 “The jury may consider this testimony for 23 24 25 26 4 Defendants argue that Dugan is distinguishable because it “involves the value of an automobile, not real property.” Doc. #36 at 6. However, Dugan specifically states that a party may testify “as to the value of her personal or real property.” 22 P.3d at 207 (emphasis added). Defendants also refer to Pitzel v. Software Development and Investment of Nevada, an unpublished Nevada Supreme Court decision, in which the court held that a minority shareholder could only testify as to the value of his interest in the company if he testified to certain complexities. No. 49163, 2008 WL 6124816, at *4-5 (Nev. Dec. 31, 2008). The Court noted that 5 1 its weight in conjunction with other evidence of value.” Id. Expert testimony is not required. Id. 2 at 207-08. Here, Laurrance represents that he has personal knowledge of the value of the property 3 based on his research of at least thirty homes prior to purchasing the 565 Buchanan Drive property, 4 and his experience living at the property and learning its attributes and flaws. As an owner of the 5 real property at issue in this lawsuit, Laurrance’s opinion about the reduced value of the subject 6 property is not improper. A jury can consider Laurrance’s value testimony in conjunction with 7 other evidence, including Defendants’ expert report. 8 9 Defendants also argue that Laurrance’s valuation testimony should be disregarded because Defendants’ expert witness conducted an appraisal and determined that the value of the property 10 was $495,000.00. See Doc. #19, Ex. D. However, the differences in testimony between Laurrance 11 and Defendants’ expert highlights a disputed question of material fact rather than the absence of a 12 disputed question. Accordingly, the Court will not automatically discount Laurrance’s opinion 13 regarding the reduced value of his property, and agrees with Laurrance that if proven, this reduction 14 in value could constitute a defect under NRS § 113.100 et seq. 15 Defendants argue that Laurrance’s claimed defect is irrelevant because the statute for a 16 seller’s failure to disclose states that “the purchaser is entitled to recover from the seller treble the 17 amount necessary to repair or replace the defective part of the property.” NRS § 113.150(4). 18 Defendants point to a portion of Laurrance’s deposition to argue that he “made it clear that he has 19 not spent a single dollar on repairs.” Doc. #36 at 8. Indeed, Laurrance stated that his testimony 20 regarding the $71,235.00 reduction in value is not meant to reimburse him for replacement or 21 repairs. Doc. #19, Ex. C at 173:2-9. However, Laurrance’s Response to Defendants’ Motion 22 “estimates the loss of value to the property of at least $71,235.00 plus out of pocket expenses for 23 attorney fees for assisting review of the pipeline maintenance issues of at least $4,000.” 24 25 26 valuation of a minority interest in a closely held corporation “is notoriously complex.” Id. at *5. Valuation of real property is also complex, but the Court will not apply the Pitzel standard to real property where the Nevada Supreme Court has expressly held that a party can testify as to the value of real property, and has not held that a party must meet the same complexities outlined in Pitzel to establish reliable personal knowledge. 6 1 Doc. #29 at 5. The Court finds that Laurrance has adequately pleaded damages pursuant to 2 NRS § 113.150(4). Nothing in the statute indicates that the plaintiff must repair or replace the 3 harmed property prior to filing suit. If the evidence at trial supported Laurrance’s position, then a 4 reasonable jury could find that Laurrance was entitled to damages pursuant to the $71,235.00 5 reduction in value and/or $4000.00 reviewing the pipeline issues in order to make repair or 6 replacement possible. 7 The Court has found that disputed questions of fact remain regarding whether the pipelines 8 constitute defects under NRS § 113.100, et seq. and whether Laurrance is entitled to recover 9 damages under NRS § 113.150(4). Accordingly, the Court shall grant Defendants’ Motion as to 10 this claim only if no facts in the record indicate that Defendants were aware of any defects prior to 11 the sale. 12 13 2. Defendants’ Awareness of the Defect Defendants argue that they cannot be liable for any failure to disclose defects on subject 14 property because they were not aware of such defects when Laurrance purchased the property. A 15 seller’s duty of disclosure only arises if the seller is aware of the relevant defects. 16 NRS § 113.140(1). The Nevada Supreme Court has held that, “[t]he term ‘aware’ means ‘marked 17 by realization, perception, or knowledge.” Nelson v. Heer, 163 P.3d 420, 425 (Nev. 2007). The 18 court added that such knowledge was necessary because “it is impossible for a seller to disclose 19 conditions in the property of which he or she has no realization, perception, or knowledge.” Id. 20 “The determination of whether a seller is aware of a defect, however, is a question of fact to be 21 decided by the trier of fact.” Id. 22 Laurrance argues that there remains a disputed question of material fact regarding whether 23 Defendants were aware of the pipelines on the property prior to the sale. In particular, Laurrance 24 points to the fact that Southwest contacted New York-based DBAG attorney Suh on January 23, 25 2012, stating that there was a problem with the pipelines on the subject property that needed to be 26 addressed. Suh then stated that the request email would be forwarded, and that Southwest should 7 1 inform Suh if they were not contacted by the end of the following day. Doc. #19, Ex. B. Laurrance 2 sought more information about the forwarded email through the discovery process, but Defendants 3 claimed attorney-client privilege. See Doc. #29, Ex. 13 at 3-4.5 There is no dispute that these 4 communications occurred before sale of the property became final, on March 13, 2012. 5 Defendants argue that knowledge by an attorney at DBAG does not constitute admissible 6 evidence that DBNT had knowledge of the pipelines because the two entities are separate.6 Indeed, 7 “federal courts have generally respected corporate efforts to maintain separate identities, and will 8 not pierce the formalities of separation merely because of a showing of complete ownership.” 9 Hickory Travel Sys., Inc. v. TUI AG, 213 F.R.D. 547, 553 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Doe v. Unocal 10 Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A subsidiary functions as the parent's alter ego if the 11 subsidiary is so intertwined with the parent that it functions as part thereof, and if disregarding that 12 unity of interest would result in fraud or injustice.” Id. Laurrance points to the fact that the same 13 law firm represents both DBAG and DBNT as national counsel, and Defendants’ assertion of the 14 attorney-client privilege related to Suh’s forwarding of the email regarding the pipelines, as 15 evidence that “[t]he two entities are unified in all matters.” Doc. #29 at 8. 16 Here, the Court need not determine whether DBNT and DBAG operate as the same entity. 17 Rather, the Court need only determine whether disputed questions of material fact remain as to 18 whether DBNT had knowledge of the pipelines on Laurrance’s property. Even if the entities are 19 completely separate, DBNT could have had knowledge of the pipelines based on the fact that 20 Suh—a DBAG lawyer—received an email from Southwest about the pipelines and stated that the 21 request had been forwarded, adding that Southwest should check in if they did not receive a 22 5 23 24 25 Defendants argue that the email chain at issue, which was produced in response to subpoenas filed by Laurrance attorney John P. Henderson, are inadmissible because Henderson is licensed to practice law in California, not Nevada, and he did not seek leave to practice pro hac vice in Nevada. This contention is directly contradicted by the record. In particular, Henderson filed a Verified Petition to Practice Pro Hac Vice on December 19, 2013 (Doc. #2), and the Court granted said Petition on December 23, 2013 (Doc. #3). 6 26 Defendants describe the entities as follows: “Deutsche Bank AG is a global financial services company headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany, whereas Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company is a California corporation headquartered in Los Angeles.” Doc. #19 at 11. 8 1 response by the following day. This creates an inference that the email was forwarded to the 2 owners of the property—DBNT. Importantly, all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom must be 3 resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 4 at 587. 5 The Court therefore finds that there remain disputed questions of material fact upon which a 6 reasonable juror could determine that Defendants were aware of the pipelines underneath 565 7 Buchanan Drive prior to the sale to Laurrance. See Nelson, 163 P.3d 425 (“The determination of 8 whether a seller is aware of a defect, however, is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of 9 fact.”). Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to 10 Laurrance’s claim for violation of NRS § 113.100 et seq. 11 B. Breach of Contract 12 Laurrance argues that Defendants breached the contract for sale of the 565 Buchanan Drive 13 property by failing to disclose the existence of the pipelines underneath the property. Defendants 14 argue that the Court should grant their Motion as to this claim because Laurrance cannot establish 15 the breach or damages element of a breach of contract claim. 16 To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a 17 valid contract; (2) that plaintiff performed or was excused from performance; (3) breach by the 18 defendant; and (4) damages resulting from defendant’s breach. See Restatement (Second) of 19 Contracts § 203 (2007); see also Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919-20 (D. Nev. 20 2006) (citing Richardson v. Jones, 1 Nev. 405, 405 (1865)). “Whether a party has breached a 21 contract and whether the breach is material are questions of fact.” Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. 22 Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 536 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Hoffman v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 823 23 P.2d 848, 850 (Nev. 1974)). However, “[i]nterpretation of a contract is a matter of law,” and 24 summary judgment “is appropriate when the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, even if the 25 parties disagree as to their meaning.” United States v. King Features Entm’t, Inc., 843 F.2d 394, 26 398 (9th Cir. 1988). 9 1 Defendants’ argument for summary judgment is “based on the same lack of evidence that is 2 fatal to [Laurrance’s] NRS 113.100 et seq. claim. Specifically . . . Plaintiff cannot show that 3 Defendants knew of the existence of the gas lines prior to the close of the sale.” Doc. #19 at 14. 4 As discussed above, the Court finds that disputed questions of material fact remain as to whether 5 Defendants knew of the existence of the pipelines before the sale occurred. Defendants argue 6 further that Laurrance “cannot prove he suffered any damages as a result of the breach” because his 7 estimation of the reduction in value of his property was not supported by an expert. Id. at 15. As is 8 also discussed above, a property owner “may testify as to the value of her personal or real property 9 when that value is an issue in the case, and expert testimony is not required.” Dugan, 22 P.3d at 10 207. Accordingly, the Court finds that disputed questions of material fact remain and denies 11 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Laurrance’s breach of contract claim. 12 C. Unjust Enrichment 13 Unjust enrichment occurs whenever an entity “has and retains a benefit which in equity and 14 good conscience belongs to another.” Leasepartners Corp. v. Robert L. Brooks Trust Dated Nov. 15 12, 1975, 942 P.2d 182, 187 (Nev. 1997). To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff 16 must establish: (1) the existence of a benefit conferred on defendant by plaintiff; (2) appreciation by 17 the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit by defendant under circumstances 18 that would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment. Unionamerica Mortg. & 19 Equity Trust v. McDonald, 626 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Nev. 1981). “An action based on a theory of 20 unjust enrichment is not available when there is an express, written contract, because no agreement 21 can be implied when there is an express agreement.” Leasepartners, 942 P.2d at 187. 22 Here, there is no dispute that Laurrance entered into a valid written contract with 23 Defendants. In fact, Laurrance has sued Defendants for breach of said written contract. This Court 24 has held that a claim for unjust enrichment can survive despite the presence of a written contract if 25 one party argues that the written contract is invalid—such invalidity would prevent the application 26 of the written agreement, and a party could then argue unjust enrichment based on an implied 10 1 agreement. Cass, Inc. v. Production Pattern and Foundry Co., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-0701, 2015 WL 2 995100, at *7 (D. Nev. Mar. 5, 2015) (citing Takiguchi v. MRI Int’l, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 3 1119 (D. Nev. 2014)). However, Defendants do not argue that the contract was invalid, but merely 4 that their actions did not breach the contract as Laurrance alleges. Because an unjust enrichment 5 action cannot succeed where the parties entered into a valid written contract, the Court grants 6 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Laurrance’s unjust enrichment claim. 7 D. Fraud 8 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Laurrance’s fraud claim relies on the 9 legal standards applicable to dismiss a claim for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 12(b)(6). Courts can grant summary judgment for failure to meet the heightened pleading 11 requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See Racine v. PHW Las Vegas, LLC, 46 F. 12 Supp. 3d 1028, 1045 (D. Nev. 2014) (granting summary judgment on defendant’s fraud-based 13 punitive damages claim because plaintiff failed to allege fraud to the particularity requirements of 14 Rule 9(b) in the complaint); Diep v. Durst-Pro-USA, Inc., No. 04-0984, 2006 WL 1788175, at *8 15 (D. Or. June 23, 2006) (granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s fraud claim for failure to meet 16 the Rule 9(b) requirements, and denying leave to amend as futile); Carr v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 17 414 F. Supp. 1292, 1301 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (finding that a court can enter summary judgment “on 18 the ground that the amended complaint does not relate with sufficient particularity the elements of 19 fraud required by” Rule 9(b)). 20 To succeed on a claim for civil fraud, a plaintiff must establish five elements: (1) a false 21 representation by the defendant; (2) defendant’s knowledge or belief that the representation is false; 22 (3) defendant’s intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon the 23 misrepresentation; (4) plaintiff’s justifiable reliance; and (5) damage to the plaintiff. Bulbman, Inc. 24 v. Nev. Bell, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (Nev. 1992). Federal Rule 9(b) requires a party alleging fraud to 25 plead such a claim with particularity. Averments of fraud must be accompanied by “‘the who, 26 what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged,’ as well as ‘what is false or misleading 11 1 about [the purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why it is false.’” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. 2 Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ebeid ex rel. U.S. v. 3 Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010)). In the context of a fraud suit involving multiple 4 defendants, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, ‘identif[y] the role of [each] defendant[ ] in the alleged 5 fraudulent scheme.’” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 765 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in 6 original) (quoting Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1989)). Defendants are correct that Laurrance has failed to meet the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading 7 8 requirement to support his claim for fraud. Although the Complaint outlines general facts about the 9 alleged fraud, it lacks detail and fails to include “the who, what, when, where, and how” with any 10 specificity. For pleading deficiencies, courts generally grant plaintiffs leave to amend the 11 complaint’s shortcomings. The standard for granting leave to amend is generous, and courts will 12 only deny leave to amend if the party opposing amendment shows “bad faith, undue delay, 13 prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment,” or that the plaintiff has previously 14 amended the complaint without healing its defects. United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 15 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). The Court 17 does not find at this point that amendment would be in bad faith, futile, cause undue delay, or 18 otherwise prejudice Defendants. Accordingly, Laurrance’s fraud claim is dismissed without 19 prejudice. If Laurrance elects to file an Amended Complaint, he shall do so within fourteen days of 20 this Order. 21 E. Negligence 22 “[T]o prevail on a traditional negligence theory, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the 23 defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach was 24 the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages.” DeBoer v. Senior 25 Bridges of Sparks Family Hosp., 282 P.3d 727, 732 (Nev. 2012). 26 /// 12 The Complaint bases Laurrance’s negligence claim on a breach of Defendants’ “legal duty 1 2 to disclose all known defects on the property . . . prior to [Laurrance’s] purchase of the subject 3 property.” Doc. #1 ¶35. Defendants argue that this claim must fail because Laurrance “cannot 4 prove that Defendants knew of the existence of the gas lines prior to the sale of the Property.” 5 Doc. #19 at 18. As discussed above, disputed questions of material fact remain as to whether 6 Defendants knew of the pipelines under the property at the time of the sale. Accordingly, the Court 7 denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Laurrance’s negligence claim. 8 IV. 9 Conclusion IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 10 #19) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Laurrance’s claim for fraud is dismissed without 11 prejudice. 12 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Laurrance wishes to file an amended complaint he shall do so within fourteen (14) days of this Order. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 DATED this 17th day of September, 2015. 16 17 __________________________________ LARRY R. HICKS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 13

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