Hall v. Baca et al

Filing 31

ORDER that the amended petition ECF No. 10 is DENIED in its entirety; a certificate of appealability is DENIED; Clerk directed to enter judgment and close case. Signed by Judge Robert C. Jones on 11/6/2018. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KW)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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***

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DAMIAN HALL,

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Case No. 3:14-cv-00613-RCJ-WGC
Petitioner,

ORDER

v.
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MR. BACA, et al.,
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Respondents.
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Damian Hall’s counseled, first-amended habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

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is before the court for disposition on the merits (ECF No. 10).

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I.

Procedural History and Background

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As this court set forth previously, on February 3, 2010, the State charged Hall by

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way of criminal complaint with four counts of sexual assault with the use of a deadly

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weapon, one count of battery with intent to commit sexual assault, one count of battery

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with a deadly weapon, one count of domestic battery causing substantial bodily harm,

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one count of assault with a deadly weapon, and one count of false imprisonment

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(exhibit 2).1 After his jury trial had commenced, Hall entered a guilty plea to count 2:

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sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon and count 6: battery with a deadly

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weapon. Exhs. 26, 27. The state district court sentenced him as follows: count 2 – life

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with the possibility of parole after ten years, with a consecutive term of 96 to 240

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months for the deadly weapon enhancement; and count 6 - 48 to 120 months,

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Unless otherwise noted, exhibits referenced in this order are exhibits to the first-amended petition, ECF
No. 10, and are found at ECF Nos. 11-12.

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consecutive to count 2. Exh. 34. Judgment of conviction was entered on April 25,
2011. Exh. 35. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Hall’s conviction on January 12,
2012, and remittitur issued on February 6, 2012. Exhs. 42, 43.
Hall filed a pro per state postconviction petition for habeas corpus on March 2, 2012.
Exh. 46. The state district court appointed counsel, and Hall filed a supplemental
petition. Exh. 50. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition on
June 12, 2014, and remittitur issued on July 9, 2014. Exh. 63.
Hall does not indicate on his federal habeas petition the date on which he
dispatched it for filing, but he signed the petition on September 28, 2014 (ECF No. 5).
This court appointed counsel, and Hall filed an amended petition on July 8, 2015 (ECF
No. 10). Respondents have now answered the petition, and Hall has replied (ECF Nos.
26, 29).
II.

Legal Standards

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a. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA), provides the legal standards for this court’s consideration of the petition in
this case:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim ―
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.

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The AEDPA “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner

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applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court

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convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 693-694 (2002). This court’s ability to grant a writ is limited to cases where “there is
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no possibility fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts
with [Supreme Court] precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). The
Supreme Court has emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the
state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63, 75 (2003)); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (describing
the AEDPA standard as “a difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for evaluating
state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court
precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “if the state court applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or “if the state
court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the
Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme
Court’s] precedent.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
405-06 (2000), and citing Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.
A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established
Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), “if the state court
identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Lockyer, 538
U.S. at 74 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). The “unreasonable application” clause
requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous; the state
court’s application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable. Id.
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).
To the extent that the state court’s factual findings are challenged, the
“unreasonable determination of fact” clause of § 2254(d)(2) controls on federal habeas
review. E.g., Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir.2004). This clause
requires that the federal courts “must be particularly deferential” to state court factual

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determinations. Id. The governing standard is not satisfied by a showing merely that the
state court finding was “clearly erroneous.” 393 F.3d at 973. Rather, AEDPA requires
substantially more deference:

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.... [I]n concluding that a state-court finding is unsupported by
substantial evidence in the state-court record, it is not enough that we
would reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appeal from a
district court decision. Rather, we must be convinced that an appellate
panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not
reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.

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Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir.2004); see also Lambert, 393
F.3d at 972.

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), state court factual findings are presumed to be
correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The petitioner bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to habeas
relief. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181. Finally, in conducting an AEDPA analysis, this court
looks to the last reasoned state-court decision. Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996
(9th Cir. 2014).
A state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if he is being held in custody
in violation of the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a). Unless an issue of federal constitutional or statutory law is implicated by the
facts presented, the claim is not cognizable under federal habeas corpus. Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). A petitioner may not transform a state-law issue into
a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d
1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996). Alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state
law do not warrant habeas relief. Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 779-80 (9th Cir.
2004).

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III.

Instant Petition

Grounds 1 & 2
Hall asserts in ground 1 that because he was incompetent he did not enter his guilty
plea voluntarily, intelligently or knowingly, and the district court improperly refused to
grant his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights (ECF No. 10, pp. 11-19). In ground 2, Hall contends that
the trial court deprived him of his right to effective and conflict-free counsel when it
refused to appoint conflict-free counsel to litigate the motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 19-21.
A guilty plea must be made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently; such inquiry
focuses on whether the defendant was aware of the direct consequences of his plea.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); see also Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742,
748 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences.”). A criminal defendant may not plead guilty unless he does
so competently and intelligently. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). The
competency standard for pleading guilty is the same as the competency standard for
standing trial. Id. at 397. As long as a defendant “has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and . . . has
a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him,” he is
competent to plead guilty. Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960); see also Godinez, 509
U.S. at 399.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses a right to representation free
from conflicts of interest. Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir.2004). With
respect to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, the Supreme Court has made
it clear that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel does not guarantee a
meaningful attorney-client relationship. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).

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Here, the state-court record reflects that on February 18, 2010, the justice court
entered an order directing that two psychiatric medical professionals conduct
evaluations of Hall to determine whether he was competent to assist in his own
defense. Exh. 3. Both evaluators concluded that Hall understood the nature of the
criminal charges against him, the nature and purpose of the court proceedings, and was
able to assist in his defense with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Exhs.
4, 5. Both reports indicated that Hall had a history of mental illness, including
schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations. Id. The court reviewed the reports and
entered a finding that Hall was competent to proceed. Exh. 6.
Hall’s jury trial commenced on February 28, 2011. Exh. 23. Hall’s wife testified in
detail that over a period of several hours on the night in question, Hall kicked her and
beat her with a wooden dowel, causing her head to bleed profusely and breaking ribs,
threatened her with a knife, and repeatedly raped her until she was able to flee after he
fell asleep. Exh. 23, pp. 23-122. The State introduced numerous photos taken at the
hospital of Hall’s wife’s injuries. See exh. 24, pp. 54-263.
Police officer Dan Snow testified as to the statement that Hall’s wife made to him
when he arrived at the scene Exh. 24, pp. 171-232. His testimony regarding Hall’s
wife’s description of events was substantially similar to the wife’s testimony.
On the fourth day of trial, Hall entered into a guilty plea. Exh. 26. At the outset of
the plea canvass, the state district court advised Hall that it wanted to be “completely
confident that before you made this decision you’ve had ample opportunity to confer
with your counsel and explore all factual and legal issues in the case.” Id. at 4-5. Hall
answered in the affirmative as to whether he was entering a guilty plea voluntarily and
had had ample opportunity to review and discuss all discovery and trial tactics with
counsel. Id. at 5. Hall indicated that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation and
did not need additional time to consult with her for any reason. Id. Hall was read the
two counts to which he pled guilty; Hall stated that he was in fact guilty of the charged

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acts. The court reviewed in detail the possible sentences with Hall, and he indicated
that he understood. Id. at 6-15.
Hall either filed or submitted a pro per motion to withdraw guilty plea and to appoint
conflict-free counsel, and on July 20, 2011, the state district court held a hearing on the
motion. Exh. 30. Hall argued that he had not had enough time to contemplate his
decision before entering the plea. The court went through the transcript of the plea
canvass with Hall. Hall stated that he did not tell the court he needed more time to
decide during the canvass because his counsel told him it was “now or never.” Id. at 8.
Hall further informed the court that he wanted new counsel appointed “to have people
look at my case again.” Id. at 9. The court denied the motion for new counsel and
denied the motion to withdraw guilty plea as belied by the record. Id. at 9.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motions. Exh. 42. The state supreme court rejected Hall’s contention that
his plea decision was overly rushed, noting that the district court thoroughly canvassed
Hall and asked him three times if he needed additional time, with Hall responding in the
negative. Id.
Hall has failed to show that the Nevada Supreme Court’s determinations on federal
grounds 1 or 2 were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or were based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, grounds 1 and 2 are denied.
Grounds 3 & 4
Hall argues that the trial court violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights when it refused to evaluate his competency before sentencing
(ground 3) and sentenced him while he was incompetent (ground 4) (ECF No. 10, pp.
21-24).

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At sentencing, Hall’s counsel informed the court that she had “severe” concerns
about his competency and believed that Hall’s mental health had deteriorated since his
entry of the guilty plea. Exh. 34, pp. 4-5. She stated that she had had no concern
regarding competency at the time Hall pleaded guilty on March 3, 2001. However, at
the April 22, 2011 sentencing, counsel said Hall’s understanding of the proceedings
appeared to be diminished; for example, Hall told her that the Nevada Supreme Court
was considering his appeal, even though he had not yet been sentenced. She also
noted that she received the presentence investigation report late and had not had time
to review it. The court questioned Hall about his entry of his plea and the several filings
he had lodged with the court. Id. at 12-14. Hall stated that while they were in his
handwriting, another inmate had helped him prepare the documents, and he did not fully
understand them. Hall did not recall the other inmate’s name, but subsequently stated
that his first name was Gene. The court—noting that filing a premature notice of appeal
was not in and of itself indicative of incompetency—found Hall’s testimony not credible,
indicated that it would proceed with sentencing at that time, and called a brief recess in
order that Hall and his counsel could review the PSI. Id. at 14.
When the sentencing hearing resumed, the court stated that during the recess it
had reviewed the two competency evaluations conducted in January, 2007, and noted
that both concluded that Hall was competent to understand the nature of the
proceedings and to assist counsel. Id. at 21-22.
Affirming the convictions, the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned:

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Here, defense counsel expressed concerns about Hall’s
competency. In response, the district court reviewed prior competency
reports, the plea canvass, and proper person court filings. We conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to order a
competency hearing because the district court had no reasonable doubt
regarding Hall’s competency.
Exh. 42, p. 3.

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Hall has not demonstrated that the Nevada Supreme Court’s determinations on
federal grounds 3 or 4 were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or were
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Grounds 3 and 4 are, therefore,
denied.
The petition is thus denied in its entirety.
IV.

Certificate of Appealability

This is a final order adverse to the petitioner. As such, Rule 11 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases requires this court to issue or deny a certificate of
appealability (COA). Accordingly, the court has sua sponte evaluated the claims within
the petition for suitability for the issuance of a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Turner v.
Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2002).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a COA may issue only when the petitioner "has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." With respect to
claims rejected on the merits, a petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)). For procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if reasonable
jurists could debate (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right and (2) whether the court's procedural ruling was correct. Id.
Having reviewed its determinations and rulings in adjudicating Hall’s petition, the
court finds that reasonable jurists would not find its determination of any grounds to be
debatable pursuant to Slack. The court therefore declines to issue a certificate of
appealability.

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V.

Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the amended petition (ECF No. 10) is DENIED
in its entirety.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and

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close this case.

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DATED: This 6th24 October 2018. 2018.
DATED: day of November,

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ROBERT C. JONES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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