DeBock v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Filing 20

ORDERED that defendant's # 4 Motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. Signed by Judge Larry R. Hicks on 11/20/2015. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DRM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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MATTHEW E.B. DEBOCK,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,

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Defendant.

3:15-CV-0447-LRH-WGC
ORDER

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Before the court is defendant United Parcel Service, Inc.’s (“UPS”) motion to dismiss

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complaint. Doc. #4.1 Plaintiff Matthew E.B. DeBock (“DeBock”) filed an opposition (Doc. #10) to

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which UPS replied (Doc. #11).

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I.

Facts and Procedural History

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Plaintiff DeBock was employed by defendant UPS as a part-time sorter from December 5,

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2005, until his termination in June 2014. At the time of his termination DeBock was allegedly on

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leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and staying at a residential rehabilitation

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facility for a serious health condition.

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While employed by UPS, DeBock was a member of the Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers and Professional, Clerical, Public and Miscellaneous Employees, Local

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Refers to the court’s docket number.

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Union No. 533 of Donner and The Tahoe Basin, Reno and Northern Nevada (“Local 533”), a labor

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organization. During the relevant time period, Local 533 and UPS had a collective bargaining

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agreement (“CBA”) that governed the employment relationship between UPS and its employees

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titled “Northern California Supplemental Agreement between Teamster Local Union Nos. 70, 87,

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137, 150, 278, 287, 315, 386, 431, 439, 490, 533, 624, 665, 856, 890, 912, 948 and United Postal

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Service” (“Local Agreement”).2 There was also another agreement titled “National Master United

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Postal Service Agreement” (“National Agreement”) that governed all employment relationships

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with UPS and all Teamster Unions.3

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On July 29, 2015, DeBock filed a complaint against UPS alleging nine causes of action:

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(1) breach of contract - FMLA leave, (2) breach of contract - failure to follow established policies

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or procedures, (3) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing - contract damages, (4) breach

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of covenant of good faith and fair dealing - tort damages, (5) tortious discharge, (6) wrongful

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termination, (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (8) negligence, and (9) retaliatory

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termination. Doc. #1, Exhibit 2. Thereafter, UPS filed the present motion to dismiss. Doc. #4.

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II.

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Legal Standard
Defendant UPS seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for

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failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure

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to state a claim, a complaint must satisfy the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) notice

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pleading standard. See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir.

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2008). That is, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard does not

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require detailed factual allegations; however, a pleading that offers “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

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A copy of the Local Agreement is attached as Exhibit 2 to UPS’s motion to dismiss. See Doc. #4,
Exhibit 2.
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A copy of the National Agreement is attached as Exhibit 1 to UPS’s motion to dismiss. See Doc. #4,
Exhibit 1.

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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’” will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.

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Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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Furthermore, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter,

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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 1949 (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows

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the court to draw the reasonable inference, based on the court’s judicial experience and common

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sense, that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See id. at 1949-50. “The plausibility

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standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

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defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

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defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

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relief.” Id. at 1949 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as

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true. Id. However, “bare assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of

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the elements of a . . . claim . . . are not entitled to an assumption of truth.” Moss v. U.S. Secret

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Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951) (brackets in original)

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(internal quotation marks omitted). The court discounts these allegations because “they do nothing

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more than state a legal conclusion—even if that conclusion is cast in the form of a factual

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allegation.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.) “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to

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dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be

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plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Id.

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III.

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Discussion
In its motion, defendant UPS argues that all of DeBock’s claims are preempted by

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Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and should be dismissed for failure to exhaust

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the grievance procedures of the relevant CBAs. See Doc. #4.

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Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), found at 29 U.S.C. § 185,
vests district courts with jurisdiction over suits alleging a violation of a collective bargaining
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agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 completely preempts any state law causes of action

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based on alleged violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations. Ramirez v.

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Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1993). “The preemptive force of

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Section 301 is so powerful that it displaces entirely any state cause of action for violation of a

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collective bargaining agreement and any state claim whose outcome depends on analysis of the

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terms of the agreement.” Newberry v. Pacific Racing Assoc., 854 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988).

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Thus, Section 301 extends not only to “claims founded directly on rights created by collective

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bargaining agreements, [but] also [to] claims which are substantially dependent on analysis of a

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collective bargaining agreement.” Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 2008).

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However, “not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision

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of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by [S]ection 301.” Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire

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Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotations omitted). Rather, state law claims are

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only preempted by Section 301 if the claims are (1) based upon a CBA, or (2) dependent upon an

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interpretation of a CBA. See Ramirez, 998 F.2d at 748; Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp.,

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223 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). To determine if a claim is dependent upon the interpretation

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of a CBA, a court must analyze whether the state law claim can be resolved simply by looking to

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the CBA as opposed to interpreting it. See Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th

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Cir. 2012). A state law claim is independent of a CBA if “resolution of the state-law claim does not

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require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,

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486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988).

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If a claim is preempted by Section 301, the court either must treat the claim as a Section 301

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claim or dismiss the claim as preempted by federal law. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.

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202, 220 (1985). If a claim is converted by the court then the employee seeking to vindicate his

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rights under a CBA must first attempt to exhaust any mandatory grievance procedures outlined in

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the CBA. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 985-86 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Here, the court finds that DeBock’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied

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covenants of good faith and fair dealing are preempted by Section 301 because these claims require

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interpretation of the underlying CBAs. In his complaint, DeBock bases his breach of contract and

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implied covenant claims on alleged violations by UPS of the leave and grievance procedures

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outlined in the CBAs. For example, DeBock’s breach of contract claims allege that “UPS

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contractually agreed that it would comply with, and afford its employees the benefits of, the

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FMLA” as well as “provide certain rights to any employee subject to discharge or suspension” but

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UPS breached these contractual obligations by failing to provide DeBock with the contracted

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rights. See Doc. #1, Exhibit 2, p. 3-4. Similarly, DeBock’s implied covenant claims allege that UPS

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“deliberately countervened the intention and spirit” of the CBAs by terminating DeBock when he

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was on leave despite “the terms of the contract.” See Doc. #1, Exhibit 2, p. 5-6. Resolving these

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claims necessarily requires interpreting the terms of the CBAs to determine DeBock’s rights to

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FMLA leave and other leave during his employment. Moreover, these claims are classic examples

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of claims consistently preempted by Section 301. See e.g., Newberry, 854 F.2d 1142; Hernandez, et

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al. v. Creative Concepts, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (D. Nev. 2012); Miller v. Mach 4, LLC., 2012

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93483 (D. Nev. 2012).

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Similarly, the court finds that DeBock’s claims for wrongful termination and tortious

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discharge are also preempted by Section 301. In these claims, DeBock simply alleges that UPS

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wrongfully terminated him from his position rather than grant him FMLA leave. However, the

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CBAs govern UPS’s right to discharge employees along with DeBock’s right to employment leave.

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Thus, resolution of DeBock’s wrongful termination claim necessarily depends on the interpretation

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and analysis of CBA terms similar to his breach of contract claims. Moreover, “[w]rongful

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discharge claims are precisely the kinds of claims that are usually preempted, since such claims

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typically amount to allegations that an employer had breached a CBA.” Berrymen v. Caesar’s

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Palace, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23565, *9 (D. Nev. 2012). The allegations in DeBock’s complaint

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to support his wrongful termination and tortious discharge claims are no different. Therefore, the
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court finds that DeBock’s wrongful discharge claim is preempted by Section 301.

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DeBock’s remaining claims for retaliatory discharge, intentional infliction of emotional

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distress, and negligence, are also preempted by Section 301 as resolution of these claims would

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require interpreting various terms in the CBAs. All of these claims are based on the same

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allegations that UPS terminated his employment rather than provide him medical leave. However

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DeBock names or characterizes these claims, the underlying allegations are the same as in his

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previous claims. Further, these claims are so inextricably linked to his other claims that it would be

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impossible for the court to separate these few claims from his other claims as resolution of these

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claims rely on the same facts and contract terms as his contract based claims. Therefore, the court

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finds that resolution of these claims would be dependent upon interpretation of the CBAs and thus,

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these claims are also preempted by Section 301. Accordingly, the court shall grant UPS’s motion to

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dismiss.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. #4) is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED this 20th day of November, 2015.

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LARRY R. HICKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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