MacKie et al v. Truckee Carson Irrigation District et al

Filing 10

ORDER denying 3 Motion for TRO and denying 4 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Miranda M. Du on 2/5/16. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - JC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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***

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STUART JAMES MACKIE, SUSAN
MACKIE,

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Case No. 3:16-cv-00031-MMD-VPC
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
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v.
TRUCKEE CARSON IRRIGATION
DISTRICT, RUSTY D. JARDINE, AND
MICHAEL J. VAN ZANDT ,

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Defendants.

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I.

SUMMARY

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On January 25, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants alleging that

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Defendants breached a contract by refusing to deliver water resulting in damages

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totaling $4,300,000. (Dkt. no. 1 at 1-4.) On February 2, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion for

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an ex parte temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a motion for preliminary injunction

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asking this Court to enjoin enforcement of an order issued by the Tenth Judicial District

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Court in Churchill County (collectively, “Motions”). (Dkt. nos. 3, 4.)1 For the following

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reasons, the Motions are denied.

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II.

BACKGROUND

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The relevant background facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ complaint and motion for

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TRO. Plaintiffs allege that they had a contractual relationship with the Truckee Carson

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Irrigation District (“TCID”) wherein TCID delivered water to Plaintiffs. (Dkt. no. 1 at 1.)

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The Motions are identical.

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According to Plaintiffs, TCID failed to deliver water for several seasons, which resulted

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in economic damages of $4,300,000. (Id.)

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Plaintiffs filed financing statements with the Nevada Secretary of State claiming a

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perfected claim for damages against TCID in the amount of $4,300,000. (Dkt. no. 1 at

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18, 20.) TCID filed suit against Plaintiffs in state court and obtained an ex parte

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restraining order from a district court in Churchill County. (Id. at 6 – 7.) The restraining

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order allowed TCID to terminate the financing statements and enjoined Plaintiffs from

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filing any further statements claiming a secured interest in TCID’s assets. (Id.)

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III.

DISCUSSION

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Plaintiffs now ask this Court to enjoin the state court’s order for three reasons.

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First, Plaintiffs allege that they were not properly served. Next, they allege that TDIC’s

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attorneys have not shown that they were licensed to practice law. And last, they argue

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that because the judge in the case did not comply with Plaintiffs’ request to place a

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certificate of election, oath of office, and copy of his official public bond into the record,

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he lacked qualification to act as a judge, and therefore his orders amount to “a clear

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imposition of involuntary servitude, slavery.” (Dkt. no. 3 at 2-3.)

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A.

Legal Standard

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 allows a court to issue a TRO and preliminary

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injunction. “An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion” and is “an extraordinary

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remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to

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such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 32 (2008). To

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obtain injunctive relief, such as a preliminary injunction or a TRO, a plaintiff must

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demonstrate (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer

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irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips

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in his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20; Earth Island Inst.

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v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Rule 65(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates when a court may

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issue a TRO without notice. Under Rule 65(b)(1), Plaintiffs must provide “specific facts
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in an affidavit or a verified complaint [which] clearly show that immediate and irreparable

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injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard

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in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Additionally, Local Rule 7-5(b) requires that

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all ex parte motions must contain a statement demonstrating good cause why the

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request was submitted without notice to the opposing party.

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B.

Analysis

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As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the

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requirements for an ex parte motion. Plaintiffs have not included a statement

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demonstrating good cause why their request should be considered without providing

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notice to Defendants, nor is it clear from the documents provided that good cause

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exists.

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Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ Motions ask the Court to exercise jurisdiction which it

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does not possess. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine states that federal district courts may

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not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a de facto appeal from a state court

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judgment. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414–17 (1923); D.C. Ct. of

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Appeals, et al. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). State court litigants may only

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achieve federal review of state court judgments by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari

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in the Supreme Court of the United States. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482.

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The Rooker–Feldman doctrine “is confined to cases of the kind from which the

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doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries

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caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

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commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon

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Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Ninth Circuit

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has explained that “[a] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden

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de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court must refuse to hear the

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forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised

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in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its

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judicial decision.” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Noel v.

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Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003)).

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Plaintiffs’ requests for relief are entirely based on a decision against them in

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ongoing litigation in a state trial court. This Court is barred from considering such claims

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by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION
It is therefore ordered that Plaintiffs’ motions for an ex parte temporary

restraining order and a preliminary injunction (dkt. nos. 3, 4) are denied.
DATED THIS 5th day of February 2016.

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MIRANDA M. DU
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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