Anderson v. NDOC et al

Filing 101

MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS of the Honorable Magistrate Judge William G. Cobb, on 10/18/2017. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Release of Court Document ECF No. 98 is GRANTED to the extent that the Clerk shall resend Plaintiff a copy of the courts order denying Plaintiffs third motion for appointment of counsel ECF No. 81 (NEF regenerated to P via LCC law library on 10/18/2017); Plaintiff's request to issue a temporary restraining order is DENIED. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

JOSEPH M. ANDERSON,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,
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Defendants.
)
________________________________________)

3:16-cv-00056-RCJ-WGC
MINUTES OF THE COURT
October 18, 2017

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE WILLIAM G. COBB, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DEPUTY CLERK:

KATIE LYNN OGDEN REPORTER: NONE APPEARING

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF(S): NONE APPEARING
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT(S): NONE APPEARING
MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS:
Before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Release of Court Document (ECF No. 98).
Plaintiff claims he did not receive a copy of the court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for
appointment of counsel (ECF No. 81) and requests it be sent to him again via the CM/ECF filing
system. (Id. at 1).
The second component of Plaintiff’s motion requests the court to issue a temporary
restraining order “to NDOC/LCC Prison authorities to keep Defendant Parks away from the prison
law library.” (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Release of Court Document (ECF No. 98) is GRANTED to
the extent that the Clerk shall resend Plaintiff a copy of the court’s order denying Plaintiff’s third
motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 81).
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MINUTES OF THE COURT
October 18, 2017
3:16-cv-00056-RCJ-WGC
Page Two

Plaintiff’s request to issue a temporary restraining order to NDOC/LCC Prison authorities
to keep Defendant Parks away from the prison law library is DENIED without prejudice. The
purpose of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo if the
balance of equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to intervene to
secure the positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic
remedy” that is “never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (citations
omitted). Instead, in every case, the court “must balance the competing claims of injury and must
consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The instant motion requires that the court determine whether Plaintiff has
established the following: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and
(4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) also mandates that prisoner litigants satisfy
additional requirements when seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. The
PLRA provides, in relevant part:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no
further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires
preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to
correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any
adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice
system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the
principles of comity set out in paragraph (1)(B) in tailoring any
preliminary relief.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Thus, § 3626(a)(2) limits the court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive
relief to inmates. See Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir.
2000). “Section 3626(a)...operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of federal courts
and to protect the bargaining power of prison administrators-no longer may courts grant or approve
relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” Id. at 999.
Inasmuch as Plaintiff has satisfied none of the criteria pertaining to injunctive relief,
Plaintiff’s motion is denied without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DEBRA K. KEMPI, CLERK
By:
/s/
Deputy Clerk