Williams v. Baker et al

Filing 24

ORDER granting in part and denying in part Respondents' ECF No. 14 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot Petitioner's ECF No. 21 Motion for Stay; giving Respondents 90 days to file response to remaining claims in petition. Reply due within 90 days thereafter. Signed by Judge Miranda M. Du on 4/18/2017. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KR)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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***

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MATHEW LEE WILLIAMS,

Case No. 3:16-cv-00505-MMD-VPC
Petitioner,

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ORDER

v.

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BRIAN E. WILLIAMS SR., et al.,
Respondents.

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This case is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

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by Mathew Lee Williams, a Nevada prisoner serving a sentence of ten years to life in

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prison on a conviction of lewdness with a child under the age of 14 years. See Petition

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for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 6). There are, before the Court, a motion to dismiss

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filed by the respondents and a motion for stay filed by Williams. The Court will grant the

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motion to dismiss in part and deny it in part, dismissing part of Ground 1 of Williams’

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petition, and the Court will deny the motion for stay as moot. The Court will set a schedule

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for respondents to file an answer, and Williams a reply.

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Williams was convicted, upon a guilty plea, in Nevada’s Second Judicial District

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Court, on November 29, 2012. (See Judgment, Respondents’ Exhibit 24 (ECF No. 15-

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24).)

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Williams appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court from his conviction, and the

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Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on September 18, 2013. (See Appellant’s Opening Brief,

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Respondents’ Exhibit 51 (ECF No. 16-20); Order of Affirmance, Respondents’ Exhibit 57

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(ECF No. 16-26).)

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Williams then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state district court,

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and that court denied the petition on November 12, 2015. (See Petition for Writ of Habeas

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Corpus (Post-Conviction), Respondents’ Exhibit 61 (ECF No. 17); Order of State District

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Court, Respondents’ Exhibit 74 (ECF No. 17-13).) Williams appealed to the Nevada

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Supreme Court from the denial of the petition, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed

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on July 13, 2016. (See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Respondents’ Exhibit 82 (ECF No. 17-

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21); Order of Affirmance, Respondents’ Exhibit 89 (ECF No. 17-28).)

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Williams initiated this federal habeas corpus action on August 29, 2016. (See

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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 6).) Williams’ petition includes two claims.

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In Ground 1, he asserts that, in violation of his federal constitutional rights, he received

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ineffective assistance of both his trial counsel and his state post-conviction counsel. (See

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id. at 3-4.) In Ground 2, Williams asserts that his sentence violates his federal

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constitutional right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. (See id. at 5-6.)

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On January 11, 2017, respondents filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14). In that

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motion, respondents contend that, to the extent Ground 1 is based on alleged ineffective

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assistance of Williams’ state post-conviction counsel, that claim is unexhausted in state

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court, and, at any rate, is not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus action. (See Motion

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to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) at 4, 6.) Respondents also contend in their motion to dismiss

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that Ground 2 is unexhausted in state court. (See id. at 4-5.)

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Williams responded to the motion to dismiss, on February 17, 2017, by filing a

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motion for stay (ECF No. 21), in which he requests that this case be stayed while he

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returns to state court to exhaust any unexhausted claims. Respondents filed an

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opposition to the motion for stay on February 28, 2017 (ECF No. 22), and Williams filed

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a reply on March 13, 2017 (ECF No. 23).

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Ground 1, to the extent based on alleged ineffective assistance of Williams’ state

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post-conviction counsel, is not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus action. See

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Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). As there is no federal constitutional

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right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, there is no constitutional right to
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effective assistance of such counsel. See id. (“There is no constitutional right to an

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attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim

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constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” (citation omitted));

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see also Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (where there is no

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constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of the constitutional right to

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effective assistance of counsel). For this reason, the Court will grant respondents’ motion

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to dismiss Ground 1 to the extent it is based on alleged ineffective assistance of Williams’

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state post-conviction counsel.

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Turning to the question of Williams’ exhaustion of his state court remedies, a

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federal court may not grant habeas corpus relief on a claim not exhausted in state court.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). The exhaustion doctrine is based on the policy of federal-state

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comity, and is intended to allow state courts the initial opportunity to correct constitutional

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deprivations. See Picard v. Conner, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). To exhaust a claim, a

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petitioner must fairly present the claim to the highest state court, and must give that court

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the opportunity to address and resolve it. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)

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(per curiam); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). A claim is fairly presented

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to the state court if, before that court, the petitioner describes the operative facts and legal

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theory upon which the claim is based. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (per

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curiam); Picard, 404 U.S. at 275; Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982).

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With regard to Ground 1, as is explained above, the Court will grant respondents’

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motion to dismiss Ground 1 to the extent it is based on alleged ineffective assistance of

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Williams’ state post-conviction counsel because that part of Ground 1 is not cognizable

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in a federal habeas action. As that is the same part of Ground 1 that respondents contend

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is unexhausted in state court (see Motion to Dismiss at 4), its dismissal renders

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respondents’ argument regarding the exhaustion of Ground 1 moot, and the Court need

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not address that issue.

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Ground 2 is Williams’ claim that his sentence violates his federal constitutional right

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to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Respondents argue that Ground 2 is
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unexhausted, at least in part, because it includes arguments not asserted when he made

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a similar claim on his direct appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court. (See Motion to Dismiss,

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at 4-5.) In particular, respondents argue that Williams argues in this case, but did not

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argue in state court, that his sentencing did not properly take into account his mental

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health and drug addiction. (See id.) The Court disagrees with respondents’ analysis.

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Williams did, on his direct appeal in state court, include, in his claim regarding the

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constitutionality of his sentence, argument concerning his mental health and drug

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addiction. (See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Respondents’ Exhibit 51 at 3-4 (ECF No. 16-

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20 at 10-11).) Williams argued on that appeal in state court that “his youth, mental health

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issues, and terrible childhood were relevant mitigation factors which should have been

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determinative when imposing the possible sentence.” (Id. at 13 (ECF No. 16-20 at 20).)

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Where the petitioner’s presentation of a claim changes in federal court, the claim is still

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considered fairly presented, and exhausted in state court, so long as the new allegations

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in federal court do not fundamentally alter the claim. See Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302,

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1318-19 (9th Cir.2014) (en banc). Williams has not fundamentally altered Ground 2 in

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federal court. Ground 2 is exhausted.

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Therefore, the Court will grant respondents’ motion to dismiss in part: Ground 1

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will be dismissed, as not cognizable in federal court, to the extent it is based on alleged

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ineffectiveness of Williams’ state post-conviction counsel; in all other respects,

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respondents’ motion to dismiss will be denied. This renders moot Williams’ motion for

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stay, as the Court finds that there are no viable claims yet to be exhausted in state court;

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the motion for stay will be denied on that ground.

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It is therefore ordered that respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) is granted

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in part and denied in part. Ground 1 is dismissed, as not cognizable in federal court, to

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the extent it is based on alleged ineffectiveness of Williams’ state post-conviction counsel.

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In all other respects the motion to dismiss is denied.

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It is further ordered that petitioner’s Motion Requesting Stay and Abeyance (ECF
No. 21) is denied, as moot.
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It is further ordered that respondents will have ninety (90) days from the entry of

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this order to file an answer, responding to the remaining claims in the habeas petition –

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Ground 1, to the extent based on alleged ineffective assistance of petitioner’s trial

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counsel, and Ground 2. Petitioner will, thereafter, have ninety (90) days to file a reply to

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respondents’ answer.

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DATED THIS 18th day of April 2017.

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MIRANDA M. DU
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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